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It is not easy being me 
There is something very hard about being so free 
I am speaking of my sexuality 
 
They call it "the life" 
I call it trife 
full of stress and strife 
 
I can't get married 
I mean that they just buried 
Even though my options are varied 
 
Because of my "status" I can't reproduce 
To this world, a child I shall never introduce 
Should I become a recluse? 
 
Don't feel sorry for me 
Just promise to be all you can be 
Gay, straight or "maybe" 
 
I still have hope 
I just have to cope 
Look at the broader scope 
 
Tis ain't easy being me 
Something ain't right with being this free 
 
Apparently 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Mountain Rise Cemetary in KwaZulu Natal where many people who died from AIDS are buried 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This picture is courtesy of Google Images: 
http://text.hmmm.co.za/images/john_robinson_aids1.jpg 
The above poem is courtsey of google poems: 
http://allpoetry.com/poem/4957057
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SUMMARY 
 
South Africa has not escaped the rising prevalence and severe impact of HIV/AIDS in 
relation women. From an economic and social vantage point, the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
hits women the hardest, with underprivileged black women the most susceptible to the 
virus. The theoretical framework of this research focuses on the intersection between 
HIV/AIDS, gender inequality and gender violence, and more specifically, on certain 
cultural practices and customs that contribute towards and exacerbate women’s 
subordination and inequality, which in turn, increase women’s exposure to become 
infected with HIV. Relevant to this focus is inevitably an investigation of perceived 
threats to specific fundamental human rights as a result of some entrenched practices 
that continue to reinforce women’s subordinate position in society, aggravated by the 
high incidence of gender violence.  
 
 
Key terms: HIV/AIDS; gender violence; intimate relationships; culture, equality; dignity; 
female genital mutilation; polygamy; patriarchy; virginity testing; dry sex. 
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 1 
“Law is not everything, but [it] is not nothing either. Perhaps the most important lesson is that the 
mountain can be moved… [and] women’s experiences can be written into the law, even though 
clearly tensions [will] remain.” (C MacKinnon Feminism unmodified: Discourses on life and law 
(1987, Harvard: Harvard University Press at 117)). 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 
TOPIC 
 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic has taken a predominantly grave toll on sub-Saharan-
Africa where AIDS is now the prime cause of death1 despite a range of 
prevention strategies. The pandemic has turned out to be an uncontrollable 
humanitarian and human security issue signifying one of the most startling 
challenges to human security and survival in many parts of the world.2 It has 
taken a particularly heavy toll on sub-Saharan Africa, where the virus not only 
has devastating effects on the individuals and families touched by HIV/AIDS, it 
is beginning to have much wider social, economical and political ramifications.3 
Everyday in South Africa, an estimated 1700 people are newly infected with 
HIV.4
 
 
Important for this study is the fact that the burden of HIV/AIDS does not fall 
evenly or equally.5
                                                 
1  Elbe S “International Security: HIV/AIDS and the changing landscape of war in Africa” 
(2002) 27 Fall 159-177 at 159. For a clinical explanation of what HIV and AIDS are, see 
paragraph 1.8.3 below. For statistics regarding the prevalence of HIV in certain sub-
Saharan countries, including South Africa, see Nienaber A G “The protection of participants 
in clinical research in Africa” (2008) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 138-162 at 
140-141. 
 The overwhelming of those currently living with HIV/AIDS are 
2  Elbe 159. 
3  Elbe 159. 
4  Karim A HIV/AIDS in South Africa (2005, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) at 2. 
Gilbert L & Walker L “Treading the path of least resistance: HIV/AIDS and social 
inequalities - A South African case study” (2002) 54 (7) Science Direct 1-17 at 2. 
 
 2 
young African women in developing countries.6 The epidemic continues to have 
a disproportionate impact on women with 46.3% of premature deaths in South 
Africa being attributed to HIV/AIDS in 2000.7 A 2004 cross-sectional study of 
women presenting for antenatal care in Soweto indicates that women with 
violent or controlling male partners are at an increased risk of HIV infection.8 
The results of the 17th national HIV and syphilis antenatal sero-prevalence 
survey9
 
 indicate an HIV prevalence rate of 28.0% among pregnant women in the 
age group fifteen to forty-nine years who attend antenatal clinics. Figures 
indicate that almost one in every three pregnant women in South Africa is HIV 
positive. When these figures are extrapolated to the general population, it is 
estimated that the total number of HIV-positive South Africans is 5.41 million, 
and that the national HIV prevalence rate among the almost 46 million South 
Africans is around 12%. 
Gender-based violence and gender inequality are repeatedly cited as key 
determinants of women’s risk to HIV, yet empirical research on the probable 
connections remains insufficient.10 Dunkle11
                                                 
6  Gilbert & Walker 2. 
 submits that research on the 
connection between social conservative constructions of masculinity; intimate 
partner violence; male dominance in relationships; behaviour that increases the 
risk of HIV-infection, as well as effective interventions is urgently needed in the 
South African context. Despite the fact that most women affected by HIV/AIDS 
live in sub-Saharan Africa, it is sad to note that almost all existing research on 
7  Hassim A et al (ed) Health and democracy (2007, Cape Town: Siberink) at 353. 
8  Dunkle D L “Gender based violence, relationship power, and risk of HIV infection in women 
attending antenatal clinics in South Africa” (2004) vol 363 (issue 9419) The Lancet at 1415. 
9  Bonthuys E & Albertyn C (ed ) Gender, law and justice (2007, Lansdowne: Juta) at 296. 
Bonthuys & Albertyn refer to statistics from the Department of Health. See Department of 
Health National HIV and syphillis antenatal sero-prevalence survey in South Africa 2005 
(2006). Edwin Cameron points out that reliable statistics on the prevalence of the pandemic 
in South Africa are not easy to find. See Cameron E “Legal and human rights responses to 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic” (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law Review 47-90 at 47 at footnote 1. See 
also the Department of Health at http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/antenatal-f.html for the results 
of the 17th national HIV and syphilis survey (visited 20 November 2008). 
10  Dunkle 1416. 
11  Dunkle 1416 
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violence and the vulnerability of women to HIV/AIDS comes from the United 
States of America.12
 
 
This study, as will be explained in more detail below, will attempt to show that 
gender-based violence and social inequality are key factors in the spreading of 
HIV/AIDS. The study will focus attention on social and cultural factors which 
increase women’s vulnerability and exposure to HIV/AIDS.  
 
1.2 HIV/AIDS DURING APARTHEID 
 
From a political perspective, the reaction of South Africa to the pandemic has 
been characterised by a form of refutation in the premier levels of political 
power.13 It is helpful to look at this matter within two governmental phases: the 
pre May 1994 period when the National Party (NP) was in power and the post 
May 1994 period when the African National Congress (ANC) government took 
over.14
  
 
It would be inappropriate to place all the ills of the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS 
among women at the door of apartheid but it is worthwhile to state that 
apartheid played a major part in the displacement of family units, thereby 
disrupting the stability of the family.15 The forced removals from land which had 
been occupied for ages through the so-called rural-urban drift and migrant 
labour, disrupted integrated families.16 Men who moved into the cities were 
housed in single-sex hostels which could not accommodate their spouses.17
                                                 
12  Dunkle 1416. 
 
13  Karim 35. 
14  Cameron at 48-56. Also see Frankowski S Legal responses to AIDS in comparative 
perspective (1998, The Hague: Kluwer Law International) at 125. Also see Cameron at 48-
56. 
15  Frankowski 126-127. 
16  Miller W B Health, Culture and community: Case study of public reactions to health 
programs (1955, New York: Russell Sage Foundation) at 18. See also Frankowski 126-
127. 
17  Frankowski 127. 
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These migrant workers turned to prostitutes for sexual solace.18 Some women 
escaped rural poverty to the city where they opted for prostitution.19 They 
exchanged sex for money which placed them at a high risk of contracting HIV.20 
What apartheid did, however, highlights the economic failure and breakdown of 
the black community thereby making HIV a receptive host on the 
underprivileged, “dysfunctional” black community.21
 
 
The National Party’s initial response to HIV during the years of apartheid was 
informed by racial discrimination and homophobia. There was no 
comprehensible and policy on HIV/AIDS.22 HIV/AIDS was alleged to be a 
predicament of homosexuals, as well as the black population, in particular the 
black immigrant workers.23 There was a belief that the AIDS peril could be 
“legislated away” if the infected could be recognised and “put away”.24 In this 
regard two tough public measures were passed.25 Firstly, the Minister of Health 
added the epidemic under the schedule “communicable diseases” and this 
regulation was passed pursuant to the (now repealed) Health Act.26
                                                 
18  Karim HIV/AIDS in South Africa at 54,161 and 310. In this regard, see also Frankowski 127. 
 The effect of 
19  Frankowski 127. 
20  Karim at 54. See also Frankowski 127. 
21  Frankowski 127. 
22  Frankowski 127. 
23  Frankowski 127. See also Gordon E & Golanty E Health and Wellness (2006: Jones & 
Bartlett) at 248.These authors emphasise that in the past people mistakenly believed that 
HIV/AIDS was a disease affiliated with homosexual men only. They argue that the reason 
why people must have been mistaken is because the first AIDS related cases of AIDS were 
among male homosexuals and a number of male homosexuals had died of the disease. 
Other misconceptions that existed relating to the HIV/AIDS epidemic is that in America, 
some African American pastors believed that HIV/AIDS was a disease which came about 
as a curse from God to homosexuals. With respect to this see Collins C F & Pinn V W 
African-American women’s health and social issues (2006, Boston: Greenwood Publishing 
Group) at 95. 
24  World Health Organisations & Mann J M Legislative responses to AIDS (1989, Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff) 136-143. Also see Frankowski 127. 
25  Frankowski 127. 
26  Communicable Diseases and the Notification of Notifiable Medical Conditions 1987, GN 
R2438, in Government Gazette 11014 of 30 October 1987, promulgated in terms of 
sections 32, 33 and 34 of the Health Act 63 of 1977. Annexure 1 of the above regulations 
lists twenty diseases as Communicable diseases. AIDS is listed as the first communicable 
diseases on this list. Communicable diseases are generally highly contagious diseases 
such as Ebola, typhoid and diphtheria (usually water or air borne) that justify measures 
such as isolation and quarantine. To include AIDS - a disease that is transmissible but not 
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the regulation was to bestow public health officials and authorities far-reaching 
powers over people suffering from the diseases and carriers of the disease.27 
The provision authorised officials to place persons suffering from AIDS or 
alleged to be suffering from AIDS under quarantine,28 to medically examine 
persons who are HIV-positive,29 as well as those who are alleged to have HIV,30 
and to order that a person suffering from HIV not be permitted to prepare or hold 
food or water which is to be drank or eaten by other persons.31
 
  
In 1972 the Home Affairs Minister issued regulations rendering persons 
suffering from HIV/AIDS “prohibited persons” in the Republic.32
                                                 
contagious - in this list was rightly criticised. The regulations provide that carriers of 
communicable diseases may not prepare food for other persons. Since HIV cannot be 
transmitted by way of food, this provision can justly be described as being inapplicable in 
the context of AIDS.  
 These harsh 
27  Frankowski 127. 
28  Regulation 2(1)(d) of the Regulations to the Communicable Diseases and the Notification of 
Notifiable Medical Conditions in Government Gazette 11014 of 30 October 1987 reads as 
follows: “A local authority may, when it comes to its notice that a communicable disease is 
present or has occurred in its district and if it is reasonably satisfied that the spread of such 
a disease constitutes or will constitute a real danger to health, by written order and subject 
to conditions contained in such order […] (d) place under quarantine in order to prevent the 
spread of such disease or in order to control or restrict such disease […] (i) any person or 
persons actually suffering or suspected to be suffering from such disease, in cases where 
such person or persons are not removed to a hospital or place or isolation.” 
29  Such a medical examination could include a HIV-test. 
30  Regulation 14(1) of the Regulations to the Communicable Diseases and the Notification of 
Notifiable Medical Conditions in Government Gazette 11014 of 30 October 1987 reads as 
follows: “Any person a medical officer of health suspects on reasonable grounds to be a 
carrier of a communicable disease and who as such constitutes a danger to the public 
health shall, if so instructed by the medical officer of health, subject himself to a medical 
examination at a time and place determined by the medical officer of health in order to 
establish whether such person is in fact a carrier as suspected.” 
31  Regulation 14(3)(a) of the Regulations to the Communicable Diseases and the Notification 
of Notifiable Medical Conditions in Government Gazette 11014 of 30 October 1987 reads 
as follows: “A medical officer of health may, when he is satisfied on medical scientific 
grounds that the danger exist of a carrier of a communicable disease to other people , order 
in writing that such carrier- 
(a) Go or be removed to a hospital, other place of isolation or area referred to in the order 
so as to remain there under medical supervision for a period determined in such order […].” 
32  Section 13(1)(h) of the Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act 59 of 1972 
reads as follows: “Any person referred to in this subsection who enters or has entered the 
Republic or who, though lawfully resident in one province, enters or has entered another 
province in which he is not lawfully resident, shall be a prohibited person in respect of the 
Republic or such other province (as the case may be), namely […] any person who is 
afflicted with leprosy or with any such infectious, contagious, loathsome or other disease 
 
 6 
measures were repealed when the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 came into 
force. These regulations, when in force, were fiercely criticised on the ground 
that they drastically infringed on individual freedoms.33 It should be emphasised 
that this happened at a time when the Bill of Rights did not yet exist. Important is 
the fact that the effect of these regulations exacerbated discrimination against 
AIDS suffers, thereby alienating them from efforts to control the epidemic.34 For 
these reasons the government’s HIV/AIDS advisors and the medical profession 
generally disapproved of these regulations and called for their repeal.35 South 
African lawyers who studied these regulations warned the government on the 
harsh impact that these coercive methods posed for the human rights of 
persons suffering from HIV/AIDS.36 HIV/AIDS patients suffered not only 
“physical debilitation and death” but also stern intolerance by the community, as 
well as rejection, discrimination and stigmatisation.37 Fortunately, as a result of 
increased opposition towards these measures, these regulations were removed 
by the National Party.38 Sadly, the fact that the previous government was a late 
convert to realising that non-coercive means would produce positive efforts in 
the control of the virus left the country without a clear strategy for controlling HIV 
for a long time.39
 
  
                                                 
(other than tuberculosis) as is defined by regulation; and any person who is afflicted with 
tuberculosis unless he is in possession of a permit to enter the Republic, issued upon such 
conditions as may be prescribed”. As mentioned above, GN R2439 in Government Gazette 
11014 of 10 October 1987 includes HIV/AIDS amongst other communicable diseases. 
33  Frankowski 129. 
34  Frankowski 129. For interest sake a few years after Columbus came back from his meeting 
with the New World there was an epidemic in Edinburgh, Scotland which speedily spread 
through Europe. Surprised with the spread of this epidemic the King of Scotland and his 
council declared that this contagious disease be named Grangor. The sufferers of this 
disease were alienated from the rest of the community and were left to die out of the town 
at an island named Frith. This is a typical example of stigmatisation against diseases 
sufferers. See Kirby M “AIDS and the law” (1993) 9 South African Journal on Human Rights 
1-21 at 1. 
35  Frankowski 129. 
36  Cameron E & Swasson “Public health and human rights - The AIDS crisis in South Africa” 
(1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 232-233. 
37  Cameron at 51. 
38  Frankowski 129. 
39  Frankowski 129. 
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In the 1980’s, the apartheid government assembled a National AIDS program 
and an AIDS Training and Information Centre (ATC).40 The ATC became 
involved in anti-HIV/AIDS strategies which indicated a move towards a non-
coercive strategy.41 Unfortunately it had a limited impact as it had no credibility 
among the African part of the population and that its activities were constrained 
due to limited funds.42 That the black community was not represented in these 
efforts is clear from the fact that the Health Minister produced posters on 
HIV/AIDS in English and Afrikaans only.43 Some of the images used to convey 
the AIDS message were designs of large condomised penises on posters and 
billboards. These further alienated the black community whose culture frowns 
upon such sexual imagery in public.44
 
  
After realising the ineffectiveness of the ATC, the government established the 
AIDS Unit which is said to have been more receptive towards the needs of the 
community.45 Much is owed to the role played by the National AIDS Convention 
of South Africa (NACOSA) which is an association of all state, private, non-
governmental sections and community based organisations.46 The convention 
was launched in 1992 with its key areas being education and prevention; 
counselling; care; welfare; research; human rights and legal reform.47 In 1994 
the National Party government allotted two hundred and fifty six million and 
seventy seven thousand rand on their budget for AIDS,48 unlike the previous 
apartheid government who had in the previous two years only spent twenty-one 
million rand.49
                                                 
40  Karim at 34-35 See also Frankowski 130. 
 NACOSA’s plans were, however, never extensively 
41  Frankowski 130. See also Karim at 35. 
42  Karim at 35. See also Frankowski 130. 
43  Frankowski 130. 
44  Frankowski 130. See also Karim at 35. 
45  Frankowski 130.  
46  Cameron E “Legal and human rights responses to the HIV/ AIDS epidemic” (2006) 17 
Stellenbosch Law Review 47-90 at 55. Also see Frankowski 130. 
47  Cameron at 55-56. See also Frankowski at 131. 
48  Setel P et al Histories of sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa 
(1999, Westport: Greenwood) at 236. 
49  Setel at 236. 
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implemented.50 NACOSA played an important role in addressing some of the 
serious issues of HIV/AIDS and human rights, which culminated in some of the 
recommendations of the South African Law Reform Commission between 1997 
and 2001.51
 
  
1.3 HIV/AIDS IN THE ERA OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 
 
The first anti-apartheid government headed by Nelson Mandela was agitated by 
major political and social change, reconciliation and state building which took 
preference over the need to accord AIDS the crucial priority.52 During the first 
years of the new democratic order, the virus was not given the strenuous 
responsiveness it ought to have been given. The period between 1993 and 
2000 thus saw a rapid increase in HIV/AIDS in South Africa.53
 
 
One of the statutes designed to address the HIV/AIDS problem is the new 
National Health Act (hereafter the National Health Act),54
                                                 
50  Cameron at 55-56. Cameron does not explicitly state the various reasons why NACOSA’s 
plans were never implemented. Ngwena, however, points out that the government was not 
able to fully fund NACOSA, and ended up focusing on short term plans aimed education, 
the prevention of the epidemic and a focus on the guidelines aimed at the care for persons 
infected. Ngwena also highlights the misuse of funds allotted to HIV/IDS projects by the 
government under the NACOSA plan. See Ngwena C “Legal responses to AIDS in South 
Africa” at 131-133, in: Frankowski S Legal responses to AIDS in comparative perspective 
(1998, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International). 
 which replaced the 
controversial Health Act 63 of 1977. The National Health Act now provides for a 
more uniform and egalitarian national health care system. As far as the issue of 
notifiable and communicable diseases are concerned, section 90(1) provides 
that the Minister, after consultation with the National Health Council, may make 
regulations regarding communicable diseases and notifiable medical conditions. 
Draft regulations to deal with communicable diseases were published for public 
51  Cameron at 55-56. 
52  Karim 35. 
53  See http://www.avert.org/aidssouthafrica.htm (visited 21 May 2008). 
54  61 of 2003. 
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comment by the Department of Health early in 2008. These Regulations 
regarding Communicable Disease55 provide inter alia for the notification of 
certain communicable diseases listed in Annexure 1, as well as the prevention 
and control of communicable diseases by health authorities. Measures include 
mandatory medical examination, isolation and quarantine of patients suffering 
from diseases listed in Annexure 1. Contrary to the 1987 regulations discussed 
above, neither HIV nor AIDS is listed in Annexure 1. HIV and AIDS are clearly 
no longer considered “communicable diseases” which need to be reported to 
health authorities.56
 
  
Tragically, the high rate of HIV/AIDS amongst women could have been lesser if 
the nation had also focused on the epidemic during those years. Now that 
almost everyone is aware of the epidemic which affects women more severely, 
the time has come that practices which increase women’s exposure and 
vulnerability to the disease be identified and critically addressed. It is important 
in this regard to briefly turn to the positive political and social changes attained 
during 1993 and 2000 in an attempt to address the problems that affect 
women’s exposure to HIV/AIDS.  
 
1.4 THE PATTERN OF HIV/AIDS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 The HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa is mainly regarded a heterosexual type 
of epidemic.57
                                                 
55  No R27 in Government Gazette of 25 January 2008.  
 An additional distinctive future of the pattern of the epidemic is the 
56  Tuberculosis (including MDR-TB and XDR-TB) remains a notifiable disease, with MDR-TB 
and XDR-TB having to be reported on an urgent basis. The draft regulations further provide 
that health care providers can apply for a high court order to have a person with MDR-TB or 
XDR-TB medically examined and isolated for a maximum period of six months, which 
period may be extended by a new court order. Certain conditions have to be met before 
mandatory action can be taken. They include that other measures which may prevent the 
spread of the disease must have been tried and that it must be the most justifiable course 
of action in relation to the risk of the disease being transmitted and to the stress the 
compulsory measure is likely to entail for the patient. 
57  Gilbert & Walker at 14. Also see Karim at 35. Also see Epprecht M Heterosexual Africa? 
The history of an idea from the age of exploration to the age of AIDS (2008, Ohio: Ohio 
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young age of onset infection of women.58 Young black women are particularly 
disproportionably affected by the disease.59 There is a strong link between 
factors such as low income, high unemployment, violence and poor education 
with HIV infection.60 In all of these correlations women emerge as those who are 
the worst affected.61
 
 There are of course a number of pre-disposing factors, 
besides violence and others mentioned above, that put women at increased risk 
of becoming infected with HIV. These include a range of biological, 
psychological, economical and cultural factors, which clearly show how complex 
the problem of women’s increased exposure to HIV is. It goes without saying 
that attention needs to be directed to the factors which are causing women to be 
more vulnerable to the disease. 
1.4.1 FACTORS AFFECTING THE PATTERN OF HIV/AIDS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
Gilbert and Walker62
 
 have identified a number of factors that affect the pattern of 
HIV/AIDS in South Africa. Some of these factors will be addressed in more 
detail in the chapters that follow. 
1.4.2 GENERAL FACTORS 
 
Some of the general factors that influence the pattern of HIV/AIDS in South 
Africa are the general low status of women in society and within relationships; 
women’s traditionally subordinate role in the family and limited personal 
resources in indigenous communities; general misinformation regarding and 
                                                 
University) at 111, for an extensive discussion on HIV/AIDS as a heterosexual type of 
epidemic. 
58  Gilbert & Walker 14.  
59  Gilbert & Walker 2. 
60  Beck E J et al The HIV Pandemic: Local and Global Implications (2008, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) at 50. Also see Gilbert & Walker 14. 
61  Gilbert & Walker 14. 
62  Gilbert & Walker 14. 
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ignorance regarding HIV/AIDS; disrupted family and communal life due in part to 
apartheid, migrant labour patterns and high levels of poverty; and finally, a 
settled transport infrastructure and high mobility of persons, allowing for the 
rapid movement of the virus into new communities. 
 
1.4.3 CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES 
 
Specific customary practices and habits facilitate the spreading of the virus in 
Sout Africa. These are, for example, resistance to the use of condoms as a 
result of specific sexual and cultural norms and values; social norms which allow 
or promote high numbers of sexual partners especially among men; the 
phenomenon of an extended family household structure; preference for a male 
child (son); the practices of polygamy; bride price; wife inheritance (levirate), 
and also the practice of silence and superstition.  
 
While the correlation between human rights and HIV/AIDS is so complex, it is 
apparent that the social and legal status of women in many societies points to 
the connectedness of HIV/AIDS and human rights.63 Some traditions, customs, 
practices and religions entrench the subordinate rank and exploitation of women 
in marriages and relationships, thereby increasing their vulnerability to HIV/AIDS 
infection.64 The protection of human rights is therefore of utmost importance in 
protecting women’s interests, avoiding becoming infected and also in 
eradicating all forms of discrimination and intolerance practiced against those 
living with HIV, their relatives and acquaintances. 65
 
  
1.5 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
                                                 
63  Gostin L O & Lazzarini Z Human rights and public health in the AIDS pandemic (1997, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press) at vii-viii. 
64  Gostin & Lazzarini vii-viii. 
65  Gostin & Lazzarini vii-viii. 
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Understanding gender violence in South Africa requires a generalised historical 
knowledge of women’s legal position in the South African society. Sexual 
relationships were historically characterised by strong imbalances.66 Women 
were traditionally regarded as powerless67 and wives were treated as minors in 
the sense that they had no proprietary capacity, nor could they contract and sue 
in court.68 In this regard, women were seen as “perpetual minors”.69 As recently 
as 1993, women had the equal status as guardians of their own children.70
 
  
A characteristic feature of the era preceding the enactment of the Constitution 
was that black women’s disadvantaged legal position was exacerbated by their 
race and gender. The coming into force of the Bill of Rights in South Africa had 
a significant impact on the legal position of women. Since this development all 
women have become entitled to receive proper appreciation as equal citizens.71 
Since the enactment of the Constitution, the law has played a significant role in 
addressing such prejudice, as the achievement of equality is one of the main 
objectives of the Constitution.72 Calls for progression and the endorsement of 
women’s status are being made and applied on a daily basis as evidenced by 
the work of a number of organisations, most notably Women for Peace, the 
African National Congress Women’s League Department, the Human Rights 
Institute of South Africa and the Centre for Gender Studies.73
 
  
There are several ways in which HIV/AIDS, violence and gender inequality may 
overlap in the context of women’s lives. Firstly, male violence may impede a 
                                                 
66  Bennett T W Customary Law in South Africa (2004, Lansdowne: Juta) at 249, 252 and 254. 
67  Castle J & Kiggundu E “Are rural women powerless when it comes to HIV & AIDS risk? 
Implications for adult education programmes in South Africa” (2007) 1 Perspectives in 
Education 45-58 at 46. 
68  Bennett at 252. 
69  Woolman S et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed (2007, Cape Town: Juta) at 37-
17. 
70  Woolman at 37-17. 
71  Meintjes S “The women’s struggle for equality during South Africa’s transition to 
democracy” (1996) 30 Transformation 47-64 at 47. 
72  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 1 (hereafter referred to as the 
Constitution). 
73  See http://www.distel.ca/womlist/countries/southafrica.html (visited 06 August 2008). 
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woman’s ability to protect herself from HIV. Sexual violence increases a 
woman’s risk through non-consensual sex, or by limiting her efforts or ability to 
convince her partner to wear a condom. Studies suggest that in some cultures, 
suggesting condom use is potentially more dangerous than even raising the 
issue of birth control, as condoms are widely associated with promiscuity, 
prostitution and disease in these cultures.74 A woman requesting her partner to 
use a condom may trigger a violent response. Hence, any HIV-prevention 
strategy that aims to get woman to “negotiate” condom use is doomed to fail, as 
it rests on the assumption of equity between the sexes that simply does not 
exist in both consensual and coercive relationships.75
 
  
In addition to the direct health harm posed by cultural practices that encourage 
concurrent sexual networks within a marriage (eg between multiple wives, the 
husband and other extra-marital sexual contacts of all the spouses permitted in 
terms of polygyny), the latter significantly amplifying the HIV transmission rate,76
                                                 
74  See Worth D “Sexual decision-making and AIDS: Why condom promotion among 
vulnerable women is likely to fail” (1989) 20(6) Studies in Family Planning 297-307. See 
also Naylor NM “‘Cry the beloved continent’: Exploring the impact of HIV/AIDS and violence 
on women’s reproductive and sexual rights in Southern Africa” in: Cook R J & Ngwena C 
(eds) Health and human rights (2007, Aldershot: Ashgate) 21-45 at 30. 
 
other seemingly less harmful practices, for example those of ‘dry sex’, female 
genital mutilation, the levirate, also increase women’s vulnerability to HIV, as the 
study will show. Against the background of patriarchy, harmful stereotyping 
(which equates a woman’s worth with her reproductive capacity), women’s 
subordinate role in certain communities, and the compounding factor of gender 
violence, it becomes clear how vulnerable women indeed are. Harmful and 
discriminatory cultural practices intersect with gender violence to increase 
women’s exposure to HIV/AIDS. Women’s vulnerable position often compels 
them to continue with unsafe or harmful practices, simply because the social, 
75  Naylor at 61. 
76  Kelly L M “Polygyny and HIV/AIDS: A health and human rights approach” in: Cook RC & 
Ngwena C Health and human rights 147-180 at 148. 
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economic and cultural costs of avoiding these risks may be too high.77
 
 Women 
lacking economic resources may often resort to prostitution or informal sexual 
relationships with several men in exchange for material goods or financial 
support. 
However, despite all the changes since the last fifteen years, women in South 
Africa are generally still disadvantaged as a result of inter alia cultural and 
religious practices which dictate among others that a woman should hold an 
inferior position in society.78 Some women, especially in rural areas, put up with 
the impact of most of the discriminatory cultural practices, especially within the 
context of the family or intimate relationships. In the present era of HIV/AIDS, 
the power imbalance between sexes in the cultural context carries a novel 
sense of urgency. Women have become especially susceptible to the disease 
as a result of their limited power in sexual encounters.79
 
 
The research question is therefore to examine the intersection between gender 
inequality and gender violence against the backdrop of HIV/AIDS, and more 
specifically, to critically assess those cultural practices and customs that 
contribute towards and exacerbate women’s subordination and inequality, which 
in the process increase women’s exposure to become infected with HIV. In 
order to illustrate this, the study will also closely examine the fundamental 
human rights relevant to this purpose. 
 
The impact of the Constitution on this topic is threefold. First, as the supreme 
law in South Africa, any legislation that is irreconcilable with the Constitution will 
be invalid;80
                                                 
77  Gruskin S “Negotiating the relationship of HIV/AIDS to reproductive health and reproductive 
rights” (1995) 44 American University Law Review 1191-1206 at 1194-5. 
 second, the Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the executive,  
78  Castle & Kiggundu at 47. 
79  Bonthuys & Albertyn at 375. 
80  Section 2 of the Constitution which reads as follows: “This Constitution is the supreme law 
of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by 
it must be fulfilled.” 
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legislative, judiciary and all organs of state;81
 
 and third, the Bill of Rights 
instructs the state to use the power that the Constitution provides for in ways 
that do not violate the fundamental rights.  
1.6 LIMITATIONS 
 
The topic of this dissertation invariably spans a wide range of legal issues 
relating to HIV/AIDS across a few legal disciplines, ranging from private law 
issues and customary law to public and procedural law matters. It would be 
impossible to traverse each of these issues in detail. The focus of this study is 
hence limited to the interplay between gender inequality, gender violence and 
HIV/AIDS in the present South African context. The focus will be on women 
specifically, as women have traditionally suffered the most in relation to gender 
inequality and violence. Relevant to this focus is inevitably an investigation of 
perceived threats to specific fundamental human rights as a result of some 
entrenched practices that continue to reinforce women’s subordinate position in 
society, aggravated by the high incidence of gender violence. The objectives of 
this research are hence inter alia to explore how some of these African customs 
and practices contribute to the women’s increased risk of becoming infected 
with HIV/AIDS, and also to deepen the understanding of the legal position and 
vulnerability of women with respect to their rights to equality, dignity, freedom of 
choice and freedom to be free from any form of violence. The nature of the 
                                                 
81  Section 39 of the Constitution states:  
“(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum - 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom;  
(b) must consider international law; and  
(c) may consider foreign law.  
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary 
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.  
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are 
recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that 
they are consistent with the Bill.” 
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issues selected for discussion inevitably points to matters related to the private 
(and personal) sphere. As the study will show, the family is seen as the unit of 
male dominance, the location of male violence and hence the main site of 
women’s oppression. States have traditionally viewed women’s concerns as 
“private” instead of “public” matters, hence the historical reluctance to intervene 
in matters such as domestic violence, etc. It is therefore submitted that in order 
to counter mainstream legal theory and jurisprudence that are mainly 
“masculinist”, this study will attempt to address the topic by emphasising the 
gendered context in which women infected and affected by HIV live and how 
this impacts on their vulnerability. The so-called “private” or “personal” domain 
which contextualises this research topic will need to be made public and 
political. 
 
1.7 GENDER INEQUALITY AND VIOLENCE THROUGH THE LENS 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 
 
The following rights are relevant in the context of women’s inequality and 
against the backdrop of HIV/AIDS and violence. Some of these rights will be 
explored in more detail in subsequent chapters of this study. In order to 
contextualise the topic, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the essence 
of some of the relevant rights.  
 
1.7.1 GENDER EQUALITY 
 
The right to equality is entrenched in section 9 of Constitution.82
                                                 
82  Section 9(1)- (5) of the Constitution reads as follows: 
 The South 
African Constitution accords high significance to the right to equality and 
“(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of 
the law.  
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote 
the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance 
persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.  
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condemns any laws and practices which support the subordination of 
disadvantaged groups and undermine their worth.83
 
 
Equality protects the equal worth of the holder of the right.84 It is argued that 
people have equal worth for the reason that all of them have human dignity and 
because they are bearers of equality.85 The right to equality sometimes require 
that particular persons be treated differently in a manner which may be 
justifiable.86
 
 
The social and reproductive equality of women will gain huge ground when all 
women are free to decide whether or not to have sex.87 While it is culturally 
correct to maintain some traditional values and customs that many African 
societies identify with, there are some customs that are retrogressive and have 
a definite impact on the fundamental rights of those women bound by these.88 
One such example is the customary principle of “cleansing”89 which forces a 
widow to have sex with a husband’s relative in order to exorcise the deceased 
spirit after his death and save the village. This practice persists, despite the 
ravaging impact of HIV and despite feminists speaking out against this custom.90
                                                 
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth.  
 
Another example that may increase a woman’s susceptibility to contract HIV is 
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or 
prohibit unfair discrimination.  
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is 
established that the discrimination is fair.” 
83  Woolman 37-12. 
84  Rautenbach IM & Malherbe EFJ Constitutional Law (4th ed) (2004, Durban: Lexis Nexis 
Butterworths) at 329-330. 
85  Rautenbach 329-330. 
86  Rautenbach 329-330. 
87  Woolman at 37-13. 
88  See http://www.sardc.net/editorial/sadctoday/v3-1-06-1999/v3-1-06-1999-11.htm (visited 14 
April 2008). 
89  Curry J (ed) The reference shelf: Women’s rights (2005, New York: H W Wilson) at 175. 
90  Curry 175. 
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the practice known as “dry sex” in South Africa.91 This practice supposedly 
increases sexual gratification for men during intercourse.92 The practice of dry 
sex also refers to the use of herbs to dry out the vagina.93 In South Africa, the 
practice is most prevalent in Kwazulu Natal, which incidentally has the highest 
rate of HIV.94
 
 
A cultural belief first seen in the Eastern Cape in 1947 when an epidemic of 
sexually transmitted diseases broke out after solders returned from World War 
II, has reared its ugly head.95 This practice entails the raping of virgin women 
and children in the belief that it would cure a sexually transmitted disease.96 
Today the same myth is presently evidenced in the belief that raping or having 
sexual intercourse with a virgin would cure HIV/AIDS.97
 
 Some believe that this 
myth is most effective when one rapes one’s own virgin girl child.  
These are only examples of some customs and beliefs that not only undermine 
women’s equality, human dignity, but also increase women’s exposure to 
HIV/AIDS. These harmful practices – which in some instances constitute gender 
violence – must be examined in the context of fundamental rights such as inter 
alia the right to freedom and security of the person and the right to equality 
which means “full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms”.98
 
  
In many rural households, the father as the head of the family has to leave the 
family home for the urban area where most of the financially viable activities 
                                                 
91  Slabbert M “Till death do us part” (2006) 47 (1) Codicillus 1-3 at 5. 
92  Slabbert at 5. 
93  Arrehag L et al The impact of HIV/AIDS on livelihoods, poverty and the economy of Malawi 
(Sida, Stockholm: 2006) 1-112 at 43. 
94  Baleta A “Concern voiced over “dry sex” practices in South Africa” Lancet vol 352 (issue 
9136) at 1292-1292 at 1292. 
95     See http://www.iol.co.za (visited 9 April 2008). 
96     See http://www.iol.co.za (visited 9 April 2008). 
97   George E et al Scared at school: sexual violence against girls in South African schools 
(2001: Human Rights Watch) at 25. See also Morisky D E Overcoming AIDS: lessons 
learned from Uganda (2006, Norfolk: Information Age) at 279. 
98  Section 9(2) of the Constitution. 
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take place. Drimie99 argues that rural communities carry the cost of their 
migrants contracting HIV/AIDS through the loss of income remitted by a worker 
who has fallen ill and through the cost of supporting such an ill worker who has 
come back home. The reality of this situation is that the rural wife has to carry 
the responsibility and burden to care for the husband by the disinvestment of 
her own assets. The disinvestment of the wife’s assets refers to situations 
where the money is not enough to care for the ill and the rural wife is forced to 
sell the small property in which she has invested over many years. Such 
property could either include livestock such as one of more goats, sheep, 
chicken or rabbits. Items typically sold usually comprise of livestock, radios and 
bicycles, the latter often the only form of savings that most underprivileged 
household possesses.100
 
 Often in these situations, the children are withdrawn 
from attending school. In most instances, it is the girl child who is withdrawn 
from attending school. This in itself is a clear indication of how HIV/AIDS is 
facilitating differentiation along gender lines.  
The customary law practice of primogeniture plays an important role when 
discussing the role of HIV/AIDS in gender-based violence and the right to 
equality. This practice, at the centre of the case of Mthembu v Letsela,101 which 
will be discussed in detail in a subsequent chapter, enables men (but not 
women) to be appointed as universal heirs of the deceased. The inheritance of 
the family property by the heirs comes with a responsibility to administer the 
property for the benefit of the widow and the deceased family members.102
                                                 
99  Drimie S “The impact of HIV/AIDS on rural households and land issues in Southern and 
Eastern Africa” A background paper prepared for the food and Agriculture Organisation, 
Sub-regional office for Southern and Eastern Africa (2002) 1-31 at 9.  
 
Bonthuys and Albertyn criticise the manner in which some handle the inherited 
property. Often the heir does not discharge his responsibility as heir and sadly 
100  Arrehag 61. 
101  Mthembu v Letsela 1997 2 (SA) 936 at 945.The principle of primogeniture is applicable to 
the customary rule of intestate succession. This principle enables the male heir to bear 
responsibility for the maintenance of the destitute female relatives. It if for this very reason 
that the court in Mthembu v Letsela held that this principle is unconstitutional.  
102  Mthembu v Letsela at 945. 
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enough at times the widow together with her children are evicted from their 
home on the basis that her marriage was not valid.103 It is submitted that having 
been left in such a situation encompassed by serious hardships and poverty, the 
widow becomes more exposed to the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS. 
Primogeniture, which in essence deprives women of the husband’s estate at the 
death of the husband, plays a significant role in contributing to the vulnerability 
of women to HIV/AIDS. The widow is left without anything to maintain herself; a 
factor which places her at a high risk of HIV-infection, as her socio-economic 
position may leave her no choice but to become involved in unprotected sexual 
relationships for money with men who are already HIV positive, or who again 
may refuse to wear a condom. In the case of Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha104
 
 
(discussed in detail later in the study) the principle of primogeniture was 
challenged on the basis that it discriminates unfairly on the grounds of gender, 
age and birth. The Constitutional court held that 
[w]here a rule of indigenous law deviates from the spirit, purport and object of 
the Bill of Rights, courts have an obligation to develop it so as to remove 
such.105
 
 
Drimie106
                                                 
103  Bonthuys & Albertyn 189-190. 
 argues that all factors which predispose people to HIV are poverty 
driven and that poverty relates to the spread of HIV in ways that are entrenched 
104  Bhe v Magistrate Khayelithsa 2004 (1) BCLR 27 (CC) at 48. The Constitutional courthad to 
decide on the constitutionality of the principle of primogeniture which underlies the 
indigenous law of succession. An African woman claimed ownership of a plot on behalf of 
herself and her two daughters after the death of her customary husband. The father of the 
husband claimed that he was the customary heir and also disputed the validity of her 
marriage. He also claimed custody over the children. The majority judgment declared this 
principle regulating intestate succession in indigenous law unconstitutional. Such a principle 
violates rights of equality and dignity. On the same grounds the majority judgment struck 
down the traditional rule of male primogeniture. The minority judgement found that that the 
rule of male primogeniture should be developed in line with the Constitution. 
105  Bhe v Magistrate Khayelithsa at 66. 
106  Drimie at 7. Refer also to Nienaber A G “The protection of participants in clinical research in 
Africa” at 142-143. Nienaber lists some of the factors that contribute to the already heavy 
burden of the disease. Among these factors are: low levels of education, high poverty, civil 
wars and a disintegrating infrastructure.  
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to structural poverty arising from gender imbalance, land ownership inequality, 
rural urban immigration and breakdown of traditional sexual mores. 
  
1.7.2 FREEDOM AND SECURITY OF THE PERSON  
 
Section 12 of the Constitution provides for the right to freedom and security of 
the person.107 This right protects the physical and psychological integrity of 
human beings.108 Various expressions are used to describe the protected 
conduct and interests under section 12, such as, for example, the right “to make 
decisions concerning reproduction”, “security in and control over their bodies”, 
and “to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private 
sources”.109 These expressions are designed to protect aspects of bodily and 
psychological integrity.110
 
  
Currie and De Waal111 submit that the inclusion of this right is an 
acknowledgment that the power to make choices about reproduction is a vital 
feature of control over one’s body. The fundamental nature of the right is to be 
left alone in matters concerning one’s body.112 In other words, the right 
generates a sphere of individual inviolability.113
 
  
                                                 
107  Section 12 of the Constitution reads as follows:  
(1) “Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right –  
(a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause;  
(b) not to be detained without trial;  
(c) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources;  
(d) not to be tortured in any way; and  
(e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.  
(2) Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right 
(a) to make decisions concerning reproduction;  
(b) to security in and control over their body; and  
(c) not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their informed consent.”  
108  Woolman 37-15. 
109  Rautenbach & Malherbe 334-335. 
110  Rautenbach & Malherbe 335. 
111  Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of rights handbook (2005, Lansdowne: Juta) at 308. 
112  Currie & De Waal 308. 
113  Currie & De Waal 308. 
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“Security in” and “control over” ones body are not synonymous in the sense that 
the former refers to the protection of bodily integrity against interruption by the 
state and others.114 The latter refers to the so called bodily autonomy or self 
determination against interference.115 Bonthuys and Albertyn116
 
 argue that 
HIV/AIDS is one pertinent issue that relates to women’s rights to freedom and 
security of the person, as will become clear from this study. 
It is further argued that section 12(2)(b) must be read with section 12(1)(c) 
which includes the right to be free from violence.117 It is apparent that bodily 
security is jeopardised by violence. In a subsequent chapter, this study will inter 
alia show how the customary law principle of patriarchy undermines a woman’s 
right to freedom and security of the person. Bhasin118
 
 uses a vast range of 
examples to illustrate what patriarchy is and how it manifests itself. The 
following two examples illustrate how patriarchy may find expression in the 
private lives of some women: 
I have to submit my body to my husband whenever he wants it. I have no say. I 
fear sex. Don’t enjoy it.119
 
 
This power pattern reinforces the notion that women are powerless beings who 
are expected to accede to the sexual demands of men. Any request by a 
woman to practice safe sex or to negotiate sexual matters with her husband or 
partner is often perceived as a challenge to his authority. Another hypothetical 
example is the following: 
 
I wanted my husband to use family planning methods but he refused. He also 
did not give me permission to get operated myself. 
 
                                                 
114  Currie & De Waal 308. 
115  Currie & De Waal 308. 
116  Bonthuys & Albertyn 296. 
117  Bonthuys & Albertyn 309. 
118  Bhasin K What is patriarchy? (1994, New Delhi: Vision Wordtronic) at 3-5. 
119  Bhasin at 4. 
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This example illustrates how the male partner’s or husband’s authority over the 
woman’s reproductive rights may prevent her from negotiating the use of 
condoms or other family planning methods. It is disturbing to find that whenever 
women speak out about the use of condoms and the violation of their rights, 
they are told that they are becoming “western” or promiscuous. The request for 
the use of a condom or contraceptives alone often triggers a violent response 
from male partners.120
 
 
The examples clearly show that in customary marriages characterised by 
patriarchy, the husband has absolute and undefined marital power over the wife. 
Castle and Kiggundu121 correctly observe that the issue of marital power has an 
impact on those marginalised by society, specifically black women living in rural 
areas. They further emphasise that sex is about power, it is also about who 
initiates it, who makes decisions about it and who wears a condom.122 Women’s 
inferior status in patriarchal societies (such as those in Louis Trichardt and 
Thohoyandou) and these women’s economic dependence on men greatly 
increase their vulnerability to sexual transmitted diseases.123 This so-called 
“gender contract” is hence a major obstacle in the way for women to protect 
themselves from HIV/AIDS.124 This position will be explored in more detail later, 
as well as the manner in which some customary practices curtail the right to 
freedom and security.
 
  
1.7.3 HUMAN DIGNITY 
 
                                                 
120  See discussion under paragraph 2 above. 
121  Castle & Kiggundu at 45. 
122  Castle & Kiggundu 46-49. 
123  Castle & Kiggundu 46-49. 
124  Castle & Kiggundu 46-48. These authors do not define “gender contract” but this term 
clearly refers to the entrenched position of women’s subordination in the labour market and 
their principle responsibility in respect of reproduction and care. The concept implies an 
invisible contract among women as a group and patriarchal structures. See also Roy K C et 
al Economic development and women in the world community (1996, USA: Greenwood 
Publishing Group) at 141. 
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The value of human dignity is protected and endorsed by the recognition of the 
right to dignity in the Bill of Rights.125 Human dignity is considered to be what 
gives a person his or her intrinsic worth.126 Dignity is the basis of a person’s 
innate rights to freedom and to physical integrity, from which a number of other 
rights stem.127 The Constitutional court in S v Makwanyane128
 
 observed that the 
reverence for dignity for all humans is of utmost importance in South Africa. The 
court further noted that apartheid was a denial of common humanity in the 
sense that black people were refused respect and dignity, but that 
The new Constitution rejects this past and affirms the equal worth of all South 
Africans .Thus recognition and protection of human dignity is the touchstone of 
the new political order and is fundamental to the new constitution.129
 
 
Human dignity accordingly also provides the basis for the right to equality –
inasmuch as all human beings possess human dignity in equal measure, 
everyone must be treated as equally worth of respect.130 Respect for human 
dignity entails recognising that all persons are able to make individual 
choices.131 The right to human dignity is linked to the right to personal freedom 
and physical integrity.132
 
  
Van Heerden J, in Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs,133
                                                 
125  Section 10 of the Constitution reads as follows:  
 held that the right to 
human dignity must be interpreted to afford protection to the institutions of 
marriage and family life. The control of women’s reproductive rights by their 
husbands or partners will be examined in more detail in the study below. It will 
“Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.”  
126  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at 777. 
127  Currie & De Waal 273. 
128  S v Makwanyane and Another at 778. 
129  S v Makwanyane 778. 
130  Currie & De Waal 273. 
131  Currie & De Waal 274. 
132  Currie I & De Waal 273. 
133  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs at 859-862. 
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be argued that such control constitutes an unjustifiable violation of a woman’s 
constitutional right to dignity.134
 
 
 
 
1.7.4 PRIVACY 
 
The Constitution protects the right to privacy in section 14.135 Privacy is an 
individual state of life with the nature of seclusion from the public and 
publicity.136 This entails an absence of acquaintance in an individual’s personal 
affairs.137 Thus privacy can only be infringed by unlawful acquaintance by 
outsiders with the individual’s personal life.138 Ackerman J in the Bernstein 
case139
 
 states that privacy is a truly a personal realm save for where a person 
moves into joint relations and activities such as business and social interaction. 
In such cases the scope of personal liberty shrinks for that reason. 
The scope of a person’s constitutional right to privacy extends to aspects such 
as a legimate expectation of privacy, the right to be left alone, the right to 
development of the individual personality, informational privacy and searches 
                                                 
134  The right to dignity is also acknowledged as an independent personality right within the 
common law concept of dignitas. This independent personality right within the concept of 
dignitas entails a person’s subjective feelings of dignity or self-respect. Violation of a 
person’s dignity in common law constitutes insulting that person. There exist a number of 
ways in which this may take place. However, for conduct in terms of the common law to be 
classified as a violation of dignity, the behaviour must both infringe the subjective feelings 
of dignity (thus factual infringement of a legal object), as well as be contra bonos mores. 
See Neethling et al Law of delict (5th ed) (2006), Durban: Lexis Nexis Butterworths) at 321. 
135  Section 14 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
“Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have -  
(a) their person or home searched;  
(b) their property searched;  
(c) their possessions seized; or  
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” 
136  Neethling 323. 
137  Neethling 323. 
138  Neethling 323. 
139  Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at 788. 
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and seizures.140 The right to be left alone encompasses decisions relating to an 
individual’s body, home and family life. The rationale behind this right is that 
other people should have nothing to do with an individual’s intimate affairs.141 It 
is submitted that the right to privacy recognises that every individual is entitled 
to a sphere of personal autonomy in which the law may not interfere.142 The 
sphere of autonomy does not only refer to control over physical aspects such as 
the human body or the home or private property, but also to certain kinds of 
decisions such as whether or not to have a sexual relationship with someone.143
 
  
The right to privacy also finds protection in the law of delict.144 This cause of 
action has been recognised since the classical Roman period and it protects a 
number of personality rights under the Latin terms corpus, fama and dignitas 
which can loosely be translated as a person’s physical and mental integrity, 
good name and dignity.145
 
 
The Constitution did not abolish the common law recognition of dignity. The 
courts will hold on to the existing common law actions which are in accordance 
with the values of the Constitution.146 In the Constitutional case of NM and 
Others v Smith and Others,147 the appellants complained that the High Court 
had failed to protect their rights to privacy, dignity and psychological integrity. 
The Constitutional court looked at whether the common law right of privacy 
should be developed so as to impose liability on those who negligently publish 
confidential information. 148
                                                 
140  De Waal at 317-328. 
  
141  Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of rights handbook (2001, Lansdowne: Juta) 1-825 at 271. 
142  De Waal 271. 
143  De Waal 271. 
144  NM and Others v Smith and Others (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 
2007 (7) BCLR 751 (CC) at 787. 
145  NM and Others v Smith and Others at 787. 
146  Woolman 38-2. 
147  NM and Others v Smith and Others at 759. 
148  NM and Others v Smith and Others at 764-765, and 772-775. The breach of a person’s 
privacy at common law constitutes an iniuria and the action for the invasion of privacy is 
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1.7.5 EDUCATION 
 
Women’s rights activists argue that by being getting marred at a young age, 
young women are doomed to become the “property” of men who are physically 
and psychologically dominant within the marriage.149 Young girls are commonly 
thought to be more “valuable” because they are sexually inexperienced or 
virgins and they are more complacent and malleable in personality and likely to 
obey orders.150 It is submitted that because the bodies of these young girls are 
physiologically underdeveloped, they are more easily injured through sexual 
intercourse and are thus extremely vulnerable to diseases such as HIV.151 This 
is due to the young girl’s unripe cervix and the low vaginal mucus production.152
 
  
There appears a widespread belief in Africa that young girls are less likely than 
adult women to be infected with HIV/AIDS and they are thus considered to be 
safer sexual partners.153
 
 Beliefs like these add to the phenomenon of men 
selecting brides significantly younger than ten and eleven years old. A following 
chapter in this study will examine the various reasons why men prefer to marry 
young girls. Early marriage exposes young women to many risk’s, which may 
include high blood pressure, anaemia, haemorrhage and a significantly greater 
risk of contracting sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV. Sadly, being 
labelled a virgin may also increase the young girl’s vulnerability to sexual 
assault or rape. 
                                                 
based on the actio iniuriarum. An unlawful intrusion of someone’s privacy is judged in the 
light of the general test of the boni mores.  
149  Packer C Using human rights to change tradition (2002, Antwerp: Intersentia) at 25. 
150  Packer 25. 
151  Packer 27. 
152  Packer 27.  
153  Leclerc-Madlala S “Protecting girlhood? Virginity revivals in the era of AIDS” (2003) 56 
Agenda 16 a t 17-18. 
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To exacerbate this situation the young bride is expected to take on her new 
duties as wife following the marriage immediately.154
 
 Her schooling thus comes 
to an abrupt end. In such circumstances schooling is considered unnecessary 
for fulfilling her new duties as homemaker. The widespread practice of early 
marriage means that young girls have to stop their education at a young age, 
despite their wishes to continue with an education. This study will argue that 
such a practice obstructs the girl child’s right to education. Education is 
imperative for the incorporation of important facts; the advance of independent 
consideration; and the formulation of opinion. The infringement of the right to 
education is closely related to other violations of rights, as will be shown. 
The South African educational system makes HIV and AIDS a priority. This 
implies that if young girls drop out of school as a result of early marriage, they 
will miss out on the crucial HIV/AIDS education that could literally save their 
lives. Gunderson155 argues that explicit AIDS education should be pursued with 
vigour, even if some find it unpleasant and an invasion of their privacy. 
Educating people on how to avoid contracting any infectious disease is a typical 
public health strategy.156
 
 With AIDS it seems appropriate to teach people about 
the disease, since transmission may involve particular activities which 
individuals can choose to avoid. From the point of view of uninfected persons 
who are concerned to avoiding contracting HIV/AIDS, the message of AIDS 
education is essential. Making information obtainable about who is at risk, the 
activities through which HIV is transmitted, and how these activities can be 
made safer will both benefit those individuals willing to avoid exposure as well 
as support the precautionary public health goal. 
The above outline of some of the rights that are affected by specific practices 
that characterise the private lives of women will be examined in more detail in 
                                                 
154  Packer 77. 
155  Gunderson M et al AIDS: Testing and privacy (1989, Utah: University of Utah Press Salt 
Lake City) 1-241 at 97. 
156  Gunderson 98. 
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the chapters that follow. One such right not referred to above, is the right to 
have access to health care services, which is entrenched in section 29(1)(a) of 
the Bill of Rights. This right will, however, be specifically addressed in relation to 
some of the rights briefly referred to in this chapter. 
 
1.8 CONCEPTS 
 
The brief description below of some of the main concepts which appear 
throughout the study will assist in contextualising the issues that will be explored 
in more detail below.  
 
1.8.1 GENDER VIOLENCE  
 
Gender violence is a very broad concept, that may take many different forms, 
such as, for example, the rape of a virgin woman or child in the belief that it 
would cure HIV/AIDS; the rape of a woman in a train; the sexual oppression of a 
girl student by staff members; or a wife being treated with hostility with the 
justification that a bride price was paid for her. The contexts in which the 
violence may occur, may differ, for example in respect of the impairment 
caused; the relationship between victim and assailant; as well as ways of legally 
dealing with the situation. However, what all these results have in common is 
the observable fact of gender.  
 
The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVW)157
                                                 
157  The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVW), 
proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 48/104 of 20 December 1993. 
 
exclusively and explicitly addresses the issue of violence against women. It 
affirms that the phenomenon violates, impairs or nullifies women’s human rights 
and their exercise of fundamental freedoms. The definition is amplified in article 
2 of the Declaration which identifies three areas in which violence among 
women commonly takes place: 
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• Physical, sexual and psychological violence that occurs in the family, 
including battering; sexual abuse of female children in the household; 
dowry-related violence; marital rape; female genital mutilation and other 
traditional practices harmful to women; non-spousal violence; and 
violence related to exploitation;  
• Physical, sexual and psychological violence that occurs within the 
general community, including rape; sexual abuse; sexual harassment 
and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere; 
trafficking in women; and forced prostitution;  
• Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by 
the State, wherever it occurs.158
Gender based violence has also been defined by the United Nations in the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) in similar terms.
 
159
Implicit in the above definition and important for the present study is the 
realisation that gender violence affecting women could be of a physical, sexual 
or psychological nature; and that gender violence includes violence occurring in 
the family, as well as dowry related violence and violence emanating from 
traditional practices.  
 
                                                 
158  DEVW of 20 December 1993, article 2. 
159  Convention on The Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 
December 1979 defines gender based violence as “any act [...] that results in, or is likely to 
result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of 
such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivations of liberty, whether occurring in private or public 
life […]. [V]iolence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, 
physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, the community, 
including battery, sexual abuse of female children, dowry-related violence, marital rape, 
female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal 
violence, violence related to exploitation, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in 
educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women, forced prostitution, and 
violence against women perpetrated and condoned by the state.”  
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1.8.2 THE PRACTICE OF DRY SEX 
The practice of dry sex is defined as the sexual practice of reducing vaginal 
secretions by using traditional medicine, by wiping out the vagina, prior to and 
during sexual intercourse for the purpose of making the woman’s vagina dry and 
tight.160 Dry sex preparation also entails the inserting of toothpaste, antiseptics 
or soap into the vagina for purposes of drying it out. Sub-Saharan women attain 
this dryness in various ways. Herbs from the Mugugudhu tree are wrapped in a 
nylon stocking and inserted into the vagina for ten to fifteen minutes in a 
procedure that is regarded as very painful. Mutendo wegudo (dry soil where a 
baboon has urinated) is a traditional Zimbabwean recipe to dry out the vagina. 
Shredded newspapers, cotton, salt and detergents are also used.161
Women engage in such a practice for many reasons. The practice is said to 
generate extra sensation for the man during intercourse but may be very painful 
for the woman. Wives often express the need to practice dry sex in order to 
keep their husbands and prevent them from finding sexual satisfaction 
elsewhere.
 
162
The practice is common in sub-Saharan Africa. Dry sex poses serious problems 
as it increases the chances of transmitting sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) 
including AIDS, due to vaginal tearing.
 
163 The practice is generally incompatible 
with the use of condoms which require lubrication to avoid breakage.164 It may 
also result in vaginal inflammation and/or traumatic lesions which in turn may 
increase the transmission of STDs and HIV in other ways.165
                                                 
160  Civic D & Wilson D “Dry sex in Zimbabwe and implications for condom use” 1996 42 (1) 
Social Science and Medicine Journal 91-98 at 93. 
 The practice 
facilitates transmission of HIV/AIDS in three ways: the lack of lubricant results in 
161  See http://www.rho.org/html/hthps_overview.htm#drysex (visited 13 August 2008). 
162  See http://www.rho.org/html/hthps_overview.htm#drysex (visited 13 August 2008). 
163  Gruenbaum E The female circumcision controversy: An anthropological perspective (2001, 
Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press) at 154. 
164  Josefina J et al The complete HIV/AIDS teaching kit (2007, New York: Springer) at313. 
165  Josefina at 313. 
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lacerations in the delicate membrane tissue, making it easier for the lethal virus 
to enter; in addition, the natural antiseptic lactobacilli that vaginal moisture 
contains are not available to combat sexually transmitted diseases and finally, 
condoms break far more easily due to the increased friction.166
1.8.3 HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS (HIV) AND THE 
ACQUIRED IMMUNO DEFICIENCY SYNDROME (AIDS) 
 
 
Medical opinion in the case of Hoffmann v South African Airways167 describes 
HIV/AIDS as a progressive disease of the immune system. The disease is 
caused by the human immunodeficiency virus, or HIV.168 HIV is a human 
retrovirus that affects vital white blood cells called CD4+ lymphocytes.169 The 
disease is characterised by decreasing immunocompetence over time.170
 
 
HIV/AIDS is an infectious disease which involves intimate contact for 
transmission.171 The predominant means of transmission is by far via sexual 
contact.172 The virus is also passed from one person to another through 
transmissions from medical-work related injuries or from needle stick or sharp 
instruments.173
                                                 
166  Hyena H “‘Dry sex’ worsens AIDS numbers in southern Africa” (1999), accessed at 
http://www.salon.com/health/sex/urge/world/1999/12/10/drysex/index.html (visited 20 
January 2009). See also Walker L et al Waiting to happen: HIV/AIDS in South Africa: The 
bigger picture (2004, Cape Town: Juta) at 48, and Page J et al Working with HIV/AIDS 
(2006, Cape Town: Juta) at 32. 
 Transmission also occurs through needle sharing by intravenous 
drug users; infected pregnant woman can pass the disease during pregnancy, 
delivery or breastfeeding. The virus can also be transmitted through the 
167  Hoffmann v South African Airways 2000 (11) BCLR 1211 (CC) at 1216. 
168  Supra. 
169  Supra. A CD4+ count is a blood test to determine how well the immune system is working 
in people who have been diagnosed with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). CD4+ cells 
are a type of white blood cell. White blood cells are important in fighting infections. CD4+ 
cells are also called T-lymphocytes, T-cells, or T-helper cells. See 
http://www.webmd.com/hiv-aids/cd4-count (visited 23 August 2008). 
170  Hoffmann v South African Airways at 1217. 
171  Supra. 
172  Supra. 
173  Supra. 
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transfusion of blood products.174 The progression of an untreated HIV infection is 
characterised by four stages, as is set out in the Hoffmann case.175
 
 
1.9 FRAMEWORK OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
The study consists of five chapters, structured as follows:  
 
In this chapter (chapter one), a general introduction to the study is presented. 
Inclusive to this is the contextual background to the research problem, the 
problem statement and limitations, as well as an overview of relevant 
constitutional rights implied by the topic. 
  
Chapter two will investigate how indigenous African culture has influenced the 
family structure, sexual relations, and particularly the social position of women in 
South Africa before and after the Constitution was enacted. In addition, chapter 
two will examine specific customary law principles and practices with the 
                                                 
174  Supra. 
175  Supra at 1216. See also Nienaber who discusses the clinical aspects of the progression of 
the HIV. Nienaber A G Ethics and human rights in HIV-related clinical trials in Africa with 
specific reference to informed consent in preventative HIV vaccine efficacy trials in South 
Africa (unpublished LLD thesis, UP, 2007) at 27-31. The four stages of the progression of 
HIV infection are the acute stage; the asymptomatic immunocompetent stage; the 
asymptomatic immunosuppressed stage and the acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
stage respectively. The acute stage is the stage directly after infection. During this stage 
the infected has flu-like symptoms for weeks. It is during this stage that the immune system 
is depressed. This acute stage is temporary and once the individually recovers clinically the 
immune systems becomes normal. The acute stage also encompasses the so-called 
window period were an infected person may test negative yet in actual fact he is already 
infected by the virus. During the asymptomatic immunocompetent stage the infected 
person’s body functions normally. The infection at this stage is clinically silent. The immune 
system at this stage is not yet affected. The third stage is marked by the drop in the CD4+ 
count to below 500 cells per micro litre of blood. HIV destroys the CD4+ such that when the 
number of cells reaches a certain level the body’s immune system becomes weak. When 
the CD4+ becomes less than 300 cells per micro litre of blood the infected person becomes 
vulnerable to secondary infections and thus needs to take prophylactic antibiotics and anti-
microbials. Despite the fact that the individual’s immune system is significantly depressed 
the individual may be unaware of the progression of the disease in his body. The final stage 
is the end stage of the gradual deterioration of the immune system. The patient at this 
stage has full-blown or clinical AIDS. The individual becomes prone to opportunistic 
infections. These opportunistic infections may prove fatal as a result of the resilient body 
which can not fight against them.  
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objective of determining whether such customary principles are constitutionally 
objectionable.  
 
Chapter three provides a detailed analysis of the relevant constitutional rights 
applicable to this study. This chapter is divided into two parts. Part one will 
examine what the assertion of the right to equality entails with particular 
reference to gender equality. The Constitutional court’s approach in the Harksen 
case to determine whether unfair discrimination exists will be discussed in 
detail. Part two of chapter three will turn to the rights of dignity, freedom and 
security of the person, the right to access to health care services, as well as the 
right to education.  
 
Chapter four will discuss the general limitation clause contained in section 36 of 
the Constitution. This chapter will examine one of the customary practices that 
is referred to in this study, namely female genital mutilation, more closely, by 
testing this practice against the equality clause and the limitation clause with the 
purpose of enquiring whether such customary practice violates the right to 
equality. The ultimate aim of this chapter is to illustrate how some of these 
customs and practices not only undermines women’s equality and freedom and 
security of the person, but also how these practices interact with gender 
violence by amplifying the risk of some women to contract HIV. Chapter four will 
also include a brief overview of some of the international human rights relevant 
to this study.  
 
Chapter five provides a summary of the study and recommendations. 
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“The memory of their screams calling for mercy, gasping for breath, pleading that those parts of their 
bodies that it pleads [sic] God to give them be spared… ‘Why Mum? Why did you let them do this to me?’ 
Those words continue to haunt me. My blood runs cold whenever the memory comes back. It’s now four 
years and my children still suffer [its] effect.” (Peters J S & Wolper A Women’s rights, human rights: 
International feminist perspectives 1995: New York: Routledge) at 224. 
 
CHAPTER 2 
CULTURAL PRACTICES THAT MAKE WOMEN VULNERABLE 
TO HIV/AIDS  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The word culture can integrate numerous elements such as a historical record, food, 
gestures, clothing, eye contact, common traits, language, race, hunting practices, 
farming and cultivation, work of art and music, to mention but a few.1 If all these 
elements that integrate the word culture are combined, culture may be defined as that 
what people believe, what they do and what they feel.2 Within this definition it is also 
likely to include insight based on human psychology, sociology or anthropology.3 An 
extensive interpretation of culture hence embraces an array of original activity linked 
with the arts and sciences, in cooperation with sporting activity and the typical and 
precise characteristics and the ways of thoughts and systematising the lives of every 
individual and every community.4
 
 
Bennett’s5
                                                 
1  Peterson B Cultural intelligence: A guide to working with people from other cultures (2004, Boston: 
Intercultural Press) at 17 and 20.  
 analysis of culture refers to people’s entire store of information and artefacts, 
particularly the languages, structure of belief, and set of laws, that give collective groups 
their distinctive character. Traditional practices have significance and execute a purpose 
2  Peterson 17. 
3  Peterson 17. 
4  Grant E “Human Rights, Cultural Diversity and Customary Law in South Africa” (2006) 50(1) Journal 
of African Law 2–23 at 5. 
5  Bennett T W Human rights and African customary law under the South African Constitution (1995, 
Cape Town: Juta) 23. 
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for those who practice them.6 Although traditional practices may have a positive impact 
on reproductive health, they may, however, also be harmful.7 Western medicine is 
becoming increasingly familiar with the advantages of some traditional health practices.8 
Positive traditional health practices are referred to as “indigenous knowledge”.9
Addressing harmful traditional practices is a complex exercise. Advice and caution 
against harmful health customs can lead to life-long detestations between the advisor 
and the group practising the harmful custom.
  
 
10 Worldwide health professionals, human 
rights activists and non-governmental organisations struggle with the issue on how to 
deal with harmful traditional practices. In this regard, human rights activists have 
decided that the best strategy in approaching changing culture is to withdraw from direct 
condemnation which can be counterproductive when they are looked upon as 
imperialist and impertinent.11 They should instead be engaged with and communicate 
with representatives of the societies in which the risky practices subsist.12 It is 
fundamental that they have to show respect of the cultures concerned and centre their 
efforts for transformation on the inner agents of change.13
 
 
A harmful traditional practice may be so deeply rooted such that such practice can only 
be changed when the people who practice it understand the danger, risk and indignity of 
                                                 
6  Grant 22. 
7  Brems E Human Rights: Universality and diversity (2001, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) at 
512. 
8  Conrad P & Gallagher E B Health and health care in developing countries: Sociological perspectives 
(1993, Philadelphia: Temple University Press) at 126-127.  
9  Von Lewinski S et al Indigenous heritage and intellectual property: Genetic resources, traditional 
knowledge, and folklore (2003, The Hague: Kluwer Law International) 129-131. Examples of 
“indigenous knowledge” are for example, long periods of breast feeding practiced in many parts of 
Africa and postpartum practices founded on divine structure, including rest, hygiene, love and good 
nutrition. See Romm A J Natural health after birth: The complete guide to postpartum wellness 
(2002, Rochester: Inner Traditions / Bear & Company) at 51-60. 
10  LeBaron M & Pillay V Conflict across cultures: A unique experience of bridging differences (2006, 
Boston: Intercultural Press) at 15-18. 
11  Brems at 512-513. 
12  Brems 513. 
13  Brems 513. 
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such harmful practice.14 Notwithstanding this, a number of countries have managed to 
uproot some deeply entrenched and harmful health practices in spite of many obstacles. 
A good example is the Chinese practice of foot binding which was for some time 
practiced in many parts of China.15 This practice was abolished within one generation.16
 
  
Closer to home, the Constitutional court held the customary law principle of 
primogeniture to be unconstitutional.17 Section 23 of the Black Administration Act was 
described as a discriminatory provision and irreconcilable with the Constitution for the 
reason that it blatantly hindered females (above male relatives) from becoming heirs.18
 
 
Curran and Bonthuys19 argue that there are many cultural practices that enhance 
women’s vulnerability to HIV which have not yet effectively been studied. For this 
reason, a comprehensive understanding of some of these cultural practices is 
necessary in deciding on approaches to address the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in South 
Africa and Africa generally.20
 
 However, in order to contextualise these practices in the 
framework of a Western, liberal model, the right to culture must be examined more 
closely first.  
                                                 
14  Heyns H & Viljoen F The impact of the United Nations human rights treaties on the domestic level 
(2002, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff) at 537. 
15  Marshall K & Keough L Mind, heart, and soul in the fight against poverty (2004, Washington DC: 
World Bank Publications) 160. 
16  Marshall & Keough 160. 
17  Bhe and Others v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission and 
Another v President of the RSA and Another 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
18  Deveaux M Gender and justice in multicultural liberal states (2006, Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
at 199-201. In this regard also see Bregmans Attorney’s Estate Articles at 
http://www.roylaw.co.za/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.article&pageID=8922777&ArticleID=8843366 
(visited 12 September 2008) for the full article. 
19  Curran E & Bonthuys E “Customary law and domestic violence in rural South African communities” 
(2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 607-635 at 608-609. 
20  Curran & Bonthuys at 608-609. 
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2.2 THE RIGHT TO CULTURE  
 
2.2.1 THEORETICAL OBSERVATIONS 
 
The right to culture is one of the fundamental human rights that is generally 
acknowledged and protected. International and regional instruments protect a number 
of key rights relating to culture. Indeed, the constitutions of most countries in the world, 
including South Africa, have explicitly provided for the protection of this right.21 Van der 
Vyver22
 
 emphasises that the provisions in the South African Constitution protecting 
cultural rights realise the global norm contained in article 27 of the International 
Covenant on Cultural and Peoples Rights (hereafter referred to as the ICCPR). 
Section 30 of the Constitution provides individuals with the right to culture while section 
31 encapsulates the right of persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic 
community to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language, thus 
making the right an individual as well as a community entitlement.23
 
 
The right to culture articulated in section 30 is expressed in a clause of choice.24
                                                 
21  Sections 30 and 31 of the Constitution read as follows: 
 
Individuals are free to participate in the culture of their choice and they also have a right, 
as members of a particular cultural community, to take part the activities of this 
30(1) “Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice, 
but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill 
of Rights.” 
31(1) “Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, 
with other members of that community; 
(a) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language; and  
(b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil 
society.” 
31(2) “The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision 
of the Bill of Rights.” 
22  Article 27 of the International Covenant on Cultural and Peoples Rights of 3 January 1986. See also 
Van der Vyver J D “Cultural identity as a constitutional right in South Africa” (2003) 14(1) 
Stellenbosch Law Review 51-67, at 52. 
23  Bennett TW Customary Law in South Africa (2007, Lansdowne: Juta) at 87. 
24  Irving H Gender and the Constitution: Equity and agency in comparative constitutional design (2008, 
Cambridge: Cambridge Press) at 238. 
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community.25 The related duty which falls on the group is to allow access to any person 
joining.26 The issue of “choice” appears to be extremely challenging when applied to the 
legal and social affairs of a specific cultural community.27 Importantly, choice however 
does not apply to children who are individually vulnerable and defenceless.28 It is during 
this childhood and defenceless period that these cultural connections are mostly 
formed.29
 
 As women in patriarchal societies have traditionally been accorded the same 
status children, they too are vulnerable in respect of certain harmful cultural practices. 
The aim of protecting and upholding cultural exercise is given additional force by section 
185 of the Constitution which authorises the establishment of a commission for the 
support and protection of the rights to culture, religion and language.30
 
 
International human rights law also has a duty to uphold and protect cultural activities 
and artefacts, chiefly those of worldwide value.31 Culture is praised as positive in the 
vast majority of human rights instruments.32 Nevertheless, some regulations such as the 
protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa33 recognise that some 
cultural and social practices might have a harmful impact on a person’s health and well-
being.34
                                                 
25  Bennett Customary law at 87. 
  
26  Bennett Customary law 87. 
27  Irving at 238. 
28  Irving 238. 
29  Irving 238. 
30  Grant at 6. Grant further stipulates that the object of the commission is the support of reverence for 
the cultural, religious and linguistic rights and the support and advancement of freedom from strife, 
compassion, acceptance and nationwide accord amongst such communities. The assignment of the 
commission is authorised and dependent on national legislation. The legislation to put the 
commission into operation was passed in 2002 which legislation is known as the Commission for the 
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities Act. 
31  See http://www.hrea.org/index.php?base_id=157(visited 14 September 2008). 
32  See http://www.hrea.org/index.php?base_id=157(visited 14 September 2008). 
33  Organisation of African Unity Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the 
Rights of Women, 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union 11July 2003. Article 2(2) of 
the Protocol stipulates that the Protocol enjoins the state parties to “modify the social and cultural 
patterns of conduct of women and men through public education, information, education and 
communication strategies, with a view to achieving the elimination of harmful cultural and traditional 
practices and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of 
either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for women and men.” 
34  See http://www.hrea.org/index.php?base_id=157(visited 14 September 2008). 
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Article 27 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (hereafter referred to as the 
UDHR)35 expressly provides for the protection of the right to culture. Article 27 states 
that everybody has the right to freely partake in the cultural life of the society, to take 
pleasure in the arts and to contribute to its scientific development and its benefits.36 In 
this regard, the right to culture includes the right to enjoy and develop cultural life and 
identity.37 Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) also protects the right “to take part in cultural life”.38
 
 
Occasionally individual and group rights may diverge.39 There are nevertheless two 
limitations understood in virtually all fundamental rights, which are the broader interest 
of the state and the primary rights of others.40 The right to culture is restricted at the 
point at which it infringes on another human right. Sections 30 and 31 of the 
Constitution include an explicit reference to other rights by means of a so-called internal 
limitation clause.41 This inner limitation section, which provides that the right to culture 
cannot be implemented in a way incompatible with any provision of the Bill of Rights, 
was anticipated to thwart communities from practising nasty and harmful practices and 
to curb the oppressive characteristics of some cultural traditions.42
                                                 
35  The Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 10 December 1948. 
 The equality clause 
36  Article 27 of the UDHR reads as follows: “Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural 
life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.” 
37  See http://www.un.org/rights/dpi1627e.htm (visited 14 September 2008). 
38  Article 15 (1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 3 January 
1976 states that: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: 
(a) to take part in cultural life; (b) to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.” 
39  Bennett at 87. 
40  Bennett at 89. 
41  Bennett 89. See footnote 21 above for the contents of sections 30 and 31. 
42  Bennett 89. For a further discussion on section 30 and 31 of the Constitution, see Henrard K Minority 
protection in post-apartheid South Africa: Human rights, minority rights, and self-determination 
(2002, Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group) at 115 and Hitchcock R K & Vinding D Indigenous 
peoples’ rights in Southern Africa (2004, Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous 
Affairs) at 102. In this regard, also see Bainham who remarks that culture cannot be said to “trump 
the right to equality under the South African Constitution.” He comes to the conclusion that in no way 
was culture ever anticipated that it would take precedence over the equality. See Bainham A & 
International Society on Family Law the International Survey of Family Law: 1996 (1998, Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) at 272. 
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contained in section 9 of the Constitution poses the greatest challenge to the right to 
culture generally and hence to the African legal tradition.43
 
  
The broad extent of the right to culture brings it inevitably in conflict with some laws and 
other fundamental human rights.44 Universalist versus cultural relativist questions arise 
in this context. The question of global standards versus local values becomes relevant. 
This topic is predominantly controversial in several African countries where arguments 
based on resistance to westernisation, as well as the desire to protect cultural 
standards, are time and again raised in opposition to universalism.45 In South Africa, the 
universalist versus cultural relativist argument has, been rendered marginal by the 
Constitution which is founded on a universalist human rights structure.46
 
 
The ostensible agreement on the subject of the application of international human rights 
norms in South Africa masks a rather more complex reality.47 South Africa is a culturally 
varied country. It is, in addition, a country in which the culture of the majority of the 
population has, over time, been subjected to a minority of the western culture, first 
under colonialism and subsequently under apartheid.48
 
 The complications innate in the 
application of universal human rights norms in culturally diverse societies, such as 
South Africa, are documented in the Vienna Declaration, which, even while confirming 
the eventual goal of universal protection, makes apparent that 
[w]hile the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, 
cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, 
regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.49
 
 
                                                 
43  Bennett 90. 
44  Bennett 95. 
45  Grant 2. 
46  Grant 2. 
47  Grant 2 
48  Grant 3. 
49  Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.157/23, 12 July, 1993, para. 5. See also Grant at 3. 
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The constitutional obligation of courts with regard to customary law is section 211(3) of 
the Constitution which provides that the courts “must apply customary law when that law 
is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with 
customary law”. Customary law is therefore subject to the Bill of Rights and the 
constitutional human rights contained therein.50 It is necessary at this point to make it 
clear that some of the customary practices that this study examines, derive from living 
customary law and not from “official” (and often distorted) customary law as it is 
contained in legislation and legal precedents.51
 
 
2.2.2 THE RIGHT TO CULTURE AS INTERPRETED BY THE COURTS 
 
In the case of Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education52 (discussed in 
more detail later), the rights to freedom of religion and culture were in conflict with a law 
barring corporeal punishment in learning institutions. The religious beliefs of the parents 
of the children involved in this case condoned the use of corporal punishment.53 These 
parents had consented to the use of corporeal punishment on their children at their 
respective schools.54 The central question in this case was whether Parliament had 
violated the religious rights of the parents of children in independent schools by 
enacting the South African Schools Act55 which prohibits the use of corporal punishment 
in schools.56
                                                 
50  This has been affirmed by the courts, see for example, Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2004 
(5) SA 460 (CC) at paragraph [51]. See also Wieland L “The role of the courts in the conflict between 
African customary law and human rights” (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 241-277 
under paragraph II. 
 The court held that the prohibition was reasonable and justifiable under the 
limitation clause primarily because children’s rights to dignity, freedom and security of 
51  Wieland at 246, footnote 24, explains that the official customary law contained in legislation has over 
time been influenced and distorted by colonialism and apartheid. 
52  Christian Education South Africa V Minister of Education 2000 (10) BCLR 1051(CC) at 1052 
paragraph [A]-[G]. 
53  Christian Education South Africa V Minister of Education at 1053 paragraph [1]-[2] [B]. 
54  Christian Education South Africa V Minister of Education at 1053 paragraph [1]-[2] [B]. 
55  Section 10 reads as follows: “(1) No person may administer corporeal punishment at a school to a 
learner. (2) Any person who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence and liable on 
conviction to a sentence which could be imposed for assault.” 
56  Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education at 1053 paragraph [1]-[2] [B]-[C] 
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the person outweigh their parent’s rights to culture and religion.57 Judge Sachs referred 
to the S v William’s58 case which found that the administration of corporal punishment 
was unconstitutional as it infringes the values on which the Constitution is based.59
 
 
Although an appellant’s right to smoke cannabis as an element of his religion and 
culture was allegedly infringed by a bar on the use and possession of drugs in terms of 
the Drugs and Trafficking Act,60 the majority of the Constitutional court in the case of 
Prince v The President of the Law Society Of the Cape of Good Hope & Others61 held 
that the encroachment was reasonably permissible for the reason that there was no less 
restrictive ways to prevent drug abuse.62
 
 
                                                 
57  Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education at 1052 paragraph [I]-[J] and 1065-1076. 
58  S v Williams and Others 1995 (7) BCLR 861 (CC) paragraphs [48] and [49]. 
59  Christian Education South Africa V Minister of Education at 1073 paragraph [44] [B]-[C] 
60  Section 4(b) reads as follows: “No person shall use or have in his possession – (b) any dangerous 
dependence-producing substance or any undesirable dependence-producing substance, unless - (i) 
he is a patient who has acquired or bought any such substance - (aa) from a medical practitioner, 
dentist or practitioner acting in his professional capacity and in accordance with the requirements of 
the Medicines Act or any regulation made there under; or (bb) from a pharmacist in terms of an oral 
instruction or a prescription in writing of such medical practitioner, dentist or practitioner, and uses 
that substance for medicinal purposes under the care or treatment of the said medical practitioner, 
dentist or practitioner; (ii) he has acquired or bought any such substance for medicinal purposes – 
(aa) from a medical practitioner, veterinarian, dentist or practitioner acting in his professional 
capacity and in accordance with the requirements of the Medicines Act or any regulation made there 
under; (bb) from a pharmacist in terms of an oral instruction or a prescription in writing of such 
medical practitioner, veterinarian, dentist or practitioner; or (cc) from a veterinary assistant or 
veterinary nurse in terms of a prescription in writing of such veterinarian, with the intent to administer 
that substance to a patient or animal under the care or treatment of the said medical practitioner, 
veterinarian, dentist or practitioner; (iii) he is the Director-General: Welfare who has acquired or 
bought any such substance in accordance with the requirements of the Medicines Act or any 
regulation made there under; [Sub-paragraph (iii) amended by section 4 of Act 18 of 1996.] (iv) he, 
she or it is a patient, medical practitioner, veterinarian, dentist, practitioner, nurse, midwife, nursing 
assistant, pharmacist, veterinary assistant, veterinary nurse, manufacturer of, or wholesale dealer in, 
pharmaceutical products, importer or exporter, or any other person contemplated in the Medicines 
Act or any regulation made there under, who or which has acquired, bought, imported, cultivated, 
collected or manufactured, or uses or is in possession of, or intends to administer, supply, sell, 
transmit or export any such substance in accordance with the requirements or conditions of the said 
Act or regulation, or any permit issued to him, her or it under the said Act or regulation; […] (vi) he 
has otherwise come into possession of any such substance in a lawful manner.” 
61  Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope and Others at 220 (2) SA 794 (CC); 
2002 (3) BCLR 231 (CC) 
62  Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope and Others at 234 paragraph [A]. 
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The case of Mabena v Letsoalo63 presents a fine example of how culture can be 
developed in line with the Constitution. In this case the mother of the bride (rather than 
the father) negotiated and consented to the marriage between her daughter and the late 
son in law. The deceased’s parents, Mr and Mrs Mabhena, contested on the validity of 
the marriage between their late son and the respondent.64 The judge in the Letsaolo 
case recognised the official customary law rule that women are continual minors who do 
not have the capacity to act as guardians for their children and that they fell under the 
guardianship of their male relatives.65 This official customary law rule extends to cases 
of marriage negotiations were it is apparent that the authorities on customary law 
recognise the father of the bride or an extra male guardian to officially contract for and 
be given lobola.66 The traditional customary law thus did not allow the bride’s mother to 
be the guardian of her daughter, since she was also under the charge of her husband, 
her biological father or either of their successors.67 Despite acknowledging authors who 
support the aforementioned position on women, Judge Du Plessis, however, remarked 
in his judgement that it must be accepted that there are cases in practice where 
mothers should be able to be involved in negotiations regarding lobolo and assent to the 
marriages of their daughters.68
 
 In this regard one would agree that the judge did not 
perceive customary law as a closed system but rather as a fluid narrative which 
changed in light of changing gender relationships. Du Plessis J noted in his judgment 
that 
[it] is evident that customary law is, as many systems of law should be, in a state of 
continuous development.69
 
 
Fishbayn70
                                                 
63  Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 (2) SA 1068. 
 argues that the judge in the Letsaolo case was able to disaggregate the 
formal beliefs of customary law from the authentic standards and practices of modern 
64  Mabena v Letsoalo at 1071 [D]-[G]. 
65  Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 (2) SA at 1073. 
66  Mabena v Letsoalo at 1073 [F]-[I]. 
67  Mabena v Letsoalo at 1073 [H]-[I]. 
68  Mabena v Letsoalo 1068 [D]-[E] and 1074 [F]. 
69  Mabena v Letsoalo 1074 [H]. 
 45 
participants in customary law. Himonga and Bosch71
 
 correctly observe that the judge 
was faithful to his responsibility to give recognition to the rule of living customary law in 
accordance with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
The judge’s postmodern interpretation of culture achieves a synthesis between the 
community’s commitment to equality as well as retaining the supportive purpose served 
by the institution of customary marriage.72 The reasoning in this judgement is 
instructive, not only for the development of equality in the South African jurisprudence, 
but also for any national or international tribunal coming to grips with conflicts over 
culture and equality.73
 
 
Specific features of South African customary law and religion which are directly and 
indirectly linked to the present pattern of HIV/AIDS amongst women will next be 
examined. 
 
2.3  PATRIARCHY 
 
A decade down the path of democratic organisation, economic inequalities still 
dominate as one of the toughest challenges frustrating South Africa’s commitment to 
human rights.74 Although poverty and economic inequality persist to mirror racial 
discrepancy, they also embed gender inequalities.75 Poverty in South Africa is gender-
centred thereby challenging the equal status of women in law and creating obstacles in 
the realisation of the human rights of women.76
                                                 
70  Fishbayn L “Litigating the right to culture: Family Law in the new South Africa” (1999) 13(2) 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 147-173 at 165 
 
71  Himonga C & Bosch C “The application of African customary law under the Constitution of South 
Africa: Problem solved or just beginning?” (2000) 117 South African Law Journal 306-341 at 336. 
72  Fishbayn 168. 
73  Fishbayn 168. 
74  Bentley K “Women’s human rights & the feminisation of poverty in South Africa” (2004) 31(100) 
Review of African political economy 247-261 at 247.  
75  Bentley 247. 
76  Bentley 247. The gendered notion of poverty in South Africa is also raised by Ghosh R N Human 
resources and gender issues in poverty eradication (2001, New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & 
Distributors) at 223-227. 
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The feminisation of poverty is important for the reason that women experience poverty 
in a dissimilar way compared to men.77 The resulting crisis is hence not only statistical 
(e.g. presenting the magnitude of women who are affected by poverty), but also relative 
in the sense that poverty has far reaching effects on women.78 It has a propensity to be 
sterner on women and it further poses more problems for women who put up with the 
load of caring for children in these circumstances.79
 
 
Patriarchy, existing in all races and societies in South Africa, subsist in conjunction with 
a system of human rights and equality before the law.80 One of the new attributes of 
patriarchy is the assumption that gender inequality is a characteristic of culture and 
tradition and, as a result, to dispute it is to interfere with the framework of society in a 
manner that infringes the right of groups to self-determination.81 Inferences such as 
these reinforce the unequal treatment of women within the household, family and the 
normal financial system.82
 
  
As noted earlier, the Constitution and other domestic laws as well as international 
human rights instruments protect women from all forms of discrimination. Important in 
this regard are the laws that address discrimination on the grounds of gender. The 
challenge then is to devise these laws to be part of every person’s life, not just 
women.83 Bentley84
 
 argues that the provisions, both domestic and international, that 
afford protection against discrimination on grounds of gender are undermined, and often 
paralysed, by profoundly rooted cultural norms of patriarchy. 
                                                 
77  Bentley 247. 
78  Bentley 247. 
79  Bentley 247. See also, Walker C Women and resistance in South Africa (1982, Salt City: Onyx 
Press) at 163. 
80  Bentley 247-248. 
81  Bentley 247-248. 
82  See Gordon A Transforming capitalism and patriarchy: gender and development in Africa (1996, 
Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers) at 106. See also Bentley 248. 
83  Bentley 248. 
84  Bentley 248 
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The notion of patriarchy was initially used by social scientists to express a structure of 
management where men held political power in their competence as leaders of the 
family circle.85 Important for this study is the connotation that patriarchy involves the 
powers of a husband over his spouse, children and any other dependants.86 This kind of 
patriarchy is restricted to the domestic and family context.87 In modern times, patriarchy 
and paternalism are used interchangeably.88 The feminist critique on male power also 
rests on patriarchy as a starting point.89
 
  
Catherine MacKinnon reminds us of the time when, during the drafting of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, the definition of a “human being” and a “person” was 
debated,90 and aptly asks whether a time will ever come “when women [will be] 
human”.91
 
 Women are still not treated in a manner which universal standards require all 
humans to be treated. MacKinnon’s question is as follows: 
If women were human, would we have little to no voice in public deliberations and in 
government? Would we be hidden behind veils and imprisoned in houses and stoned 
and shot for refusing? Would we be beaten nearly to death, and to death, by men with 
whom we are close? Would we be sexually molested in our families?92
 
 
This extract typifies some characteristics of patriarchy such as the belief that women are 
not given a chance to speak out and be heard. This is evidenced in cultural 
communities were men control and take leadership positions in community groups93
                                                 
85  Bonthuys & Albertyn at 18. 
 as 
well as in their respective families. Women are perceived as a gentle group, not capable 
86  Bennett 55. 
87  Bennett 55. 
88  Bennett 55. 
89  Bennett 55. 
90  http://www.nostatusquo.com/ACLU/mackinnon/mackin1.html (visited 7 February 2008). 
91  http://www.nostatusquo.com/ACLU/mackinnon/mackin1.html (visited 7 February 2008). 
92  http://www.nostatusquo.com/ACLU/mackinnon/mackin1.html (visited 7 February 2008). 
93  Bourque S C & Warren K B Women of the Andes: Patriarchy and social change in two Peruvian 
towns (1981: Michigan: University of Michigan) at 46-47. 
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of expressing themselves.94 These marginalised women often fear to tell their stories, 
the “stories of the marginalised”, as Van Niekerk describes.95
 
 
For radical feminists, patriarchy “justifies” the control of males over females.96 
Patriarchal power, interestingly, is not limited to females but is expanded to control over 
younger men.97 History clearly illustrates that patriarchy has been in existence since the 
earliest times all over the world.98 In the context of this study, patriarchy should be 
understood as a societal relationship between men, instituted with the intention to 
formulate interdependence between men and women with the consequence that men 
dominate women.99 This system gives preference to the existence of men and value 
men’s work as more honourable than that of women.100
 
 
Patriarchy in present times is evidenced in a variety of ways, such as by precluding 
women from accessing managerial positions which may keep them at the bottom end of 
the labour market or in the family home, where they (often unable to compete financially 
with men) have to stay, serving men for personal, sexual and childrearing purposes.101
 
  
Section 211(1) of the Constitution recognises the institution, status and role of traditional 
leaders.102
                                                 
94  Van Esterik P Materializing Thailand (2000, Oxford: Berg Publishers) at 236. 
 The foundation of leadership under the African portion of South Africans is 
95  Van Niekerk G “Indigenous Law and narrative: Rethinking methodology” (1999) 32 Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa 208-227 at 210. 
96  Dale R (ed) Education and the state: Politics, patriarchy and practice (1981, New York: Taylor & 
Francis) at 197. See also Bonthuys and Albertyn at 19 in this regard. 
97  Bonthuys & Albertyn at 19. 
98  Dale 197. 
99  Dale 197. 
100  Lewis R A & Sussman M B Men’s changing roles in the family (1986, Philadelphia: Haworth Press) 
at 17. 
101  Dale 197. Despite the constitutional guarantee of equal treatment in the labour force by virtue of 
section 23(1) of the Constitution, and the protection afforded by the Employment Equity Act 55 of 
1998 (section 6) and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 
(sections 6 and 8), discrimination against women still persist. 
102  Section 211 of the Constitution reads as follows: (1) “The institution, status and role of traditional 
leadership, according to customary law, are recognised, subject to the Constitution. (2) A traditional 
authority that observes a system of customary law may function subject to any applicable legislation 
and customs, which includes amendments to, or repeal of, that legislation or those customs. (3) The 
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entrenched in a collective system of patriarchy.103 This entails that the position of 
traditional leadership is restricted to male affiliates of the family.104 It is also restricted to 
the male and eldest son of the primary wife.105 This system of succession with regard to 
leadership is perceived as inconsistent with the constitutional obligation of equality on 
grounds of gender. It appears that it is only among the Lovedu population of the 
Northern Province where a woman may possibly become head of her community.106 
Men are capable to hold the position of ward heads.107
The question whether the tradition of male succession to traditional leadership to the 
exclusion of females amounts to unfair discrimination, is an open one.
 
108 One may 
argue that the acknowledgment of the institution of traditional leadership may well entail 
tolerance of the unfair practices allied to this practice.109
 
  
One of the several consequences of patriarchy is the control of women’s sexuality, as 
will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.110 MacKinnon111 points out that sexual 
abuse has become so deeply rooted and is also a consequence of the “systematic form 
of sex discrimination”. This persistence of male power over women has consequently 
led women to becoming more vulnerable to HIV/AIDS, the latter in turn also inextricably 
correlated to poverty. Poverty in itself does not cause HIV/AIDS.112 Poverty, however, 
can be seen as an incubator of HIV/AIDS.113
                                                 
courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any 
legislation that specifically deals with customary law.” 
 Since gender and poverty are inextricably 
combined, it is deeply disturbing to note that 70% of the world’s poorest people are 
women. These poor women are very vulnerable as they often have to submit to unsafe 
103  Bekker et al Introduction to customary legal pluralism in South Africa (2002, Durban: Butterworths) at 
131. 
104  Deegan H South Africa reborn: Building a new democracy (1999, New York: Routledge) at 85. See 
also Bekker at 131. 
105  Bekker at 131. 
106  Bekker at 131. 
107  Bekker at 131. 
108  Bekker at 131. 
109  Bekker at 131. 
110  Dale at 197. 
111  MacKinnon C Women’s lives, men’s laws (2007, Harvard: Harvard University Press) at 1.  
112  Bentley at 257. 
113  Bentley at 257. 
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sex with their husbands or other male partners, or risk possible violence in their 
domestic settings if they insist on the use of contraceptives or condoms, in an attempt to 
secure a source of living, which in turn increase their exposure to HIV.114
 
 
This distressing situation of women is supported by findings of the UNAIDS Gender 
Analysis: Fiscal 2004-2010 Strategic Plan, which examines the links among poverty, 
violence and AIDS. This analysis explains and relates these factors to the subordinate 
and inferior social position of women and girls, which makes it hard or unattainable for 
these women to negotiate safe sex.115
Most often, in both in both casual and steady relationships, the use of condoms is 
determined by the man. Societies which are characterised by male control display more 
intimate partner violence. In these societies, male dominance is cited as a primary 
cause of intimate partner violence.
 
116
 
 It is thus clear from this discussion and that of the 
introductory chapter that the issues relating to women’s exposure to HIV/AIDS cannot 
be separated from a number of interrelating factors, such as gender inequality, violence, 
harmful customary practices and poverty. 
It is hence submitted that the socio-economic context described above, compounded by 
the cultural norms that support women’s subordination, which in turn increases women’s 
vulnerability to HIV/AIDS, has to be critically assessed and addressed. While a number 
of laws in South Africa are designed to protect women, their predicament lies in the 
enforcement of such laws in the face of deeply rooted cultural beliefs, which will next be 
considered.117
 
  
                                                 
114  Bentley at 257. 
115  Bentley at 257. See also the UNAIDS gender analysis: Fiscal 2004-2010 strategic plan 2003 at 42. 
116  Jewkes R “Intimate partner violence: causes and prevention” 2002) 359 The Lancet  (1423-1429 at 
423. 
117  Bentley at 258. 
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2.4  POLYGAMY, LEVIRATE, EARLY MARRRIAGE AND VIRGINITY 
TESTING  
 
2.4.1  POLYGAMY 
 
Polygamy is a traditional African custom which is exercised in three–quarters of the 
world’s recognised societies.118 In sub-Saharan Africa, Togo is stated as the country 
with the highest percentage of polygamy.119 Fifty-two percent of married women in Togo 
are involved in polygamous relationships.120 In contemporary Africa the incidence of 
polygamy is believed to be 20 to 30 polygamists for every 100 married men.121
 
 
It is trite that children play a significant role in African culture and that a family’s status 
and reputation is measured by the children born to that family.122 The original purpose 
of polygamy in traditional Africa was to make sure that all women in the rural community 
had a spouse for the purpose of procreating.123 Polygamy also contributed to the 
continued existence of the community, particularly the black community, through a high 
fertility rate.124 It also enabled a husband to marry a second wife if the first wife was 
infertile or was not able to give him a son.125 In this regard a man can be guaranteed of 
an heir and the permanence of the lineage without resorting to a divorce.126
 
 
                                                 
118  Moller V & Welch G R “Polygamy, economic security and well–being of retired Zulu migrant workers” 
(1990) 5 (3) Journal of Cross-Cultural Gerontology 205-216 at 205.  
119  Cook CT “Polygamy: Did the Africans get it right?” (2007) 38 Journal of Black Studies 232-250 at 
236-237. 
120  Cook at 236. 
121  Moller & Welch at 205. 
122  Nkosi G “Indigenous African marriage and same sex partnerships: Conflicts and controversies” 
(2007) 2 International Journal of African Renaissance Studies: Multi-, inter- and transdisciplinarity 
200-216 at 206.  
123  Cook at 238. 
124  Cook at 238. In this regard also see Moller V & Welch G J Polygamy and well-being among Zulu 
migrants (1985, Durban: Centre for Applied Social Sciences) at 14.  
125  Cook at 238. 
126  Moller & Welch Polygamy and well-being among Zulu migrants at 14.  
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It is also argued that polygamy is practiced for the purpose of sexual necessity.127 A 
popular assumption is that males are by nature endowed with a disposition for 
assortment in sexual partners, the latter supposedly not a characteristic feature among 
women.128 The argument that men practice polygamy for the reason that they have a 
high sex drive is open to criticism on the ground that it is extremely weak and untenable. 
Not only is there no biological evidence supporting this theory, it also ignores the reality 
that in most traditions and customs the husband may have many sexual relationships 
out of wedlock.129
 
 
A lengthy post-partum sex taboo is cited as one of the reason which facilitates the 
practice of polygamy.130 This argument - similar to the sex drive thesis - is theoretically 
and empirically more sound.131 A post-partum sex taboo refers to the bar against sexual 
intercourse for a prescribed period following an event, such as the birth of a child. 
During this period, the husband is strictly prohibited from having sexual intercourse with 
his wife. Polygamy is hence said to be a societal reaction to lengthy post-partum sex 
taboos, thus providing the husband with the opportunity to have access to other sex 
partners.132
 
 
Polygamy also enables females to marry where females outnumber marriageable 
males.133 This process is also known as a “marriage squeeze” market.134 A “marriage 
squeeze” in the context of this study refers to the demographic imbalance where there 
are plenty of women and a shortage of men to marry the potential brides.135
                                                 
127  Moller & Welch Polygamy and well-being among Zulu migrants at 5. 
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128  Moller & Welch Polygamy and well-being among Zulu migrants at 5. 
129  Moller & Welch Polygamy and well-being among Zulu migrants at 5. 
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131  Moller & Welch Polygamy and well-being among Zulu migrants at 6. 
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of societies more likely to have an imbalanced sex ratio in favour of females are 
societies with a high male loss in warfare.136
 
 
Moller137 argues that polygamy can be perceived as a privilege and not a principle for 
the reason that its extent depends on the riches and rank of the husband. Status and 
prestige are cited as some of the reasons that drive women to opt for polygamous 
marriages as they believe that these husbands are well-off to provide for them 
sufficiently.138 Chiefs and leaders were believed to practice polygamy for the purpose of 
acquiring a higher rank.139
 
  
Polygamy should be considered together with the practice of bride price and service.140 
It is trite that in the African tradition the man must pay a certain amount of money and 
cattle which is commonly known as bride price or bride wealth (also known as lobolo, 
bogadi, bohali, xuma, lumalo, thaka, ikhazi, magadi, and emabheka).141 Legislation in 
South Africa states that a court may not find that the practice of lobolo is on conflict with 
public policy.142 Bonthuys and Curran143
                                                 
136  Moller & Welch Polygamy and well-being among Zulu migrants at 7. 
 point out that like other customary institutions, 
the payment of lobolo has changed radically since the time when “official” rules 
regarding it were recorded. It is nowadays paid in cash rather than cattle; it is no longer 
retained by the wife’s family, but rather spent to meet economic needs. As a result of a 
steady “inflation” in the amounts paid for lobolo, it has become more difficult for some to 
marry, resulting in an increase in cohabitation. It is, in addition, rather the grooms 
themselves and not the families, who pay the lobolo. These practices potentially 
increase women’s vulnerability to domestic violence, as some of these men abuse their 
137  Moller & Welch “Polygamy, economic security and well–being of retired Zulu migrant workers” 205. 
138  Moller & Welch Polygamy and well-being among Zulu migrants at 15. 
139  Moller & Welch at “Polygamy, economic security and well–being of retired Zulu migrant workers” 
205. 
140  Cook 238. 
141  Cook 238. See also section 1 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998.  
142  In Thibela v Minister van Wet en Orde 1995 (3) SA 147 (T) the court confirmed that lobolo was not 
against the rules of public policy or the rules of natural justice. See also section 11(1) of the Black 
Administration Act 38 of 1927; section 54(A) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944 and section 1 
of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988.  
143  Curran E & Bonthuys E “Customary law and domestic violence in rural South African communities” 
at 616. 
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wives by claiming that they had ‘paid’ for them.144 As the lobolo is paid to the fathers of 
the wives and this money is often quickly spent, the families of the wives are usually 
reluctant to welcome them back when they suffer domestic abuse, as they are unable to 
return the lobolo. In this way, women’s own families may collude with violent husbands 
to trap them in abusive marriages, as was the case in S v Mvamvu145
 
 where a woman 
who had been married in customary law left her husband because of his violence. As 
the lobolo in this case was not returned when she left, he claimed that the marriage still 
existed, abducted her and raped her twice, despite the existence of a domestic violence 
interdict against him. 
A polygamist should hence be wealthy enough to marry the first and subsequent 
wives.146 In both traditional and contemporary Africa, polygamy is also seen as a sign of 
wealth since a man’s success or wealth is measured by the number of wives he has.147 
Women in Africa, particularly rural woman, contribute to the agricultural economy, which 
adds to the husband’s wealth in the sense that women and children in the specific 
polygamous family are a form of cheap labour.148 Some of the funds attained from the 
labour that women and children provide allow the husband to take additional wives.149
 
  
From the above it is apparent that polygamy was in some way advantageous to women. 
Polygamy, however, is most often fraught with intricacies within the family circle, not 
only amid co-wives, but between the wives and the husband too.150 Over-protectiveness 
and jealousy amongst co-wives is one such feature, resulting most likely from fear that 
the husband does not share his feel for affection and possessions evenly among 
them.151
 
  
                                                 
144  Curran & Bonthuys 617. 
145  Unreported Supreme Court of Appeal judgment, case no 350/2003, delivered 29 September 2004. 
146  Cook 238. 
147  Cook 238. 
148  Cook 238. 
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Modern day polygamy faces conflicts such as the issue of tradition versus modernity, 
religion versus culture, form versus content, young versus old as well as the West 
versus non-West.152 This study submits that in South Africa the major concern resulting 
from polygamous marriages is the problem of HIV/AIDS.153
 
 It would be wrong to 
conclude that polygamy is a primarily harmful practice which leads directly to the 
spreading of HIV/AIDS. The manner, however, in which persons in polygamous 
marriages conduct themselves, however, may facilitate the spreading of HIV.  
In a polygamous family circle the potential victims of HIV/AIDS are more numerous 
compared to the marriage couple in a monogamous union. The extent of the potential 
spreading of HIV/AIDS in a polygamous marriage is much more pronounced compared 
to a monogamous union.  
 
Infidelity within a polygamous marriage is a clear divergence of what is traditionally 
required by the official customary values of polygamous marriages.154 The emergence 
of so called “affluent polygamy” may be illustrative.155 This type of polygamy is practised 
not as a set of the original African tradition but in a rebellious way by shirking the 
original values of polygamy. Nwoye156
                                                 
152  Zeitzen M K Polygamy: A cross-cultural Analysis (2008, Oxford: Berg Publishers) at 145. In the 
context of this study, modernity versus tradition denotes the conflicts that arise when social and 
cultural beliefs have been rationalised as a result of recent developments. Cultural constraints, for 
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of the original structure of polygamy and the new rebellious way of diverting from the original practice 
of polygamy (discussed in more detail in the main text below). Young versus old looks at how the 
upcoming generation ridicule, disapprove and modify certain cultural practices. They see such 
practices as intolerable. The explanation on tradition versus modernity applies also to the West 
versus non-West description above.  
 submits that this type of polygamy is becoming 
153  Zeitzen 176. This same issue is also raised by Viljoen F & Stefiszyn K (eds) Human rights protected? 
Nine Southern African country reports on HIV, AIDS and the law (2007, Pretoria: PULP) at 252. 
154  Nwoye A “The practice of interventive polygamy in two regions of Africa: Background, theory and 
techniques” (2007) 31(4) Dialectical Anthropology 383–421 at 383-384. 
155  Nwoye at 383-384. 
156  Nwoye at 383-384 
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more popular by the day in most African cities in Southern Africa. Infidelity is thus a 
characteristic feature of affluent polygamy. The failure to maintain sexual relationships 
within the traditional polygamous marriage could be an example of rebelling against the 
original values of the principles of polygamy. It is clear that this type of polygamy places 
the women involved in these relationships at a high risk of contracting HIV/AIDS.  
 
The manner in which HIV may be spread by members in these polygamous unions is 
manifold. The husband in a polygamous marriage may be the source of the virus.157 
This usually happens when the family or the men migrate to urban areas in search for 
employment.158
 
 During their stay in the city the men may engage in sexual activities 
with other women. If these men become infected with HIV, they may then pass the virus 
to all their wives at home upon their return. The women in the polygamous marriage 
may in turn also have extra-marital sexual encounters, which expose them all and the 
husband to possible infection, as well as the women with whom the husband may 
engage during his stay in the cities. 
Within the context of HIV/AIDS, polygamy does not only affect the partners involved in 
this marriage.159 Children in a polygamous marriage are also exposed to the risk of 
infection for the reason that communal breast feeding is practised in many deeply 
rooted African communities and in polygamous families.160
 
 The extent of infection 
among these children is much higher as there are usually more children in a 
polygamous marriage. 
The wives and sexual partners involved in polygamous marriages have little or no 
control over the sexual behaviours of other members within their family circle.161
                                                 
157  Zeitzen at 176. 
 The 
fear of being infected has led some women to oppose polygamy on the basis that it 
places them at a high risk of not only contracting HIV, but also a variety of sexually 
158  Zeitzen at 176. 
159  Zeitzen at 176.  
160  Zeitzen at 176. 
161  Zeitzen at 176. 
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transmitted diseases. Women across Africa have begun inquiring whether a man has a 
right to have more than one wife in view of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.162 In Swaziland, 
where almost forty percent of the population is HIV-positive, protest against polygamy is 
at its peak.163 The king of Swaziland has more than nine wives and traditionally chooses 
a new bride each year.164
 
  
For the purpose of this study it must be noted that customary marriages, and by 
implication polygamy, is now recognised in terms of the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act.165 The requirements for a valid customary marriage are briefly 
consensus between the parties; a formal ceremony to transfer the bride to the other 
family, and the payment of lobolo.166 Although the aspect of the transfer of the bride as 
one of the requirements is not regulated by the Recognition of Customary Marriages 
Act, it can be regarded as a custom in terms of section 3(6) of the Act. This custom, 
however, requires a woman to cry when she is formally transferred to her husband, and 
she has to appear semi-naked in front of the prospective family. If she does not cry, she 
could be beaten until she does, as was the case in Mabuza v Mbata,167
                                                 
162  Zeitzen at 176. 
 where the court 
was asked to consider if this custom (ukumekeza) was a legal requirement for a valid 
Swazi marriage. In this case, Hlophe J found that the custom is not necessarily a 
prerequisite for a Swazi marriage and that dispensation thereof cannot be regarded as a 
fatal flaw in the marriage ceremony. He stated that marriage practices evolve as 
customary law does and that he should consider if such practices are in conflict with the 
Constitution or not, in this case in relation to the right to human dignity. As the 
constitutionality of the custom was however not in dispute (but rather whether the 
163  Zeitzen at 176. 
164  Patterson S The African State and the AIDS Crisis (2005, Aldershot: Ashgate) at 109. 
165  120 of 1998, section 2(3) and section 2(4). Section 2(3) recognises all polygamous marriages 
concluded before the commencement of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, whereas 
section 2(4) provides for the conclusion of polygamous marriages after the commencement of the 
Act. These marriages, however, must comply with the requirements of this Act. 
166  For a discussion of these requirements, see Herbst M & Du Plessis W “Customary law v common 
law marriages: A hybrid approach in South Africa” (2008) 12(1) Electronic Journal of Comparative 
Law (accessed at http://www.ejcl.org, visited 12 May 2009) 1-15 at 5-8. 
167  2003 (4) SA 218 (KH). 
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parties were married or not and whether a divorce decree could be granted), the 
question on the constitutionality was never answered.168
 
 
It is clear from the above example that polygamy indirectly impacts on the fundamental 
rights of women. Despite the fact that women’s status as perpetual minors has changed 
since 2000,169 and despite the fact that the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
states in section 6 that a woman has full status and capacity in addition to any other 
rights that she may have in terms of the customary law,170 equality and the full 
enjoyment of other human rights is still not a reality for women in rural areas whose live 
continue in a traditional setting.171
 
 
2.4.2  LEVIRATE 
 
Unkungena or the levirate union is a custom that is used when a man dies without a 
male heir. The widow will then be required to choose another husband from amongst 
the deceased man’s younger brothers in order to bear male children for the deceased’s 
house. The custom is said to provide for the maintenance of the widow and preserve 
the relationship between the families that was initiated in the original marriage.172 In the 
Zulu culture, the practice allows a male relative to marry his sister-in-law or the widow of 
his brother.173 The custom is also referred to as “marriage by inheritance”.174
 
  
                                                 
168  Mabuza v Mbata at 226 [C]-[E]. 
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The fundamental nature of a customary marriage does not only involve the union 
between two spouses but includes the two families of the spouses. It goes as far as 
including the two families of the spouses. Upon the death of the husband the marriage 
is not dissolved unless the widow’s family pays back the bride price or lobolo to her 
husband’s family. A widow thus does not gain her private independence upon her 
husband’s death.175 Since a male relative may marry the divorced and widowed wife of 
his brother,176
 
 chances are that a brother who inherits a wife from his brother whose 
cause of death is AIDS, may pass the virus to his other wives. 
The whole family unit is at risk of becoming infected owing to the “inheritance” of the 
infected wife. The infected wife may perhaps not be aware of her HIV-positive status 
when marrying the brother of her deceased husband, or alternatively, if she is aware 
that she is infected, may decide to withhold this fact from the family out of fear of being 
rejected or losing her means of income. This practice could also force women into 
unwanted marriages, expose them to unwanted sex and domestic violence. 
 
Apart from exposing women to an increased risk of contracting HIV, this practice is in 
conflict with the equality rights of women, as well as their human dignity and personal 
autonomy. 
 
2.4.3  EARLY MARRIAGE AND VIRGINITY TESTING 
 
In a so-called gerontocratic society, wives may inadvertently be the principal source of 
carrying and spreading of HIV.177 In a gerontocratic society, older men marry young 
girls.178 In most African societies this practice is known as early marriage. Some of 
these young women often have young lovers of their age.179
                                                 
175  Werner at 416. 
 These old bachelors may, 
in turn, be involved with commercial sex workers or they may have affairs with a number 
176  Nkosi at 210. 
177  Zeitzen at 176. 
178  Zeitzen at 176. 
179  Zeitzen at 176. 
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of married women,180 which places them at a high risk of contracting HIV. The virus may 
consequently be passed on to both other sex partners who themselves may be in 
polygamous relationships,181
 
 or those young girls, if they are not already infected. The 
young bride herself may perhaps be the source of the virus herself, and then 
transmitting it to the older man and his other sexual partners. 
In South Africa, especially in the province of KwaZulu-Natal there has been a recent 
revival of the traditional practice of virginity testing.182 Reference was made in the 
introductory chapter to the fact that a higher value is traditionally placed on virgin brides, 
evidenced in the higher amount of lobolo paid for them. However, supporters of virginity 
testing presently claim that it will assist in the reduction of HIV/AIDS and teenage 
pregnancy, as well as the detection and prevention of child sexual abuse.183 It is 
submitted that the opposite is in fact true: the fear of the detection of the loss of virginity 
may in fact be used by males to control girls’ sexual activity, leaving young males free to 
engage in premarital sex.184 This result indorses double standards regarding sexuality. 
In view of the current belief that sex with a virgin may cure or protect against AIDS and 
venereal diseases, public identification as a virgin may in fact increase the risk of sexual 
abuse and HIV-infection. Young girls may be less keen to report sexual abuse for fear 
of disclosing that they are no longer virgins.185
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2.5  PRIMOGENITURE 
 
Before the operation of the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of 
Related Matters Act,186 section 23 of the Black Administration Act187 endorsed the 
principle of primogeniture. This whole process of inheritance to a specific male heir 
instead of the wife is known as primogeniture. The principle of primogeniture places 
women and extra-marital children under the guardianship of an heir.188 In terms of this 
principle, women are not entitled to share in the intestate succession of the deceased 
estate.189 The heir, however, has a duty to discharge support of the widow.190 The 
elimination of women from heirship and subsequently from being able to inherit property 
was in observance with a patriarchal structure which subjected women under a position 
of “subservience and subordination.”191 Within such a system women were looked upon 
as perpetual minors under the guardianship of their fathers, spouses or the head of the 
extended relatives.192 Extra-marital children were not permitted to inherit their father’s 
estate under customary law.193 They were nevertheless competent to inherit in their 
mother’s family unit subject to the principle of primogeniture.194
 
 
In his minority judgement in Bhe v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others, 195
                                                 
186  11 of 2009. 
 Ngcobo 
J described the concept of succession, in particular the rule of primogeniture, in 
187  Section 23(1) & (2) of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. Section 23 (1) reads as follows: “All 
movable property belonging to a black and allotted by him or accruing under Black law or custom to 
any woman with whom he lived in a customary union, or to any house, shall upon his death devolve 
and be administered under Black law and custom.” Section 23(2) reads as follows:” All land in a tribal 
settlement held in individual tenure upon quitrent conditions by a black shall devolve upon his death 
upon one male person, to be determined in accordance with tables of succession to be prescribed 
under subsection 10.” 
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       26(3) Obiter at 474-487 at 476. 
189  Bhe and Others v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission and 
Another V President of the RSA and Another 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at 28 paragraph [77] [C]. 
190  Bradshaw Y W & Ndegwa S N The uncertain promise of Southern Africa (2001: Indianapolis,Indiana 
University Press) at 289. 
191  Bhe v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others at 28 paragraph [78] [E]. 
192  Bhe v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others at 28 paragraph [78] [E]. 
193  Bhe v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others at 28 paragraph [79] [F]. 
194  Bhe v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others at 28 paragraph [79] [F]. 
195  Bhe v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others at 52 paragraph [162] [E]. 
 62 
indigenous law as originating from a society whose social system laid emphasis on 
obligations and responsibilities and not rights. It was from this societal context that the 
rule of succession, principally primogeniture, built up and functioned.196 The duty to care 
for the family is imperative and is an essential role in the African social system.197 
Kroeze describes such a society as one based on “the idea of “natural” privileges based 
on sex, birth and status”.198
 
 
Research in some countries shows that some of these designated heirs fail to discharge 
their duty as guardians to maintain or support the relevant wives and children.199 This 
phenomenon is described as “property grabbing”.200 The system leaves the widow with 
nothing to depend on and this is often the reason why these widows consider sex work 
for a living. This situation makes these widows extremely vulnerable to contracting 
HIV/AIDS. This problem of “property grabbing” has transformed the original nature of 
the customary law principle of primogeniture which was originally intended as a form of 
social security or support system.201
 
  
The customary law principle of primogeniture as it applies in the customary law of 
succession was the focus in the case of Bhe.202 This case was brought in the interest of 
the public and as a group action on behalf of all women and children prohibited from 
becoming the heir to on grounds of the impugned rule of male primogeniture.203
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rule of primogeniture, which was subsequently challenged.204 The two girls from 
Khayelithsa had been living with their parents up to the time that their father died.205
 
 
Under customary law the house was deemed to be the property of the eldest son or the 
eldest male relative. As a result of this, the grandfather of the two girls was the surviving 
eldest male relative. The grandfather proposed to sell the house. 
The court had to determine the constitutional legitimacy of section 23 of the Black 
Administration Act, together with the rules promulgated with it and the validity of the 
principle of primogeniture. The majority judgment held that section 23 of the Black 
Administration Act contains a violation of the rights of black African persons as it 
constitutes unfair discrimination on the grounds of gender and sex, violated women’s 
dignity and also discriminated against female and extra-marital children.206 The 
judgment was critical of the failure of customary law to take account of changing social 
conditions and the hardship which this caused for women and children. Langa DCJ 
further held that section 23 and its regulations are transparently inequitable and in 
violation of the rights to equality entrenched in section 9(3) and dignity in section 10 of 
the South African Constitution, and for that reason must be struck down.207 It was noted 
in this judgment that the exclusion of women from inheritance is a kind of unfairness 
which embodies an ancient representation of disadvantage towards a susceptible 
group, which is incompatible with the assurance of equality.208 The constitutional right to 
dignity recognises the importance of all persons as part of our society.209 The court 
ordered that the Intestate Succession Act210
 
 be applied to African people as it does to all 
South Africans who die without leaving wills. 
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The solution of developing customary law in line with the Constitution was not viable in 
this matter, since the rule of primogeniture could not be reconciled with the 
contemporary theories of equality and human dignity as laid down in the Bill of Rights.211 
The consequence was that the limitation imposed by this rule on the rights of women, 
girl children, extra-marital children and young males is “not reasonable and justifiable in 
an open and democratic society” based on the principles of fairness, human dignity and 
freedom”.212
 
 
The outcome of this judgement is highly significant for the reason that it regarded the 
customary law rule of primogeniture as accordingly unconstitutional and invalid against 
women, and illegitimate children.  
 
The promulgation of the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of 
Related Matters Act213 introduces a shift from the succession principle of primogeniture 
to devolution of intestate estates which takes all children and spouses into account.214 
This fundamental change is in line with the Constitution since its provisions are 
consistent with the notions of equality and human dignity.215
 
 
                                                 
211  Bhe v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others at 33 paragraph [95] [C]-[D]. 
212  Bhe v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others at 32 paragraph [91] [B]. 
213  Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009, 
published in GG No 32147 of 21 April 2009. 
214  Section 2(1) of the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 
reads as follows: “The estate or part of the estate of any person who is subject to customary law who 
dies after the commencement of this Act and whose estate does not devolve in terms of a will of 
such a person, must devolve in accordance with the law of intestate succession as regulated by the 
Intestate Succession Act , subject to subsection (2). (2) In the application of the Intestate Succession 
Act – (a) where the person referred to in subsection (1) is survived by a spouse, as well as a 
descendant, such spouse must inherit a child’s portion of the intestate estate or so much of the 
intestate estate as does not exceed in value the amount fixed from time to time by the Cabinet 
member responsible for the administration of justice by notice in the Gazette, whichever is the 
greater; (b) a woman, other than the wife of the deceased, with whom he had entered into a union in 
accordance with Customary law for the purpose of providing children to the house of his wife must, if 
she survives him, be regarded as a descendant of the deceased.” 
215  Section 2(1) of the Act, extends the application of the Intestate succession Act to apply to the 
intestate estates of a deceased whose estate was previously administered by the Black 
Administration Act. This new Act has finally curbed all uncertainties with respect to customary law 
inheritance. 
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The Bhe case verdict resulted in the ending of unfair legislation which embedded 
unfairness and which fossilised indigenous law. 216 It is also a significant step in doing 
away with legal pluralism founded on unfairness.217
 
  
It is useful to examine foreign case law on the continent which has so far proved to 
advance the status of African women, more importantly to remove the disabilities 
suffered under the application of the customary law principle of primogeniture. The 
supreme court of Zimbabwe in the case of Chihowa v Mangwende218 was faced with the 
facts similar to those in Bhe. The Chihowa case is an appeal against the decision of the 
community court which appointed Auxilia Mangwende as the intestate heiress of the 
deceased who was Auxilia’s father.219 The appellant (the deceased’s father) appealed 
this decision on the grounds that the magistrate in the court a quo erred in finding that 
Auxilia was the intestate heiress.220 His further argument was that the magistrate erred 
when he found that “real and substantial justice” demanded that Auxilia be the 
heiress.221 Overturning the judgment of the court a quo, Chief Justice Dumbuthsena 
explained how the customary law of inheritance had put women in dire situations.222 
She remarked in her judgement that “where a man used to inherit for the benefit of the 
dependants of the deceased, now a woman can do the same.”223
 
  
Despite the above legal developments, the principle of primogeniture is still practiced. 
The impact of this exacerbates the situation of women and children living under 
customary law, specifically if this discriminatory practice leaves them without any 
means. Often these women have to resort to sex work to survive, or become involved in 
abusive relationships, whereas the children are left in the care of other family members 
or join the large number of street children. Primogeniture is one cultural custom whose 
                                                 
216  Van Niekerk “Succession, living indigenous Law and Ubuntu In the Constitutional court” at 475. 
217  Van Niekerk 475. 
218  Chihowa v Mangwende 1987 (1) ZLR 228 (SC). 
219  Chihowa v Mangwende at 229 paragraph [C]. 
220  Chihowa v Mangwende at 233 paragraph [G]. 
221  Chihowa v Mangwende at 229 paragraph [G]. 
222  Chihowa v Mangwende at 233 paragraph [E]. 
223  Chihowa v Mangwende at 230 paragraph [B]. 
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impact on the lives of women and children is indirect and subtle, yet instrumental in 
increasing the vulnerability of women and children in respect of HIV/AIDS and violence. 
 
2.6 FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION224
 
 
Female circumcision or excisions are terms used interchangeably with female genital 
mutilation (hereafter referred to as FGM).225 FGM is also known as genital cutting.226 
FGM is a collective name relating to a number of diverse traditional rituals that highlight 
the physical disfigurement connected with this exercise.227 FGM is predominantly 
practised in the sub-Saharan countries and in Egypt.228 Of the forty-three African 
countries, twenty-six practice FGM.229 It is also said to be practised among certain 
communities in the Middle East and Asia, including parts of United Arab Emirates, 
Yemen, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia.230 In 2004 it was reported that eighty-nine 
percent of the total population of women in Sudan were circumcised.231 Female genital 
mutilation is practiced by Muslims, Christians and one Jewish sector, the Falasha of 
Ethopia.232 It is also practiced in some communities in North and South America.233
 
 
Some non-governmental organisations (such as No Peace without Justice, an Italian 
non-governmental agency) aim to have FGM abolished.234
                                                 
224  See also introductory discussion on female genital mutilation in chapter one above. 
 According to this 
organisation, approximately 120 to 130 million women worldwide have undergone 
225  Richmond & Gestrin at 46. 
226  McMichael P Development and social change: A global perspective (2004, California: Pine Forge 
Press) at 265.  
227  See http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/content/full/pediatrics;102/1/153 (visited 16 September 
2008)  
228  Richmond & Gestrin at 46. 
229  See http://www.rho.org/html/hthps_overview.htm (visited 13 September 2008). 
230  See http://www.rho.org/html/hthps_overview.htm (visited 13 September 2008). 
231  McMichael at 265 
232  Richmond & Gestrin at 46. 
233  See http://www.ugpulse.com/articles/daily/Health.asp?id=587 (visited 12 October 2008). 
234  See http://www.ugpulse.com/articles/daily/Health.asp?id=587 (visited 14 October 2008). 
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FGM.235 Experts report that almost all of the 120 million women who were subjected to 
FGM come from twenty-eight countries, including South Africa.236
 
 
In South Africa alone, approximately two million girls are subjected to this practice 
annually. Female circumcision is symbolically analogous to male circumcision.237 The 
difference between the male and the female circumcision is that female circumcision is 
far more extensive and its consequences are physical, psychosomatic, violent and long 
lasting.238
 
 
Female genital mutilation is not a requirement of any religious doctrine but is mainly 
based on cultural belief.239 Its origins are vague. It is believed to have originated in 
Egypt more than 2000 years ago.240
 
  
FGM involves the procedure in which parts of girls external genitals are expurgated 
without anaesthesia. The girls subjected to this procedure experience pain, trauma, and 
regularly severe physical problems such as blood loss, infections or even death.241
 
  
The age required to qualify for this ritual differs from place to place.242 In Ethiopia the 
required age for the ritual to be performed is a seven days after birth,243 whereas in 
Somali the ritual is performed between the ages of six and seven years.244
 
 
Among Africans the procedure is said to be requested by a child’s parents or 
conservative grandparents.245
                                                 
235  See http://www.ugpulse.com/articles/daily/Health.asp?id=587 (visited 14 October 2008). 
 Such parents and grandparents see this procedure as a 
236  Gutto S Equality and non-discrimination in South Africa: The political economy of law and law 
making (2001, Cape Town: New Africa Books) at 86.  
237  Richmond & Gestrin at 46. 
238  Richmond & Gestrin at 46. 
239  Richmond & Gestrin at 46. 
240  Richmond & Gestrin at 46. 
241  Richmond & Gestrin at 47. 
242  Denniston G C & Mibs M F Sexual mutilations: A human tragedy (1997, New York: Springer) at 140. 
243  Denniston & Mibs at 140. 
244  Denniston & Mibs 140. 
245  Richmond & Gestrin 47. 
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rite of passage which transforms a girl into a woman.246 Some parents firmly believe 
failing to carry out this procedure will prevent daughters from finding husbands. 
Traditionalists argue that this ritual keeps girls pure and clean for their marriage and this 
will result in the women’s devotion and faithfulness to their husbands.247
 
 
2.6.1 TYPES OF FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION 
 
Normally a village expert, lay person, or midwife does the ritual at a cost. The procedure 
is done by means of an assortment of tools, such as knives, razor blades, broken glass, 
or scissors.248 In developed countries doctors may be required to carry out FGM in 
sterilized conditions and making use of anaesthesia.249
 
 
Figure A250 below shows the typical genital structure of a 
                                                 
246  Richmond & Gestrin 47. 
pre-pubertal girl before the 
ritual has been performed. FGM is classified into three categories based on the 
invasiveness or severity of the structural disfigurement. Figures B, C and D below show 
the different types of FGM.  
247  Richmond & Gestrin 47. 
248  See http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/content/full/pediatrics;102/1/153 (visited 16 September 
2008). 
249  See http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/content/full/pediatrics;102/1/153 (visited 16 September 
2008). 
250  http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/content/full/pediatrics;102/1/153 (visited 09 February 2009). 
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2.6.2 EFFECTS OF FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION 
 
FGM has turned out to be a health and human rights matter in western countries such 
as Australia, Canada, England, France and the United States of America. Its physical 
harm has drawn world-wide attention. In 1996 the United States legislative body passed 
criminal law legislation prohibiting the ritual in the United States.251 The legislation also 
mandated education of specific immigrant groups on the health effects of this practice. 
Considering the unclean surroundings under which FGM takes place, attention should 
be drawn to the fact that the practice presents a risk to the spread of the HIV.252 
Researchers in Ethiopia who studied the probable connection between FGM and 
HIV/AIDS253 established that there is a crystal clear-risk, especially in cases where 
FGM is practiced as an initiation rite in conditions where the same unwashed and 
unsterilised knives are used in the process of operating.254 The health risks associated 
with the use of crude equipment that circumcisers use to deform guiltless girls should be 
widely communicated.255 If the utilisation of these tools is not stopped, they become 
instruments causing death and serious physical and psychological harm to young 
innocent girls in the name of culture and tradition.256
 
 
From a human rights perspective, FGM constitutes an abuse of women’s rights, 
including an impairment of women’s sexual pleasure, physical and physiological health 
that are extremely invasive and uncalled for. 257
 
 
The question arises whether FGM should be proscribed as a customary practice for the 
reason that it authorises the torture of female children and submits them to degrading 
treatment. It places them at a high risk of contracting HIV/AIDS. This and other 
                                                 
251  Richmond & Gestrin 47. 
252  Denniston & Mibs at 140. 
253  Denniston & Mibs at 140. 
254  Denniston & Mibs at 140. 
255  Karanja N D Female genital mutilation in Africa: Gender, religion and pastoral care (2003, Virginia: 
Xulon Press) at 65. 
256  Karanja at 65. 
257  McMichael 265. 
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questions raised earlier in this chapter will be discussed in the subsequent chapter 
which will also examine this ritual more closely from a human rights perspective. 
 
2.7 THE PRACTICE OF DRY SEX258
 
 
Dry sex is also known as vaginal drying.259 Literature on dry sex suggests that dry sex is 
widely practiced by women260 for hygienic purposes.261 As explained in chapter one 
above, this practice entails the artificial drying of the vagina for the sexual gratification of 
males.262 The purpose of vaginal drying is to make sure that the vagina is “hot, tight and 
dry”. 263
 
 
Despite the dangers associated with this practice for HIV transmission, people continue 
to practice dry sex. In an interview conducted amongst sex workers who practice dry 
sex, thirty-three percent of the sex workers remarked that dry sex is a painful customary 
practice.264 In spite of the painful process, it is continued in an attempt to attract male 
clients265 who in turn pay higher prices for sex offered by sex workers who engage in 
this practice.266 Eighty-six percent of women in Tanzania who were randomly 
interviewed in relation to dry sex admitted to practice dry sex.267
 
 
                                                 
258  See also the introductory discussion on the practice of dry sex in chapter one above. 
259  Kitts J et al The health gap: Beyond pregnancy and reproduction (1996, Ottawa: International 
Development Research Centre) at 73. 
260  Davis A J & Tschunin V Essentials of teaching and learning in nursing ethics (2006, Oxford: Elsevier 
Health Science) at 295. 
261  Karim A HIV/AIDS in South Africa (2005, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) at 291. 
262  Karim at 291. 
263  Baleka A “Concern voiced over ‘dry sex’ practices in South Africa” The Lancet 352 at 1292. 
264  Karim at 291. 
265  Karim at 291. 
266  Segal S J Under the Banyan tree: A population scientist’s odyssey (2003, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press) at 188.See also Baleka at 1292 in this regard who noted that an interview conducted on 
prostitutes between the ages of 15 and 45 in South Africa showed that they favoured dry sex. These 
sex workers are said to focus on truck stops in South Africa. The mobility of truck drivers who may 
become infected with HIV poses a huge problem that contributes towards the spreading of HIV. 
267  Baleka at 1292. 
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KwaZulu-Natal is said to be the province in South Africa where dry sex is mostly 
practiced. It is incidentally also the area with the highest prevalence of HIV/AIDS in 
South Africa.268
 
  
Despite the fact that dry sex is practiced to please male sex partners and clients, it is 
also reported that to be practised to remove the wetness in the vagina caused by Depo-
Provera, a contraceptive injection, which leads to increased vaginal wetness.269 Some 
men are said to complain about this excess wetness.270 Certain women hence remove 
the excess wetness through the practice of vaginal drying271
 
 or alternatively by failing to 
continue with the contraceptive injection. Both these actions have dire consequences 
for their exposure to HIV. 
2.7.1  FOCAL CONCERNS OF DRY SEX IN THE HIV/AIDS ERA 
 
• Dry sex generates conditions where friction of the genital area is highly 
probable.272 The substance used by women may cause disturbances in the 
membrane lining the vagina and the uterine wall.273
• Friction in the genital organs correlates with irritation of the white cells causing 
optimum exposure to HIV.
 
274
• Dry sex is linked with the failure or reluctance to use condoms, while condom 
usage is linked with a decrease in HIV transmission.
 
275
• Dry sex wipes out the bacteria which assist in fighting infection.
 
276
• The practice also increases the likelihood that a condom may be torn.
 
277
 
 
                                                 
268  Baleka at 1292. 
269  Davis & Tschunin at 295. 
270  Davis & Tschunin at 295. 
271  Davis & Tschunin at 295. 
272  Davis & Tschunin at 295. 
273  Baleka at 1292. 
274  Davis & Tschunin at 295. 
275  Davis & Tschunin at 295. 
276  Alcamo E AIDS (2003, Boston: Jones and Bartlett publishers) at 136. 
277  Alcamo 136. 
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There is no doubt that the cultural practice of drying of the vagina places women at a 
very high risk of becoming infected by HIV. The practice is again also linked with 
women’s gender inequality and their subordinate position in rural societies. 
 
2.8  CONCLUSION 
 
The discussion above has pointed to a number of cultural practices that in varying 
degrees increase women’s vulnerability, be it from an economic or physiological 
perspective. Some of these customs directly place women at an increased risk of HIV. 
The result brought about by these cultural practices is physical, sexual or psychological 
harm. The effects brought about by such practices are clearly not in conformity with 
human rights instruments such as the South African Constitution and CEDAW. The 
human rights aspects associated with these practices will be considered in more detail 
next. 
 
It must be made clear that not all customary practices have this discriminatory effect. 
Customary law, like any other laws, is open to change and resistance and needs to 
adapt to keep up with social and other developments. It is often ironical that the purpose 
of a specific custom may initially indeed have been to provide financial security or 
stability to women and children, but over time may have changed as a result of various 
factors, leading to a practice that now in fact provides the opposite and discriminates 
against vulnerable and marginalised groups in society. Although outside the scope of 
this dissertation, it is suggested that it would be impractical and impossible to blindly 
discard those practices which date back many years. Customary institutions that 
discriminate against or which are harmful to women (by increasing their exposure to 
HIV) should be identified, and where possible, be developed in line with the 
constitutional objective of gender equality, without relinquishing the true and positive 
values that underlie a relevant custom. 
 74 
“To achieve aspirations for public health and human rights, society must carefully examine its duties to 
promote public health, to respect human dignity, and to empower vulnerable persons to protect 
themselves.” (Gostin L O et al Human rights and public health in the AIDS pandemic (1997, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) at 55. 
 
CHAPTER 3 
PART 1: HIV/AIDS AND GENDER EQUALITY: A REVIEW OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION  
  
Just as culture is not an aspect which has to be barred from the human rights equation, 
so too it should it not be given the position of a metanorm which challenges rights.1 A 
number of cultural practices do not meet the universal human rights standards and 
seem too complex if not impossible to reconcile with such standards.2 Foot binding, 
child slavery or oppression, and female infanticide in various societies are instances of 
customs which have by now yielded in response to heated culture-based discussions in 
support of human rights standards.3
 
 Closer to home the customary principles and 
practices of patriarchy, dry sex, polygamy, primogeniture, early marriage and female 
genital mutilation pose a potential threat to the fundamental human rights of certain 
women, as discussed in a previous chapter. 
HIV/AIDS is unquestionably not only a private sphere matter, but also a public health 
matter.4 Health and human rights have not often been correlated in a precise manner.5 
Yet health and human rights are mutually dominant, contemporary approaches to 
defining and advancing the well-being of persons.6
                                                 
1  Alston P “The best interest principle: Towards a reconciliation of culture and human rights” (1994) 8 
International Journal of Law and the Family 1-25 at 20. 
 Health matters have often been 
2  Alston at 20. 
3  Alston at 20. 
4  Valdiserri R O Dawning answers: How the HIV/AIDS epidemic has helped to strengthen public health 
(2003, Oxford: Oxford University Press) 4. 
5  Mann J M et al Health and human rights (1990, New York: Routledge) at 7. 
6  Mann at 7. 
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neglected in human rights talks with the exception of instances where an apparent harm 
and possible human right threat was evident.7
 
 
One of the reasons for the lack of interaction between the fields of health and human 
rights include the nature of the contemporary models of both human rights and health 
which are often both viewed as obscure and progressively developing.8 Health 
professionals often question the effectiveness of integrating human rights theories into 
their work and vice versa.9 Regardless of ground-breaking work attempting to bridge 
this perceived gap in bioethics, jurisprudence and public health law, a record of 
discordant connections between health professional and public advocates or between 
medicine and law may perhaps appear to add to the uncertainty regarding the 
prospective of a successful joint collaboration.10
 
 The extent of health issues resulting 
from an abuse of fundamental rights and dignity remains to a large extent under 
appreciated. 
It is clear from the preceding chapters that the risk of HIV infection amongst women is 
an apparent health issue which cannot be resolved without a review and consideration 
of human rights. Upholding and protecting the human rights would strengthen women’s 
capacity to negotiate for example safe sex, thus protecting them against possible HIV 
infection.11
 
 
This chapter will provide a detailed overview of specific human rights which are under 
threat by certain cultural practices and customs which continue to be harmful to many 
women in the contemporary social and legal context. This chapter consists of two parts: 
Part one will examine the nature of the right to equality with specific emphasis on 
                                                 
7  Mann 7. 
8  Mann 7. 
9  Mann 7. 
10  Mann 7. 
11  Oesstreich J E Power and principle: Human rights programming in international organizations (2007, 
Georgetown: Georgetown University) at 133-134. 
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gender equality, considering also the framework that courts apply when faced with a 
matter concerning sex or gender discrimination (eg the equality test). 
 
The second part of the chapter will turn to the rights of dignity, freedom and security of 
the person, the right to access to health care services, as well as the right to education. 
The purpose of this discussion is to provide the backdrop against which the 
constitutionality of some of these cultural customs and practices, some nothing but 
glaring examples of gender violence, will be more closely scrutinised. The discussion 
will be limited to these selected rights, despite the fact that some of these practices may 
also infringe other constitutional rights, notably the right to privacy, which is relevant in 
relation to HIV-testing and disclosure.12
 
 
                                                 
12  The right to privacy was briefly discussed in chapter one above. An example of an invasion of a 
person’s constitutional right to privacy is the taking of a person’s blood for testing without consent, 
see S v Orrie 2004 3 SA 584 (C) 589–590, regarding the taking of a DNA blood test for criminal 
investigations; C v Minister of Correctional Services 1996 4 SA 292 (T) on a blood test for HIV/Aids, 
or Klein v Attorney-General WLD 1995 3 SA 848 (W) regarding the restoring of previously erased 
computer information. Neethling refers to M v R 1989 1 SA 416 (O) 426 where Kotze J describes the 
wrongfulness in principle (except if a ground of justification, such as a court order exists) of a blood 
test: “[T]he taking of a blood sample which is normally in effect not much more than a prick of a 
needle, can be regarded technically as a violation of the right to privacy, as is contemplated in the 
law of personality”. See Neethling’s Law of personality (2005) (2nd ed) at 224, fn 65. In C v Minister of 
Correctional Services 1996 (4) SA 292 (T), which deals with a HIV test on a prisoner without his 
informed consent, it was held that the manner in which the test was carried out not only constituted 
an assault on the prisoner’s, C’s, corpus, but also an iniuria in the form of an invasion of C’s privacy 
(per Kirk-Cohen J at 301B). In the later case of NM v Smith (Freedom Institute as Amicus Curiae) 
2007 (5) SA 250 (CC), which concerns the unauthorised disclosure and publication of the HIV-status 
of the applicants by the respondents, the Constitutional Court held that the publication of the HIV-
status of the applicants constituted a wrongful publication of a private fact and that the applicants’ 
right to privacy was breached by the respondents (per Madala J). For a detailed discussion of patient 
privacy in the context of medical law, see in general Carstens & Pearmain Foundational principles of 
South African medical law (2007, Durban: LexisNexis) chapter 11 and the cases referred to there. 
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3.2  THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY  
 
3.2.1 THEORETICAL OBSERVATIONS 
 
The customary-law principle of patriarchy as well as how this principle affects the legal 
position of women in society was examined in the previous chapter. As noted earlier, 
this principle subjects women, especially black rural women, under the entire control of 
their husbands. These women are consequently marginalised as a group dominated by 
male authority in almost every decision within these families.  
 
It is evident from the previous chapter that poverty and inequality are gendered and that 
most of the victims of poverty and gender inequality are black women, specifically black 
rural women.  
 
The Constitution of South Africa13 prohibits discrimination by the state or any other 
person on inter alia the grounds of gender, age and race. Equality is said to be at the 
centre and heart of the Constitution as well as its organising principle.14 The Constitution 
is irreconcilable with any laws and practices that support the subordination of 
disadvantaged groups and undermine their worth.15
                                                 
13  Section 9 of the Constitution reads as follows:  
 It follows that any law, practise or 
rule which is founded on the notion of inferiority of women should be condemned. 
9(1) “Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.  
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.  
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.  
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds 
in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination.  
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is 
established that the discrimination is fair.” 
14  Kommers D P American constitutional law essays cases and comparative notes (2004, Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield) at 995. 
15  O’ Sullivan M, in Woolman et al Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd ed) (2007, Cape Town: Juta) 
at 37-12. 
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Equality is not merely a fundamental right of women, but is also a social and political 
instrument to bring about a more just, impartial, and sustainable advancement for 
everyone.16 Equality stands as an indispensable standard in interpreting the 
Constitution. What reinforces the importance of the right to equality is that within the Bill 
of Rights, the right to equality is the first substantive right.17 Together with the concepts 
of dignity and freedom it influences the explanation and application of all other rights 
contained in chapter 2 of the Constitution.18 The idea of an “open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom” flows evenly through the 
Constitution.19
 
 
Both natural and juristic persons can invoke the rights contained in the Bill of Rights.20 
Section 8(2)21
                                                 
16  Alger C F The future of the United Nations system: Potential for the twenty-first century (1998, United 
Nations University Press) at 259. See also Leonen T & Rodrigues P R Non discrimination law: 
Comparative perspectives (1999, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff) 3. 
 asserts that a stipulation in the Bill of Rights binds natural or juristic 
persons if, and to the extent that it is applicable, considering the attributes of the right as 
well as the nature of any duty imposed by the right. The wording of section 8(2) denotes 
that some rights such as the right to dignity, privacy and equality before the law and 
equal protection and benefit before the law may perhaps apply as between private 
persons whilst other rights for example, the right to citizenship, and rights that relate to 
arrest and detention do not apply as between persons but between the state and an 
17  Van Reenen TP “Equality, discrimination and affirmative action: An analysis of section 9 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa” (1997) 12 SA Public Law 151-165 at 152. See also 
International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy et al Pluralism and law: 
Proceedings of the 20th IVR World Congress, Amsterdam (2004, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag) at 
134. 
18  Van Reenen at 152. 
19  Van Reenen at 152. 
20  Andrew B The international survey of family law (1998, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) at 
436. 
21  Section 8(2) of the Constitution reads as follows: “A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a 
juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and 
the nature of any duty imposed by their right.” Also see Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and 
Another 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) at 667 paragraph [8]. 
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individual as per section 8(1).22
 
 The former denotes a horizontal application of the bill of 
rights while the latter indicates a vertical application of the Bill of Rights. 
Section 9 of the Constitution is open to diverse interpretations.23 The most important 
question is whether section 9 in its entirety should be construed to embed equality in a 
formal or substantive sense.24 Formal equality holds that every person is an equal 
bearer of rights and obligations within a fair and lawful order,25 for example in analysing 
a specific statute in order to establish if a pertinent explanation exist for similar or 
different treatment.26 Equality is hence a “state of affairs” which can be realised by 
awarding equal rights to everyone in conformity with the “same, general, non-
preferential” standard.27 The formal meaning of equality has thus nothing to do with 
“institutionalised, structural distinctions” in equality.28 It pays no attention to real social 
and economic differences between persons and categories in society. As a result it has 
a propensity to support and establish rather than do away with inequalities.29
 
 
Substantive equality, on the other hand, entails the analysis of the real material 
circumstances of persons and categories of persons, at the same time exploring how 
government action can restructure and improve unfavourable social and economic 
conditions.30
                                                 
22  Section 8(1) of the Constitution reads as follows: “The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the 
legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.” For an in-depth discussion on the 
horizontal and vertical application of the Bill of Rights see the following cases: Du Plessis and Others 
v De Klerk and Another 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) at 667 paragraph [8], where the Constitutional 
court stated that the term “vertical application” is used to indicate “that the rights conferred on 
persons by a bill of rights are intended only as a protection against the legislative and executive 
power of the State in its various manifestations. The term “horizontal application” on the other hand 
indicates that those rights also govern the relationships between individuals, and may be invoked by 
them in their private law disputes.” 
 Substantive equality is hence sensitive to and concerned with the concrete 
23  Van Reenen 154. 
24  Van Reenen 154. 
25  Macklem P Indigenous indifference and the Constitution of Canada (2001, Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press) at 212. See also Van Reenen at 153. 
26  Macklem 212. 
27  Van Reenen 153. 
28  Macklem 212. See also Van Reenen 153. 
29  Van Reenen 153. 
30  Macklem 212. 
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social and economic circumstances which may result in disparities and discrimination 
between persons and categories of people.31
 
 
Section 9(1) of the Constitution assures every individual the right to be “equal before the 
law” and to “equal protection and benefit of the law”.32 Whereas each of these 
expressions denotes an individual and different meaning, they have common 
characteristics and harmonise each other in providing a complete legal framework when 
applying the right to equality.33
 
  
Against the background of South Africa’s history of inequality and subjugation along 
with the call for transformation and restructuring, procedural equality seems to be the 
essential nature of equality before the law.34 Besides its authoritarian and beneficiary 
functions, “equal protection and benefit of the law” denotes government action that will 
advance the safeguard of susceptible and disadvantaged persons and categories of 
people from abuse by more dominant individuals and groups.35
 
 
Section 9(3) provides that the state may not unjustly discriminate directly or indirectly on 
the sixteen grounds established. Some of these grounds relevant to this study are those 
of gender and sex.36 Sections 9(3) and 9(4) make the equality clause pertinent to both 
the government and private person jointly in public and private law dealings.37 This 
unambiguously planned vertical and horizontal function of section 9 is also 
substantiated by the Constitutional court in dealing with the final text of section 8(2) in 
the Certification case.38
  
 
                                                 
31  Van Reenen 153. 
32  Van Reenen 154. 
33  Van Reenen 154. 
34  Campbell T Sceptical essays on human rights (2001, Oxford: Oxford University Press) at 304. See 
also Van Reenen at 155. 
35  Van Reenen 156. 
36  Van Reenen 156. 
37  Van Reenen 156. 
38  In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic Of South Africa 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at 
1280D-1281C. 
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The final Constitution of South Africa is much clearer on the horizontal application of the 
Bill of Rights compared to the interim Constitution.39 Considering the historical 
background of South Africa as well as the necessity for transforming the South African 
society, the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights is essential as a vertical 
application is not at all times sufficient to deal with the existing discrepancies.40
 
 
Section 9 states that everyone has a right to be equal before the law as well as a right 
to the equal protection and benefit before the law.41 It is indispensable to state that 
section 9(4) also explicitly states that “[n]o person may unfairly discriminate … against 
anyone […].”This expression is completely different from the extensively used words 
(“everyone has the right to…”) central to the general application of the Bill of Rights,42 
making it clear that the proscription in respect of unfair discrimination binds private 
persons in their dealings with each other.43 It is as a result possible to argue that in 
South Africa, private dealings, be they administered by legislation, customary law or a 
religious systems of law, are not protected from the application of the Bill of Rights.44
 
 
The potential for conflict between customary law and the right to equality, as this study 
will illustrate, is great. Equality as protected in section 9 and the customary law principle 
of patriarchy are irreconcilable. If patriarchy leads to an unequal relationship between 
the sexes in a specific community, the matter is between private persons and hence the 
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights will be applicable. 
                                                 
39  Bradshaw Y W & Ndegwa S N The uncertain promises of Southern Africa (2001, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press) at 277. 
40  Rabe J Equality, affirmative action and justice (2001, Norderstedt: Books on Demand GmbH) 329. 
Rabe further points out the negative aspects of involved with application of the Constitution in a 
horizontal way. He states that “there are however both positive and negative aspects involved with 
regards to the application of the horizontal application of the constitutional provisions. The negative 
side of the horizontal application is the state’s encroachment in the private sphere and the difficulty 
containing the ambit of the application. The complete horizontal application of the Bill of rights is 
unacceptable as this would for example mean that it would apply to family relationships and a child 
may claim a violation of his/her rights if other children in the family received some other benefits”. 
Rabe at 329. 
41  Andrew B International survey of family law (1998, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) at 437. 
42  Andrew 437. 
43  Andrew 437. 
44  Bradshaw & Ndegwa 278. 
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Discrimination may be direct or indirect.45 Direct discrimination takes place in 
circumstances were a person is disadvantaged merely on the basis of race, sex, 
ethnicity, religion and the like.46 Motive or intention seems immaterial in finding whether 
behaviour resulting in harm amounts to direct discrimination.47 In the City Council of 
Pretoria v Walker case48 the Constitutional court found that motive or intention is not a 
requisite in finding whether harmful conduct amounts to direct discrimination. The 
application of a precise standard, for instance gender or disability is all that is pertinent 
in a bid to establish discrimination.49
 
 
Indirect discrimination takes place when, for example, impartial policies are related in a 
way that unfavourably influence a unequal number of a portion of an explicit group.50 
Both direct and indirect discrimination can be premeditated or inadvertent.51 The neutral 
criterion may perhaps be implemented with the purpose of selecting out affiliates of a 
particular group, or it may be implemented in good faith and even so have a 
disadvantageous effect on a disproportionate amount of a particular group.52 The 
peculiarity between direct and indirect discrimination is as a result not merely a 
distinction between deliberate and inadvertent discrimination.53
 
 
                                                 
45  Cotter A M et al Discrimination law: Professional practice guide (2005, London: Routledge 
Cavendish) at 1. 
46  Van Reenen at 158.The South African Constitution, particularly sections 9(3) and (4) prohibit both 
direct and indirect discrimination. For interest’s sake, the American Constitution and the German 
Constitution do not contain any reference to indirect discrimination and the prohibition has gradually 
developed via case law. The South African Constitution has evaded this problem by expressly 
prohibiting both direct and indirect discrimination. With respect to the aforementioned, see Rabe J 
Equality, affirmative action and justice (2001, Noderstedt: Books on Demand GmbH) at 322. 
47  Rabe 322.Rabe points out that the South African position, which does not require motive or intention 
in establishing whether harmful behaviour amounts to direct discrimination, is different from the 
position in the United States of America. In the US a form of intent is required and in Germany the 
position is that there has to be a causal connection between the harm suffered and the prohibited 
characteristic. See also Van Reenen at 159. 
48  City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 CC at paragraph [31]. 
49  Van Reenen 159. 
50  Cotter at 2. See also Van Reenen 159. 
51  Van Reenen 159. 
52  Van Reenen 159. 
53  Van Reenen at 159. 
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The implicit proscription of both direct and indirect discrimination in sections 9(3) and 
9(4) guarantees that our courts will implement an adequately wide approach in respect 
of what comprises discrimination. The reason of enclosing both expressions is to 
undoubtedly offer an ample protection against unfair discrimination.54 Hence both direct 
and indirect discrimination should be interpreted as descriptions of the diverse forms 
which discrimination may assume and not as two jointly exclusive groups into which 
claims should be fixed.55
 
  
Applying the notion of equality, labelled by Albertyn and Goldblatt as a “complex right”, 56 
however, has shown to be quite challenging.57 In Prinsloo v Van der Linde and 
Another58
 
 it was remarked that issues of equality need to be brought about 
“incrementally and on a case by case basis with special emphasis on the actual context 
in which the problem arises”.  
It is now necessary to examine how the Constitutional court has interpreted the right to 
equality in order to give meaning to it.59 The starting point and basis for the discussion 
that follows on what constitutes unfair gender discrimination will be the Harksen case.60
 
 
The next discussion will hopefully assist in illustrating not only the complexity of 
adjudicating on sex and gender equality, but also provide the theoretical context against 
which the subsequent constitutional scrutiny of some of those cultural customs 
examined earlier will become more clear.  
                                                 
54  Van Reenen at 159. 
55  Van Reenen at 159. 
56  Albertyn C & Goldblatt B “Section 9 -The right to equality”, paper presented at the Constitutional Law 
of South Africa Conference, 29 March 2006, at Constitutional Hill, at 1. (Copy of paper on file with 
author). 
57  Jagwanth S “South Africa: The inequality challenge” (2000) 15(3) South African Report Archive 3-30 
at 30. 
58  Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Another 1997 (6) BCLR paragraph [20]. 
59  Campbell T Sceptical essays on human rights (2001, Oxford: Oxford University Press) at 303. 
60  Harksen v Lane NO & Others 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC). Also see Campbell 303. 
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3.2.2  WHAT CONSTITUTES UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUND 
OF GENDER? 
 
A question whether specific conduct unfairly discriminates on the ground of equality 
firstly needs to determine whether the given conduct or statutory provision makes a 
distinction between people or categories, and if so, whether this distinction is a rational 
one. 61
 
 
3.2.2.1 Does the given provision make a distinction between people or categories? 
 
In the Harksen case62 the applicant challenged section 21 of the Insolvency Act63 on 
ground that it violated the applicant’s constitutional guarantee to equality. It was argued 
that the effect of the stipulations contained in section 21 constitutes an unequal 
treatment of solvent spouses and unjustly discriminates against them64 by inflicting a 
heavy load and debt on the applicant (solvent spouse) different than those relevant to 
other persons with whom the insolvent had transactions or associations or whose 
possessions were found in the control of the insolvent.65
                                                 
61  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1505 at paragraph [42]. See also Albertyn & Goldblatt at 4. 
 On appeal it was held that 
62  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1490. 
63  Section 21(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 reads as follows: 
“Effect of sequestration on property of spouse of insolvent – (1) The additional effect of the 
sequestration of the separate estate of one of two spouses who are not living apart under a judicial 
order of separation shall be to vest in the Master, until a trustee has been appointed, and, upon the 
appointment of a trustee, to vest in him all the property (including property or the proceeds thereof 
which are in the hands of a sheriff or a messenger under a writ of attachment) of the spouse whose 
estate has not been sequestrated (hereinafter referred to as the solvent spouse) as if it were 
property of the sequestrated estate, and to empower the Master or trustee to deal with such property 
accordingly, but subject to the following provisions of this section. The trustee shall release any 
property of the solvent spouse which is proved - (a) to have been the property of that spouse 
immediately before her or his marriage to the insolvent or before the first day of October, 1926; or (b) 
to have been acquired by that spouse under a marriage settlement; or (c) to have been acquired by 
that spouse during the marriage with the insolvent by a title valid as against creditors of the insolvent; 
or (d) to be safeguarded in favour of that spouse by section twenty-eight of this Act or by the 
Insurance Act, 1923 (Act No. 37 of 1923); […].” 
64  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1505 at paragraph [40]. 
65  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1491. The widely published judgment by Goldstone J, Chaskalson 
P, Langa DP, Ackermann and Kriegler JJ (concurring) established section 21 was not inconsistent 
with the equality clause. Justices O’Regan, Madala and Mokgoro, on the other hand, found that 
section 21 ought to be found to be incompatible with the equality clause. 
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section 21 indeed differentiated between the solvent partner of an insolvent and others 
with whom the insolvent had transactions or associations or whose possessions were 
found in the control of the insolvent.66
 
 
In the case of Jordan v State67 the question of whether section 20(1)(aA) of the Sexual 
Offences Act68 (which criminalised sex work) differentiated between sex worker and a 
client had to be answered. The court a quo established that there was indeed a 
differentiation between two categories of people and that this differentiation was 
“obviously unjustified discrimination between not only sexes but also persons.”69
 
  
On appeal in the Constitutional court, however, the majority decision regarded the 
relevant provision of the Sexual Offences Act as gender-neutral as it the provision refers 
to both sexes, eg “any person” who engages in sex for reward.70 Ngcobo J observes 
that there is a qualitative distinction between a prostitute who carries out the trade of 
prostitution for a reward and is as a result likely to be a recurring offender on the one 
hand, and the client who seeks the services of a prostitute simply on an instance and 
therefore might or possibly will not be a repeat offender.71 He describes the 
differentiation resulting from the relevant provision as an ordinary distinction found in a 
number of statues such as the Dangerous Weapons Act72 and the Sea Fishery Act,73 to 
mention but a few.74
                                                 
66  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1512 paragraph [55]. 
 
67  Jordan and Others v S and Others 2002 (11) BCLR 1117 (CC) at 1119-1123. 
68  23 of 1957. Section 20(1)(aA) reads as follows: “Persons living on earnings of prostitution or 
committing or assisting in commission of indecent acts - (1) Any person who (a) knowingly lives 
wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution; or (b) in public or in private in any way assists in 
bringing about, or receives any consideration for, the commission by any person of any act of 
indecency with another person shall be guilty of an offence […].” 
69  S v Jordan and Others 2001 (10) BCLR at 1058 paragraph [a]. 
70  Jordan and Others v S and Others 2002 (11) BCLR 1117 at 1120 paragraph [8]. 
71  Jordan and Others v S and Others at 1120 paragraph [10]. 
72  Section 3(3) of the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 reads as follows: “Any person who 
manufactures, sells or supplies any object in contravention of the provisions of any notice issued in 
terms of subsection (1), shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years.” 
73  Section 47(f) of the Sea Fishery Act 12 of 1988 reads as follows: “Any person who -possesses, sells 
or displays or offers for sale any fish or any portion of fish the catching of which is prohibited by this 
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The majority (as per Ngcobo J with Chaskalson CJ, Kriegler, Madala JJ, Du Plessis and 
Skweyiya AJ concurring) held that section 20(1)(aA) was constitutional and valid.75 In 
reaching this conclusion, Ngcobo J emphasised the following points, namely that (1) the 
impugned stipulation did not directly differentiate because it is gender neutral;76 (2) the 
impugned provision did not indirectly discriminate between women for the reason that 
there is a “qualitative difference” between sex workers and their customers;77 (3) any 
outcome of unfairness is not unfair for the reason that the purpose of the law is so 
important, and any disgrace and stigma that relates to sex workers is owed to social 
attitudes and not to the law;78 and that (4) any discrimination which results when the law 
is applied does not indicate that there is a defect contained by that law.79
 
 
The minority judgement, on the contrary (as per O’Regan and Sachs JJ with Langa 
DCJ, Ackermann and Goldstone JJ concurring) established that section 20(1)(aA) 
constituted unfair discrimination on the basis of gender.80 The minority judgement also 
noted that the section promoted “harmful sexual stereotypes” which must be avoided in 
a society that strives for gender equality.81
 
  
                                                 
Act; shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding R50 000 or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding six years or to both such fine and such imprisonment”. 
74  The minority judgement in the Jordan case attempted the issue from the question whether a 
constitutionally compatible interpretation of the section 20(1)(aA) exists. Counsel for the state argued 
that a broader approach to interpreting the section should be used which approach would 
consequently lead to the outcome of no differentiation. The broadening of the description of an 
offence in an effort to avoid unfair discrimination was something a court does in extraordinary 
situations. Where a criminal offence results in unfair discrimination there are only two ways to deal 
with such a problem to avoid unfair discrimination: to obliterate the criminal prohibition, and to 
expand its scope to the excluded groups. The minority then concluded that broadening the 
description of the offence would amount to a contravention of the principle of legality which calls for 
certainty on the scope of the definition of a crime, and would also not be in accordance with 
constitutional values. See Jordan and Others v S and Others paragraph [45]-[46]. 
75  Jordan and Others v S and Others at 1118. The Constitutional court accordingly upheld the 
constitutionality of the brothel provisions and by a majority declined to confirm the order of the Court 
a quo invalidating the prostitution provisions.  
76  Jordan and Others v S and Others at 1122 paragraphs [15] and [17]. 
77  Jordan and Others v S and Others at 1122 paragraph [18]. 
78  Jordan and Others v S and Others at 1122 at paragraph [16]. 
79  Jordan and Others v S and Others at 1123 at paragraph [18]. 
80  Jordan and Others v S and Others 2002 at 1118. 
81  Jordan and Others v S and Others 2002 at 1118. 
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The decision in Jordan is undoubtedly a serious setback for women’s rights.82 Albertyn83 
points out that unlike other cases decided on gender inequality, the decision in Jordan 
failed inter alia to observe the private sphere of sexuality and took no notice of context, 
but instead reinforced entrenched and detrimental stereotypes regarding sex workers. It 
is particularly disappointing following a string of celebrated decisions where the courts 
accepted the necessity for “substantive equality”.84
 
  
In the context of the present study, the consequences for poor, black women forced to 
engage in sex work in order to survive, are clear. Driven from their own oppressed 
backgrounds, many of these women find themselves with no other choice but to 
become sex workers. The majority’s conclusion that prostitutes knowingly accept the 
risk of lowering their standing in the eyes of the community, as well as attracting the 
stigma associated with prostitution, does not take cognisance of the reality of the lives 
of many of these women.85
 
 Moreover, the majority’s reluctance to recognise the effect of 
the distinction that the relevant provision of the Sexual Offences Act draws between not 
only the male client and the female prostitute, but between women generally (those 
involved in sex work and those not), is deeply disappointing. 
Bonthuys86 raises an important point that the stigmatisation of particular types of sexual 
conduct is in conflict with evolving debates of sexuality connected with human rights 
and gender equality. This stigmatisation of certain forms of sexual conduct differs from 
debates in modern literature on HIV/AIDS prevention which relate HIV/AIDS prevention 
to gender equality in sexual relationships.87
                                                 
82  See, for example, Bonthuys E “Women’s sexuality in the South African Constitutional court” (2006) 
14 Feminist Legal Studies 391-406 at 392. Bonthuys describes the decision of the Jordan case “as 
an unpleasant surprise to the community of feminist lawyers in South Africa”. 
 The decision in Jordan case reverberate 
with some Christian and Western ideas advocating restrictive “sexual expression” for 
83  Albertyn C “Defending and securing rights through Law: Feminism, law and the courts in South 
Africa” (2005) 32(2) Politikon 217-238 at 229-230. See also Albertyn & Goldblatt “Section 9 -The 
right to equality” at 9. 
84  Bonthuys “Women’s sexuality in the South African Constitutional court” at 392. 
85     Jordan and Others v S and Others at 1122 at paragraph [16]. 
86     Bonthuys 392. 
87     Bonthuys 392. 
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women and which indirectly blames women for the spreading of HIV/AIDS.88
 
 It also 
reinforces women’s powerlessness in intimate relationships, as well as their incapacity, 
by perpetuating their inability to shield themselves and others from sexually transmitted 
diseases and HIV. 
Turning now from the court’s initial stage of enquiry in determining whether unfair 
discrimination exists, namely to find whether there has been a differentiation between 
categories of people, the next stage of the enquiry is the consideration of the following 
question: 
  
3.2.2.2 Does the alleged differentiation stand in a rational relation to a lawful purpose? 
 
The approach in the Harksen case requires one to enquire whether the alleged 
differentiation stands in a rational relation to a lawful government purpose.89 If at this 
juncture there seems to be no rational connection to a lawful government purpose, then 
the courts normally declares that a violation of section 9(1) exists.90 Section 9(1) may 
hence be seen as the initial sieve within the equality clause whose focus is the bar of 
unfair discrimination.91 If however it is justified that the differentiation stands in a 
reasonable relation to a lawful government purpose, the next step turns to the question 
whether the differentiation is unfair.92
 
  
3.2.2.3 Is the differentiation unfair? 
 
This enquiry firstly determines whether the differentiation amounts to discrimination,93 
establishing whether the differentiation is based on a listed ground contained in section 
9(3).94
                                                 
88     Bonthuys 392. 
 There are sixteen grounds listed in section 9(3) of the Constitution. A large 
89  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1506 at paragraph [42]. See also Albertyn & Goldblatt at 5. 
90  Albertyn & Goldblatt 5. 
91  Albertyn & Goldblatt 5. 
92  Harksen v Lane at 1507 at paragraph [44].  
93  Harksen v Lane at 1508 at paragraph [45]. See also Albertyn & Goldblatt 4. 
94  Harksen v Lane at 1508 at paragraph [45]. See also Albertyn & Goldblatt 4. 
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number of cases so far heard by our courts were determined on a small number of the 
listed grounds listed in section 9(3).95
 
  
Most cases dealing with discrimination so far specifically related to race, gender and 
sexual orientation.96 The first case dealing with sex and gender as a basis for 
discrimination was that of Brink v Kitshoff.97 It has been argued that this case has not 
been of great assistance for the majority of the women in South Africa most probably 
because it dealt with issues relating to an insurance policy.98 The impact of the cases of 
Fraser99 and Hugo100
 
 is more pertinent. Both cases were brought by men and their 
respective outcomes were substantive equality decisions. Both decisions considered 
the lives and backgrounds of certain women and the reasons why the law ought to take 
cognisance of the often disparate roles that men and women fulfil in relation to children 
in society.  
Another important case dealing with gender discrimination specifically was that of 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo101
                                                 
95  Albertyn & Goldblatt 7. The issue of discrimination on grounds of sex and gender was, for example, 
determined in the following cases: Fraser v Children’s Court Pretoria North and Others 1997 (2) 
BCLR 153 (CC); Hugo v State President of the Republic of South Africa and another 1996 (6) BCLR 
876 (D); Jordan and Others v S and Others 2002 (11) BCLR 1117 (CC); Volks NO v. Robinson, 2005 
(5) BCLR 446 (CC); Bhe and Others v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human 
Rights Commission and Another v President of the RSA and Another 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). The 
issue of race was addressed in the following case: Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
The issue of discrimination on the ground of race was determined in Moseneke and Others v Master 
of the High Court 2001 (2) BCLR 103 (CC); Mabaso v Law Society of the Northern Provinces and 
Another 2005 (2) BCLR 129 (CC) and Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs and 
Others 2005 (3) SA 589 (CC).  
 which came to the 
96  For a detailed discussion on the cases dealing with discrimination specifically related to race, gender 
and sexual orientation, see City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC); Hugo v State 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 1996 (6) BCLR 876 (CC) and President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708; Bhe and Others v The Magistrate, 
Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the RSA and 
Another 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); Brink v Kitshoff No 1996 (6) BCLR 752 (CC); National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs, 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) [NCGLE 2000]. 
97  Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (6) BCLR 752 (CC). 
98  Albertyn & Goldblatt at 8. 
99  Fraser v Children’s Court Pretoria North and Others 1997 (2) BCLR 153 (CC). 
100  Hugo v State President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 1996 (6) BCLR 876 (CC) & 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708. 
101  President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo at 711. 
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Constitutional Court as an appeal against the judgement of Magid J in the case of Hugo 
v State President of the Republic of South Africa and Another.102
  
 The applicant, serving 
a sentence at the time when President Mandela was inaugurated as the first democratic 
president, claimed that the President’s special remission of the sentences of mothers 
with small children under the age of twelve constituted discrimination based on gender. 
The applicant, a male, was also the sole caretaker of a child younger than twelve, but 
because he was a man, he could not be released.  
Despite the fact that the majority decision in Hugo recognised women’s gender role in 
caring primarily for small children in the South African society, this has a down side 
too.103 Goldstone J correctly depicts women’s social burden in child rearing as a fact 
which he describes as “one of the root causes of women’s inequality in our society”.104
 
 
Although this observation is true, the danger that lurks in entrenched perceptions and 
stereotypes may in the long run be more harmful to women’s struggle for gender 
equality. This is borne out by the reality of many rural women whose traditional role of 
submission and inequality will remain unchanged and stagnant if attention is not drawn 
to the real circumstances that they find themselves on a daily basis. If society continues 
to perceive women as sole care takers of small children, or in a customary setting, as 
so-called “Western”, promiscuous or even a “witch” for being more assertive regarding 
reproduction and family planning, South African still have a very long road ahead as far 
as gender equality is concerned. 
The cases of Jordan,105 Bhe106 and Volks107
                                                 
102  Hugo v State President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 1996 (6) BCLR 876 (D). Magid J 
upheld the application ruling that the Presidential Act discriminated against the respondent and his 
son on the basis of gender (at 884 and 886). 
 came to the respective courts as claims by 
women supported by women’s movements in an attempt to claim fairness were some 
103  President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 at 727, paragraph 
[37]. 
104  President of the Republic of South Africa and another v Hugo at 728, paragraph [38]. 
105  Jordan and Others v S and Others 2002 11 BCLR 1117 Volks NO v. Robinson 2005 (5) BCLR 446 
(CC). 
106  Bhe and Others v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission and 
Another v President of the RSA and Another 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
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legislation restricted women of certain advantages.108 The case of Bhe,109
 
 discussed 
earlier, held that the customary law rule of primogeniture unfairly discriminated on 
women on the ground of gender. For Albertyn, this decision has 
both normative value in setting the terms of the relationship between custom and gender 
equality, and practical value in extending inheritance rights to all women married in 
customary law.110
 
  
If the alleged differentiation is not based on any listed ground in section 9, then a 
determination should be made if the differentiation is founded on aspects and features 
potentially harmful to the basic human dignity of persons or may have a comparably 
negative effect.111 The issue whether there is differentiation on a listed ground or not 
should be viewed objectively.112
  
 
Returning again to the Harksen case which sets out the equality test, the question 
whether the differentiation was fair was answered in the positive. Although it was 
established that the differentiation between the solvent spouse and other persons who 
had dealings with insolvents does not constitute differentiation on one of the specified 
grounds,113 the court held that the rest of persons who had dealings with the insolvent or 
whose assets were found in the care of an insolvent are not encroached upon in the 
same way as the assets of the insolvent’s spouse.114
 
  
The next part of the test now has to determine the following: 
 
                                                 
107  Volks NO v Robinson 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
108  Albertyn & Goldblatt at 9. 
109  Bhe and Others v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission and 
Another v President of the RSA and Another 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at 31 paragraph 88 [A]. 
110  Albertyn “Defending and securing rights through law: Feminism, law and the courts in South Africa” 
at 228-229. 
111  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1508, paragraphs [46] and [47] See also Albertyn & Goldblatt at 4. 
112  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1508, paragraph [47]. 
113  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1514, paragraph [61]. 
114  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1514, paragraph [61]. Their assets do not befall to the Master or the 
trustee and they do not have trouble with the obligation of providing evidence of proving their 
property prior its release. No one prohibits them to dispose of their belongings except and until they 
prove their ownership right in a way that convinces the trustee or a court of competent jurisdiction. 
The inconveniences of section 21 are not applicable to the children of the insolvent. 
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3.2.2.4 Does the discrimination amount to unfair discrimination? 
 
The analysis for unfairness is said to be the significant part of the equality analysis as it 
addresses permissible constitutionally sanctionable discrimination.115 If, however, the 
discrimination is on a ground listed in section 9(3), then it is presumed that unfairness 
exists.116 The consequence of this is that if differentiation exists on an explicit ground, a 
presumption of unfairness is created in addition to the alleged discrimination.117 
However, if the alleged discrimination is not on any of the listed grounds in section 9(3), 
unfairness must first be established.118 For example, on appeal against the judgment in 
Hugo v President of the Republic of South Africa,119 the majority judgment concluded 
that there was indeed a form of discrimination on the basis of gender but that such 
discrimination was not unjust.120 As the discrimination related to a ground listed in 
section 8 of the interim Constitution, the court deduced that the discrimination was 
unfair, hence requiring that the contrary be proven.121
 
  
The test in Harksen designed to determine unfairness looks at the following: (1) the 
status of the complainants in society, if they have been affected by past patterns of 
disadvantage, and whether the alleged unfairness is listed in section 9(5);122 (2) the 
nature of the provision or authority and the function required to be accomplished by it;123 
and (3) the degree to which the complainant’s constitutional rights or interests have 
been infringed and whether the infringement of such rights impacted on their 
fundamental right to human dignity or whether the impairment constitutes an 
infringement of a comparably serious nature.124
 
 
                                                 
115  Campbell Sceptical essays on human rights at 303-304. 
116  Campbell 303. 
117  Campbell 303. 
118  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1509, at paragraph [47]. 
119  Hugo v State President of the Republic of South Africa and Another at 878. 
120  President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo at 709. 
121  President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo at 709. 
122  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1510, paragraph [51]. See also Campbell 303. 
123  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1510, paragraph [51]. See also Campbell 303. 
124  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1510, paragraph [50]. See also Campbell 303. 
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The above test considers the impact caused by the unfair conduct, illustrating both the 
historical and the contextual.125 The central value in this comprehensive test is the right 
to dignity.126 The more susceptible a person or group to be a victim of discrimination, 
the more inequitable the discrimination may be found to be.127 Such a notion of equality 
revolves around an understanding that aims to break with past patterns of disadvantage 
and interpret discrimination against the background of past and existing social, political 
and economic inequalities.128 This places emphasis on the necessity for a corrective or 
restitutive equality, ensuring that dealing with past patterns of discrimination is an 
important purpose of the equality clause.129 Regrettably, it has not been the historically 
most disadvantaged groups who have approached the courts seeking the protection of 
the equality clause.130
 
 
The focus of this study is a neglected and deeply disadvantaged category, namely black 
rural women. The Constitutional court’s recognition in the Hugo case131 of the daily 
social context of women, often left to fend alone for themselves and their children, must 
be welcomed. Despite the concerns raised above regarding the possible entrenchment 
of already harmful stereotypes, this decision recognises the powerlessness of many 
women who are either unemployed, or employed in low paying jobs. Rural women are 
the worst off: those depending on husbands or partners who work elsewhere in urban 
areas have little say in matters relating to reproduction and have to put up with whatever 
the men may demand in return for some form of financial security. They are extremely 
vulnerable to contracting HIV from these male partners who may return HIV-positive 
from their places of work in larger cities. As observed in the Hugo case, women’s 
obligation (many abandoned by husbands or partners) of child nurturing makes it 
extremely hard for these women to compete for gainful employment. 132
                                                 
125  Albertyn & Goldblatt 5. 
 Each case 
126  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1510, paragraph [51]. 
127  Campbell 304. 
128  Campbell 304. Also see Van Reenen 155. 
129  Campbell 304. 
130  Campbell 304. 
131  President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo at 710. 
132  President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo at 709. 
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before the courts will thus require a cautious and methodical consideration of the impact 
of the inequitable conduct upon the specific persons to decide if the impact is one 
advancing the constitutional objective of fairness or not.133
 
 
The nature of the authority in terms of which the unfairness resulted from, as well as the 
nature of the interests affected by the discrimination is amongst other factors that are 
taken into account when determining whether the discrimination is fair or not.134
 
 
Turning to the Harksen case again, the court considered all three factors in the test 
explained above.135 Although Mrs Harksen belonged to a group that had not 
experienced unfairness in the past136 and was hence not part of a susceptible 
category,137 the nature of the authority in terms of which the unfairness resulted from, as 
well as the nature of the interests affected by the discrimination were factors taken into 
account by the court,138 which in the final instance held that section 21 does not amount 
to unfair discrimination.139
4.2.2.5 Is the unfair discrimination justifiable? 
  
                                                 
133  President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo at 710. Although the Act may well 
have deprived men a chance which it afforded women, it is wrong to say that such an opportunity 
essentially impaired their right to dignity or sense of equal worth. It had been accepted that the head 
of state had performed his discretion moderately and in a way that is agreement with the Constitution 
(at 710). 
134  President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo at 710. It would have been practically 
and judicially impossible to release all fathers and mothers in prison. Male prisoners outnumbered 
the female prisoners. It is apparent that the discharge of male prisoners would not have saved the 
achievement of the president’s objective which was to benefit children. The discharge of a great 
figure of male prisoners is presumed to might possibly have sourced a considerable public protest. 
(at 710). 
135  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1515, paragraph [62]. 
136  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1515, paragraph [63]. 
137  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1515, paragraph [63]. 
138  The power to place the solvent spouse’s estate to vest in the Master was exercised by Parliament 
whose right and obligation is to protect the public interest. In the Insolvency Act this duty culminates 
in protecting the rights of the creditors of insolvent estates, which is the rationale behind section 21. 
This purpose was accordingly held not to be incompatible with the fundamental values protected by 
the then section 8(2) of the Interim Constitution (see paragraph [64]). 
139  Goldstone J remarked that in cases where the solvent spouse has a choice to litigate, this leads to 
inconvenience to the solvent spouse, as well as to possible humiliation. In many instances, the 
solvent spouses will require legal assistance, which is not an option to many, resulting in additional 
prejudice (paragraph [66]). This is however an unavoidable result between a trustee of an insolvent 
estate and a solvent spouse with regard to ownership of assets. The consequence of such prejudice 
does not justify a conclusion that section 21 amounts to unfair discrimination (paragraph [68]). 
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The final stage in the comprehensive test for unfair discrimination is to determine 
whether the unfair discrimination is justifiable under the limitation clause.140 The Bill of 
Rights may never unjustifiably violate the rights of others or irrationally and indefensibly 
hinder the state in its lawful government functions.141 Most contemporary Bills of Rights 
enclose a limitation clause that allows for rights to be restricted in certain appropriate 
conditions.142
 
 
The limitation clause as expressed in section 36 of the Constitution will be examined in 
detail in chapter 4 below. 
 
3.2.3 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION  
 
The discussion above on the equality test and relevant gender discrimination cases 
illustrate that despite the advances that have been made regarding gender equality over 
the past decade and longer, the successes are limited.143
 
  
As was seen in an earlier chapter, gender violence and gender discrimination which 
most rural women experience on a daily basis place them in a vicious cycle, often 
forcing some of them to leave rural areas to look for employment in urban areas. Here 
their vulnerability and powerlessness are even more acute, as many of these have no 
                                                 
140  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1511, paragraph [52]. 
141  Buhlungu S State of the nation (2005-2006: Pretoria, HSRC Press) at 101. 
142  Buhlungu 101. 
143  Bhe and Others v the Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission and 
Another v President of the RSA and Another 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). See also chapter two above 
under the discussion of primogeniture for more detail of the Bhe case. Another example is that of 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 
1169 (CC), for the reason that women are more prone than man to be living under unbearable 
circumstances. The Grootboom case provides a good structure for an analysis of women’s housing 
rights. In this case it was noted how women’s access to housing is influenced by the past social and 
economic background and that discriminatory laws and practices have restricted women’s access to 
housing and socio-economic rights. These discriminatory practices were remarked as having 
inconsistently affected black women. The Constitutional court determined that although the state is 
obliged to improve the circumstances of the homeless, it is not obliged to go beyond available 
resources or to realise these rights immediately. The prerequisite is that the rights to housing be 
progressively realised.  
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choice but to engage in sex work and are often physically and economically exploited by 
ruthless pimps, as well as by male clients or abusive partners. Their exposure to HIV is 
extremely high, particularly in view of the high incidence of drug use that is associated 
with the sex work industry.144
 
 The decision in the Jordan case, discussed above, clearly 
shows that the stigmatisation and social prejudice regarding sex workers is deeply 
entrenched. 
Poor, black rural women do not have an organised mechanism of dealing with gender 
equality violations. This raises uncomfortable legal questions which will be dealt with 
subsequently in this study. Legislation pertaining to equality seems more than enough. 
The fact remains that a large segment of the South African society suffers severe and 
constant discrimination in their homes, families and certain communities. 
 
The discussion above has alluded to the fact that in developing a jurisprudence relating 
to equality, courts have drawn a distinction between cases of differentiation based on 
grounds that affect a person’s dignity as a human being and those cases that do not 
have this effect.145
 
 The courts will closely examine the impact of an alleged 
discriminatory provision or conduct to determine whether it is in fact unfair. The extent to 
which a measure entrenches or strengthens patterns of disadvantaged experienced by 
groups in society is particularly important. 
As all human rights are not absolute, the study will also examine the possible limitations 
on the right to equality. What follows next in the second part of this chapter is broad 
examination of the rights to human dignity, the right to freedom and security of the 
person, the right to privacy, the right to education and also the right to access to health 
care. These fundamental rights are relevant to the position of the women described in 
this study. It is necessary to establish to what extent these may assist in addressing 
their dire position. 
                                                 
144  Parry C D H et al “Rapid assessment of HIV risk behaviour in drug using sex workers in three cities 
in South Africa” (2008) 1 AIDS and Behaviour 1-12 at 7,8 & 9. 
145  Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC). 
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CHAPTER 3 
PART 2: THE RIGHT TO HUMAN DIGNITY 
 
3.3 THEORETICAL OBSERVATIONS 
 
The assertion of innate human dignity as one of the founding values of our Constitution 
is important.1 Section 1(a) of the Constitution opens with the reference that the 
attainment of “[h]uman dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of 
human rights and freedoms” 2 are the principles on which South Africa is founded. The 
founding values in section 1 of the Constitution are the guiding principles that currently 
revise all facets of our legal order.3
 
  
The vital and foundational place of the values of dignity and equality is clear from 
section 7 of the Constitution which “affirms the values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom”.4
                                                 
1  Chaskalson A “Human dignity as a foundational value of our constitutional order” (2000) 16 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 193-205 at 196.  
 The limitation clause also requires the restriction of rights to be done in a 
manner that is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic  
2  Section 1 of the Constitution reads as follows: “The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, 
democratic state founded on the following values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality 
and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. (b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. (c) 
Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. (d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common 
voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure 
accountability, responsiveness and openness.” In this regard also see Cowen S “Can ‘dignity’ guide 
South Africa’s equality system?” (2001) 17(1) South African Journal on Human Rights 17 at 36. 
3  Chaskalson 195. In the case of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex 
parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) paragraph [44], the 
Constitutional court confirmed that the South African Iegal system is based on the Constitution which 
is the supreme law, and the entire law as well as the common law, is subject to the Constitution, 
expressed also in section 2 of the Constitution. 
4  Section 7 of the Constitution reads as follows: “(1) This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy 
in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values 
of human dignity, equality and freedom. (2) The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights.(3) The rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations contained or 
referred to in section 36, or elsewhere in the Bill.” Also see Cowen at 36. 
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society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”.5 Section 39(1)(a) of the 
Constitution requires the South African courts to promote human dignity when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights.6
 
  
The right to dignity is entrenched in section 10 of the Constitution which states that 
“everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected.”7 Kroeze8 points out that the inclusion of all these provisions guaranteeing the 
right to dignity illustrates that dignity is protected as both a constitutional value as well 
as an individual right. Inherent human dignity also brings the words of the Constitution 
closer to the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity9 and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights10
 
 which confirm that “freedom, equality, justice and dignity 
are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of African 
peoples”. 
                                                 
5  Section 36(1) of the Constitution reads as follows: “The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only 
in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in 
an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account 
all relevant factors, including- (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the 
limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its 
purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” 
6  Section 39(1) of the Constitution reads as follows: “When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, 
tribunal or forum – (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider 
foreign law.” 
7  Unlike South Africa’s Constitution, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is silent on the 
right to human dignity. To stress the importance of this right (despite its absence in that Constitution) 
the Canadian Supreme court in the case of R v Oaks (1986 19 CRR 308 at 334-35) remarked that 
the basis of the human rights and freedoms in the Canadian Charter incorporates “respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person”. It was also noted by Judge Wilson in In re Morgenthaler (1998 
31 CCR 1 at 82) that all other rights and freedom guaranteed in the Canadian Charter find 
expression in the right to dignity. 
8  Kroeze IJ in: Pôle universitaire européen de Montpellier et du Languedoc-Roussillon et al The 
principle of the respect of human dignity: Proceedings of the UniDem seminar (1999: Council of 
Europe) at 87. Also see Woolman et al Constitutional law of South Africa at 34-116. 
9  Charter of the Organisation of African Unity Adopted at Addis Ababa on 25 May 1963. 
10  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted by the 18th Assembly of the Heads of State 
and Government of the Organisation of African Unity on 17 June 1981. See also Chaskalson at 196. 
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Similar to the South African Constitution, the German Constitution11 lays down the right 
to dignity within the opening section in an exceptionally profound manner: “The dignity 
of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of all state authority.” 
This reference in the German Constitution is set before all other primary rights. 
Chaskalson12
 
 asserts that by so doing, the German Federal Constitutional Court is 
allowed to construe all the basic rights against the background of the founding value of 
dignity. In this regard, it is significant that article 1 of the German Constitution is a 
constitutional value and not a human right. 
Dignity is a vague notion expressing diverse ideas of what a life with dignity comprises. 
The term dignity is derived from the Latin words dignitas and dignus13 which respectively 
mean “merit” and “worthy”.14 Needless to say, the word dignity is open to a number of 
interpretations as there are also a number of different dictionary explanations15 and 
scholarly interpretations to this term. Dignity has been described as an experience of 
pride about how one feels about herself;16 a life filled with pride without shame. It may 
well refer to a life that is guided by a principled and honourable model of the moral or 
the “good life”.17 Jayawickrama18 points that dignity naturally comes as a feature of 
human life. The right to dignity is interpreted as involving an acknowledgement of the 
inherent value of human beings and the appreciation that human beings are supposed 
to be taken care of as worth of respect and concern.19
                                                 
11  Article 1 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of German, promulgated by the Parliamentary 
Council on 23 May 1949 (as amended by the Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990 and Federal 
Statute of 23 September 1990). 
  
12  Chaskalson 198. 
13  Johnstone M J Bioethics: A nursing perspective (2008, Chatswood: Elsevier Health Sciences) at 
173. 
14  Johnstone 173. 
15  Johnstone 173. 
16  Johnstone 174. 
17  Connell R O “The role of dignity in equality law: Lessons from Canada and South Africa” (2008) 6(2) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 267-286 at 272. 
18  Jayawickrama N The judicial application of human rights law: National, regional and international 
jurisprudence (2002, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) at 258. 
19  Van der Merwe C G & Du Plessis J at 96. Johnstone (Bioethics at 175) give a list of what different 
scholars believe to be the common elements of what constitutes dignity: Dignity entails a person’s 
intrinsic moral worth and hence needs to be treated with reverence; it involves the idea that person 
should be appreciated as autonomous choosers; it involves a life filled with support when a person 
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The theoretical foundation for a successful equality challenge is based on the reality 
that a procedure that distinguishes between categories of people may have the 
consequence of harming the dignity of such people.20 The function of dignity in the 
equality jurisprudence is apparent in three diverse ways.21 First dignity is pertinent when 
establishing whether discrimination exist on an unspecified ground.22 Secondly, dignity 
is relevant when establishing whether discrimination based on either a specified or 
unspecified ground is unfair. (The court in the Harksen case,23 for example, also asked 
whether the alleged infringement of the right to equality also damaged the complainant’s 
fundamental right to human dignity.24
 
) Thirdly, the right to dignity is applicable when 
establishing whether unfair discrimination is justifiable under the limitation clause as 
shall be seen in the next chapter. In the event of assessing rights in the Bill of Rights 
under the provisions of section 36, the crucial question to ask is how dignity has been 
impinged on. 
Devoid of dignity, a person is excluded from society.25 A social safety system aspires to 
include an individual in society through channels put into practice by the state and or 
civil society to show harmony towards such an individual.26 Through social security 
channels a person can be placed in a situation to fulfil his or her function in society with 
dignity.27 Cases such as the Bhe28 and Grootboom,29
                                                 
exercises his autonomous choices; it involves the support for self respect and esteem. These 
characteristics of dignity may well lead one to conclude that dignity entails an exceptional interest 
that individuals hold in being treated as persons with inherent moral worth, whose independence and 
competence for implementing self determining decisions must be valued.  
 for example, have taken a step in 
20  Cowen 36. 
21  Cowen 35. 
22  See also Albertyn & Goldblatt at 4, and Cowen at 36. 
23  Harksen v Lane NO & Others at 1516, paragraph [67]. 
24  In his decision Goldstone J found that the burden of litigating did not result in the harm of the 
complainant’s dignity or comprise an injury of a comparably severe nature. Harksen v Lane NO & 
Others at 1508, paragraphs [46] and [47]. 
25  Brand D et al Socio-economic rights in South Africa (2005, Pretoria: PULP) at 235. 
26  Brand 235. 
27  Brand 235. 
28     Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha 2004 (2) SA 544 (C) at paragraph [6].   
29     Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR     
        1169 (CC). 
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the right direction regarding the rights of women, the underprivileged and other 
susceptible groups of society.30
 
  
The centrality of human dignity to the prohibition of unfair discrimination was recognised 
in the Hugo case.31 The Court remarked that at the heart of the proscription of unfair 
discrimination lies recognition that the intention of our novel constitution and democratic 
order is the establishment of a society in which all human beings will be accorded equal 
dignity and respect regardless of their membership of particular groups.32 In the case of 
Grootboom,33 it was remarked that it is certain that those without food, clothing and 
shelter are often deprived of human dignity, freedom and equality, the founding values 
of our society. Finally, the landmark decision of S v Makwanyane34
 
 emphasised that the 
right to dignity as a manifestation of the intrinsic worth of human beings, shapes the 
basis of several other constitutional rights including the rights to freedom, physical 
integrity and the right to equality. 
The few theoretical observations regarding the right to human dignity in the South 
African context clearly point towards the relevance and significance of the realisation of 
this right to those South African women who find themselves at the intersection of 
HIV/AIDS, gender inequality, and violence. 
 
                                                 
30  Woolman at 34-119. 
31  President of the Republic Of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) at paragraph 
[41]. 
32  President of the Republic Of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) at paragraph 
[41]. 
33  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 
(CC) at paragraph [23]. 
34  S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 paragraph 328 and 144.  
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3.4 HIV/AIDS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RIGHT TO HUMAN DIGNITY 
 
The abuse of power in the private sphere, eg within families and intimate relationships, 
undoubtedly contributes towards the unequal treatment that many South African women 
face. These women’s inability to make decisions concerning reproduction or the 
patrimonial affairs of the family not only impacts on their right to equality, but also their 
right to human dignity. As will be seen in the discussion that follows, matters relating to 
equality, human dignity, freedom and security of the person, and access to health care 
services are often intertwined. The impairment of human dignity can assume many 
forms that may impact on the last-mentioned rights to varying degrees. 
 
The situation of a large number of rural women is exacerbated by their socio-economic 
position, characterised by poverty and lack of basic resources. This is unquestionably 
demeaning. In terms of a “materialistic conception of dignity”,35 the question is asked 
whether shared community supplies are uniformly dispersed to everyone’s material 
benefit.36
  
 This question will be addressed in more detail below in the discussion on the 
right to access to health care services. Addressing women’s exposure to HIV/AIDS and 
promoting women’s health generally, including reproductive health specifically, depends 
on the interaction of most human rights, specifically those examined more closely in this 
study. 
3.5 THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM AND SECURITY OF THE PERSON  
 
3.5.1 THEORETICAL OBSERVATIONS 
 
Section 12 of the Constitution provides for the right to freedom and security of the 
person. 37
                                                 
35  Connell 274. 
 This right safeguards the physical and psychological integrity of human 
36  Connell 274. 
37  Section 12 of the Constitution which reads as follows: “12(1) Everyone has the right to freedom and 
security of the person, which includes the right – (a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or 
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beings. Section 12(1) refers to the right to be free from all forms of violence from either 
public or private sources (section 12(1)(c)), including not to be tortured in any way 
(section 12(1)(d)), and not be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way 
(section 12(1)(e). 
 
This section draws its objective from the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of 
Racial Discrimination (hereafter CERD).38 Article 5(b) places an obligation on state party 
to protect human beings within their state from violence or bodily harm whether inflicted 
by government officials or by any individual, group or institution. Article 2 of CEDR 
includes a positive duty on the state to proscribe, reprimand and to deject violence in all 
its forms. It is important to stress that the CEDR is solely fixed towards “racially-
motivated carnage” whilst the provisions of section 12(1)(c) are broad in the sense that 
they are directed to prevent all forms of violent behaviour.39
 
 
Violence has been described by some law reviewer as a “grave invasion of personal 
security”.40 Bishop and Woolman41
                                                 
without just cause; (b) not to be detained without trial; (c) to be free from all forms of violence from 
either public or private sources; (d) not to be tortured in any way; and (e) not to be treated or 
punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. (2) Everyone has the right to bodily and 
psychological integrity, which includes the right - (a) to make decisions concerning reproduction; (b) 
to security in and control over their body; and (c) not to be subjected to medical or scientific 
experiments without their informed consent.”  
 criticise this definition of violence by asserting that 
there is very small or no basis to differentiate between serious invasions of personal 
security and ordinary invasions. Women or men trapped in violent relationships may 
possibly experience emotional as well as physical violence, with the first-mentioned not 
categorised as “grave”. As violence may perhaps be a characteristic in some 
38  Article 5(b) of the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted and 
opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 of 21 December 1996, 
protects “[t]he right to security of person and protection by the State against violence or bodily harm, 
whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual group or institution.” Also see Bishop & 
Woolman in Woolman at 40-48. 
39  Bishop & Woolman, in: Woolman 48-49. 
40  Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of rights handbook (2005, Lansdowne: Juta) at 304.  
41  Bishop & Woolman, in: Woolman 40-49. 
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relationships, the term violence should hence not be narrowly interpreted. Violent 
behaviour should denote some instant danger to life or physical safety.42
 
 
The Constitutional court initially acknowledged the constructive dimensions of Section 
12(1)(c) when it had to regard a dispute to the Domestic Violence Act.43 In the case of 
Carmichele44 the court established the constructive duty imposed on the state by virtue 
of section 12(1)(c). This case involved a man who had been only just freed from jail and 
was alleged to have raped a woman at some point when the state through its applicable 
officials had awarded bail to the attacker.45 It was argued by the complainant that the 
release of the criminal from prison led the alleged criminal to rape the woman.46 On a 
reflection of the facts in casu the plaintiff had clearly discharged the burden of proving a 
causal connection between the omissions and the assault on her.47
 
 
Contrary to the High Court’s decision the Constitutional court found that 
 
The constitutional duty to protect is enshrined in sections 10, 11 and 12 of the 
Constitution which entrench the right to dignity, life, and freedom and the security of all 
persons. Section 7(2) moreover imposes a duty on the State to respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil these rights. The responsibility for these constitutional duties imposed on the 
State rests, inter alia, with the police and prosecution services.  
 
This judgment generated a transformation in the law of delict.48 This innovative 
obligation placed in section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution extends the state’s main liability 
to shield its citizens from harm.49 In his judgement, Chetty J remarked that there was an 
adequately close connection between the omissions and the harm caused to the 
plaintiff.50
                                                 
42  Bishop & Woolman, in: Woolman at 40-49. 
 As a result it was found that the defendants were jointly and severally liable to 
the plaintiff in delict for the damages she suffered due to the assault committed by the 
43  Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998. S v Baloyi (Minister of Justice & Another Intervening) 2000 (2) 
SA 425 (CC), 2000 (1) BCLR 86 (CC). 
44  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2002 (10) BCLR 1100 (C) at 1101 & 1112. 
45  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another at 1100. 
46  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another at 1101. 
47  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another at 1101. 
48  Bishop & Woolman, in: Woolman 40-48. 
49  Bishop & Woolman, in: Woolman 40-48. 
50  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another at 1115 paragraph [38]. 
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defendant to her.51 Bishop and Woolman52
 
 argue that a number of successful delictual 
actions in this regard have justified the right of women to be free from violence. 
3.5.2 HIV/AIDS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM AND 
SECURITY OF THE PERSON 
 
For the purpose of this study, section 12(2)(b)53 of the Constitution is very important. 
This section creates a subject of “individual inviolability with two components”.54 These 
components are “security in” and “control over” one’s body. These two components are 
not the same. “Security in” means the safeguard of the body against physical attack by 
the state and any other person, whilst “control over” refers to a concept of bodily 
autonomy and self-determination regarding one’s body. In the case of S v Xaba55
 
 the 
High Court established that the removal of a cartridge from the suspect’s body for the 
reason of a police enquiry was a restriction of the suspect’s right to bodily integrity. 
“Control over” presupposes that persons are competent of making choices that are in 
their personal interest and as functioning as “responsible moral agents”. Significant is 
the fact that section 12(2)(b) and the legitimate limitations on its implementation are 
confined by the similar core standard, namely joint concern and joint reverence for 
others.56 Poor health, age or mental incompetence, on the other hand, may lead to 
impaired individual autonomy.57
 
  
Many South African women do not have the benefit of protection and power over their 
bodies. The high rate of rape, sexual exploitation, compelled sex, sexual threats, marital 
                                                 
51  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another at 1115 paragraph [38]. 
52  Bishop & Woolman, in: Woolman at 40-48. 
53  See discussion above. 
54  Bishop & Woolman, in: Woolman at 40-85. 
55  S v Xaba 2003 (2) SA 703 at 708, paragraph [H]. 
56  Bishop & Woolman in Woolman at 40-88. 
57  Preceding the endorsement of the final Constitution, South African law accorded partial 
acknowledgment to the assurance to control over one’s body in the situation of euthanasia. In Clarke 
v Hurst 1992 (4) SA 630 (D) the patient had earlier on made a request that the artificial feeding 
should be discontinued. An order was granted to cease the artificial feeding of a patient. This verdict 
is a vital assurance of the recognition of bodily autonomy.  
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violence and femicide in South Africa indicates that marital exploitation and family 
violence is a persistent and commonly concealed predicament which challenge society 
at all times. Violent behaviour within the family is organised, persistent and 
devastatingly gender-oriented.58 As was discussed in an earlier chapter, women’s 
reproductive autonomy is severely hampered by the fact that their spouses or partners 
refuse to wear condoms during sexual intercourse, or prevent them from accessing 
contraceptives. They are often forced to have sex with these men against their will.59
 
 
HIV/AIDS infection is an additional result of the coercive sexual atmosphere. Women in 
abusive relations in South Africa are at a higher risk of being infected with HIV opposed 
to women in peaceful affiliations.60
 
 The combination of sections 12(2)(a) (“everyone has 
the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right – (a) to make 
decisions concerning reproduction”) and 12(2)(b) (“to security in and control over their 
body”) make it clear that decisions regarding one’s body relate to both a physical and 
psychological dimension. A husband preventing his wife from using contraceptives 
infringes on her physical and psychological integrity by exposing her not only to the risk 
of possible HIV-infection, but also unwanted pregnancy. Both these results have serious 
physical and mental consequences.  
The history of reproductive rights in South Africa shows a “pervasive, highly invasive 
regulation” of women’s reproductive capacity.61 Women were under the patrimonial 
control of their spouses and downgraded to the position of perpetual minors.62 They 
were given the same rank as guardian of their own offspring’s up until 1993.63
                                                 
58  O’Sullivan, in: Woolman 37-16. 
 In terms 
of racist guidelines under the apartheid administration black women’s reproductive 
rights were severely undermined by the use of “injectable contraceptives”, the latter an 
59  O’Sullivan, in: Woolman 37-17. 
60  O’Sullivan, in: Woolman 37-17. 
61  O’Sullivan, in: Woolman 37-17. 
62  See Sinclair J “Family rights” in: Van Wyk D, Dugard J, De Villiers B et al (eds) Rights and 
constitutionalism (1994, Cape Town: Juta) 502-572 at 566-570. One such example is section 11(3) 
of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 in terms of which African customary wives, except those 
living in KwaZulu-Natal, were deemed to be minors subject to the guardianship of their husbands. 
63  O’Sullivan, in: Woolman at 37-17. 
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additional grave invasion of their bodily integrity, dignity and equality.64 Until recently, 
abortion was illegal.65 Women carried foetuses against their will and as a result had to 
resort to unsafe abortions.66
 
  
The right to freedom and security of the person hence includes the right of women to 
have the ability to engage in safe sexual relations. Refusing vulnerable women the 
power to insist on the use of contraceptives (eg condoms) not only inflict severe 
potential hardship on them in the form of either unwanted pregnancies or likelihood of 
HIV-infection, but constitutes ill-treatment and torture in terms of section 12 of the 
Constitution. This also impairs the dignity of these women, all the result of their 
inequality in the private sphere.  
 
3.6 THE RIGHT TO ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE SERVICES 
 
3.6.1 THEORETICAL OBSERVATIONS 
 
                                                 
64  O’Sullivan, in: Woolman at 37-17. 
65  Prior to the enactment of the Choice on the Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996, abortion in 
South Africa was regulated by the Abortion and Sterilization Act 2 of 1975. Before the enactment of 
the Abortion and Sterilisation Act, abortion law in South Africa was regulated by the common law 
which allowed the performance of abortion only when the mother’s life was to be endangered by the 
continued pregnancy. The Abortion and Sterilization Act described a very limited number of 
conditions under which abortion was legally permissible. Most of these grounds made it practically 
impossible for black women to obtain lawful abortions. For a detailed study on these circumstances, 
see Slabbert M N The human embryo and foetus: Constitutional and other legal issues (unpublished 
LLD thesis, 2000, Unisa) at 131-137.The Choice on the Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996, 
which currently regulates abortion in South Africa, allows the termination of a pregnancy upon 
request by the pregnant women during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. For a critical analysis of 
this Act, see Slabbert 139-153. Slabbert argues that the insertion of section 2(b)(iv) of the Act (which 
provides for the termination of a pregnancy upon request of a woman referred to above) illustrates 
the government’s commitment to addressing the predicament of unintended pregnancies amongst 
the poor. It has been observed that those most acutely affected by unwanted pregnancies are poor 
black women. This study submits that these women are often the victims of sexual oppression in the 
context of their patriarchal communities and family homes. The Choice on the Termination of 
Pregnancy Act at least allows these poor black woman carrying unwanted pregnancies to terminate 
such pregnancies within a prescribed time.  
66  It is estimated that 200 000 women worldwide die each year as a result of illegal and unsafe 
abortions. See World Health Organization Coverage of maternity care: A tabulation of available 
information WHO/FHE/MSM/93.7 (3rd ed 1993) at 12. 
 108 
The right to access to health care and health care services is pivotal to women who find 
themselves at the intersection of HIV/AIDS, gender inequality and gender violence. The 
discussion below will briefly touch on the content of this right as it has been interpreted 
by the courts in recent decisions. 
 
Section 27 protects the right to access to health care services, which include 
reproductive health care.67 Just like other socio-economic rights, this right is subject to 
“budgetary implications” and limitations, in that the positive duties imposed on the state 
are explicitly restricted.68 Current campaigns to increase access to important drugs in 
developing countries have focused on the right to health care.69
 
 In South Africa several 
of these campaigns were centred on the need for access to the anti-retroviral and 
nevaripine drugs. 
One of the landmark decisions regarding section 27 is the case of Soobramoney70 
which concerned a 41-year old man with a chronic renal failure, as well as suffering 
from heart disease and diabetes.71 As he was not eligible for a kidney transplant, he 
required lifelong dialysis to survive.72 His nearest hospital had only twenty dialysis 
machines, not nearly enough to provide dialysis for everyone who needed it in that 
area.73 In terms of the hospital’s policy, only patients with acute renal failure were 
eligible for life-long dialysis.74 During the subsequent court proceedings the department 
of health argued that this policy met the government’s duty to provide emergency care 
in terms of the Constitution. Patients with chronic renal failure, such as the patient in 
question, did not automatically qualify.75
                                                 
67  Section 27(1) provides as follows: “Everyone has the right to have access to – (a) health care 
services, including reproductive health care; (b) sufficient food and water; and (c) social security, 
including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social 
assistance.” 
 
68  Cameron E “Responses to the HIV/AIDS epidemic” (2006) 1 Stellenbosch Law Review 47-90 at 82. 
69  Gruskin S et al Perspectives on health and human rights  (2005, New York: Routledge) at 507. 
70  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) All SA 268 (CC) at 270. 
71  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal at 270. 
72  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal at 270. 
73  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal at 270. 
74  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal at 270-271. 
75  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal at 271. 
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In determining whether the Constitution mandated the department of health to supply a 
an adequate amount of machines to each person whose life may perhaps be saved by 
it, the court pointed out that under the Constitution, the state’s duty to provide health 
care services is qualified by “its available resources”.76 Moreover, the court pointed out 
that offering very expensive medical treatments to everyone would make substantial 
inroads into the health budget […] to the prejudice of the other needs which the state 
has to meet.”77 Finally, the Constitutional court decided that the administrators of 
provincial health services, not the courts, should oversee budgetary priorities and that 
the courts should not impede with decisions that are rational and made “in good faith by 
the political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with such 
matters.”78
 
 
Similarly, in the case of Grootboom, that involved the right to housing, the Constitutional 
court determined that although the state is obliged to improve the circumstances of the 
homeless “it is not obliged to go beyond available resources or to realise these rights 
immediately.”79 The prerequisite is that the rights to housing be “progressively 
realised.”80 The court noted that there is at the very least a negative duty placed on the 
state and all other units and people to desist from preventing or impairing the right of 
access to adequate housing.81
 
 
The South African government’s limitations on the use of nevarapine to prevent the 
transmission of HIV from mothers to infants led to another important judgment. The 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) instituted a case against the Minister of Health for 
                                                 
76  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal at 275, paragraph [19]. 
77  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal at 276, paragraph [28]. 
78  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal at 269. 
79  Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 
1169 (CC) at 1208 at paragraph [94]. 
80  Section 26 of the Constitution reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to have access to adequate 
housing. (1) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. (2) No one may be evicted from their 
home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the 
relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.” 
81  Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others at 1171. 
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refusing to offer the nevaripine drug to HIV infected women. The TAC asserted that the 
government’s failure to have the drug more widely available violated the right to health 
of pregnant women who are HIV-positive.82 The High court noted that the government 
clearly failed to deal with the issue of possible transmission of the HI-virus from the 
mother to the child.83
  
  
Cameron84
 
 points out that the decision of the High court resulted in powerful political 
and legal debates on the government’s answerability to implement socio-economic 
rights, as well as the power of the courts to put into effect such rights. 
The Constitutional court subsequently concluded that the right to health care services 
must be read in relation to the state’s available resources.85 The government’s duty to 
value rights, as expressed in the housing case of Grootboom, applies equally to the 
right to health care services. The Constitutional court accordingly ordered the 
government to, without delay, remove restrictions preventing that nevirapine be made 
available for the purpose of reducing mother-to-child transmission of HIV at public 
hospitals and clinics.86
 
 
3.6.2 HIV/AIDS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RIGHT TO ACCESS TO HEALTH 
CARE SERVICES 
 
The decision demonstrates that the Constitution operates as an influential tool in the 
hands of civil society to guarantee that the government provide appropriate notice to the 
essential needs of the poor, the vulnerable and the marginalised.87
                                                 
82  Treatment Action Campaign and Others v Minister of Health and Others 2002 (4) BCLR 356 (T). 
 The justification of 
the right to have access to health care services in the TAC judgment to a great extent 
83  Treatment Action Campaign and Others v Minister of Health and Others at 387. 
84  Cameron at 85. 
85  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (1) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 
(CC) at 1034. 
86  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (1) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 
(CC) at paragraph [135]. 
87  Cameron 87. 
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also confirmed public responsibility to lessen the burden HIV/AIDS.88 This has also 
drastically improved the health-related autonomy of pregnant HIV-positive women by 
means of allowing reproductive choice and permitting them to prevent the transmission 
of HIV to their infants.89
 
 The discussion on the right to education below is closely linked 
to the above exposition on the right to access to health care services. Many illiterate 
women find themselves in remote rural areas in South Africa. Their lack of education 
contributes to their predicament, as they are mostly either unaware of the above legal 
developments that may improve their physical and legal position, or unable to visit local 
clinics or hospitals to receive the required treatment to prevent them from passing HIV 
on to their unborn. They often only become aware of their HIV-status once AIDS sets in. 
As was pointed out already, having their HIV-status disclosed is another dilemma, as 
this put them at risk of rejection by their male partners or husbands, or alternatively may 
subject them to violence within their own families and communities. 
The availability of anti-retroviral treatments is directly linked to the ability to manage HIV 
infection and AIDS.90
 
 Although the TAC judgment has led to a great improvement of the 
position of HIV-positive women, many others, as has been explained above, are still 
unable to reap the benefits of this legal development. 
Another controversial issue which relates to the right to health care in the context of 
HIV/AIDS is the issue of subordinate women who are deprived of their freedom to go for 
HIV/AIDS testing or counselling or to either take nevaripine or anti-retroviral drugs upon 
a disclosure of their status to their partners and husbands. Pieterse91 points out that the 
health status of a person is influenced by a combination of cultural, economic, biological 
and health policies. These factors largely apply to the socially marginalised or 
disempowered segment of society.92
                                                 
88  Pieterse M “The interdependence of rights to health and autonomy in South Africa” (2008) 125(3) 
The South African Law Journal 553-572 at 570. 
 
89  Pieterse 570. 
90  Cameron 81. 
91  Pieterse 555. 
92  Pieterse 555. 
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Section 12 of the Constitution93 protects a person’s health related autonomy. Section 
12(2)(a) is considered as the significant section for the attainment of equality and is 
mainly associated to choices regarding contraception, or the termination of 
pregnancies.94
 
 The choice to use contraception may perhaps be analogous to a choice 
to take any other medication or not, including nevaripine or anti-retroviral drugs.  
3.7 THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
 
3.7.1 THEORETICAL OBSERVATIONS 
 
The apartheid period was characterised by an ethnically divided and an imbalanced 
system of education.95 The financing of education was unequal in the sense that the 
black community was given the smallest amount.96
 
  
Section 29 of the Constitution97 makes education a fundamental aspect for all. A basic 
education should be available to everyone.98 This places a duty on the state to ensure 
that a quality educational structure is instituted and maintained in South Africa.99 An 
explanation of section 29 should as a result be geared in the direction of redressing this 
historical difference.100
                                                 
93  See paragraph 3.5 above. 
 This right to education imposes an obligation on the state to 
make access to the right accessible by taking into account past racial discriminatory 
laws and practices. At the outset the word “everyone” in section 29 explains that 
education should be made available to all people, regardless of race and gender. In the 
94  Pieterse 558. Pieterse further remarks that section 12(2)(a) should be interpreted as a section which 
sustains or boost the right to access to health in section 27 of the Constitution. 
95  Brand D & Heyns C H Socio-economic rights in South Africa (2005, Pretoria: PULP) at 60. 
96  Brand & Heyns at 60. 
97  Section 29(1) of the Constitution reads as follows: “(1) Everyone has the right – (a) to a basic 
education, including adult basic education; and (b) to further education, which the state, through 
reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible.”  
98  Verheyde M Article 28: The right to education (2006, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff) at 15. 
99  Verheyde 15-16. 
100  Brand & Heyns 60. 
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context of this study it is essential to note that black rural women and children are also 
part of this exercise. 
 
In the case of In re Education Bill of 1995 (Gauteng)101
 
 the court dealt with the right to 
education in terms of the Interim Constitution. The court had to decide whether the 
provisions of section 32(c) of the Interim Constitution (which guaranteed the set up of 
non-discriminatory educational institutions for everyone), placed a positive obligation on 
the state to establish educational institutions to all individuals based on common culture, 
language or religion. The court explained that this section 
creates a positive right that basic education be provided for every person a not merely a 
negative right that such a person should not be obstructed in pursuing his or her 
education.102
 
 
The right to advanced education, the right to learn in a language of one’s choice and the 
right to found private or independent educational organisations is a multi-faceted 
characteristic of the right to education which elucidates why scholars group the right to 
education with other rights such as the right to culture, language or religion. The right to 
education is jointly a civil and political as well as a social and cultural right.103
 
 
An educated population and labour force is essential to national health.104 Together with 
sound macro-economic strategies, education is unquestionably a vital factor in 
upholding shared interests and poverty alleviation for the reason that it directly affects 
national productivity, which consecutively determines living standards and a 
government’s capability to participate in the global community.105
 
 
                                                 
101  In re Education Bill of 1995 (Gauteng) 1996 (4) BCLR at 537, paragraph [9]. 
102  In re Education Bill of 1995 (Gauteng) at 546, paragraph [9] 
103  Gutto S Equality and non discrimination in South Africa: The political economy of law and law making 
(2001: Clement, New Africa Education) 251. 
104  World Bank Education and HIV/AIDS: A window of hope (2002: World Bank Publications) at 3. 
105  World Bank at 3. 
 114 
Like access to resources, health and security, formal and informal education is 
essential.106 Gutto107 accepts that the acquisition of knowledge skills and principles is 
fundamental to every society’s interests and continued existence. Education rights 
hence filter through other rights.108 Investment in education is important as it facilitates 
the realisation of six of the eight millennium development goals, which are: (1) the 
reduction of extreme poverty and hunger; (2) realising global primary education: (3) the 
promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women; (4) reduction of infant 
and child mortality; and (5) the lowering of the prevalence of HIV/AIDS.109
 
 
Evidence shows that education dramatically shapes young peoples’ reproductive 
health.110 According to Coomb and Kelly,111 HIV transmission rates are lower and 
continually dropping among young educated women compared to the less educated. 
This sharp decline is linked to women with secondary and higher levels of education 
compared to women who did not advance further than the primary level.112 Urban 
women in the 15 to 19 age group who left school early are more likely to be HIV-
infected than those of the similar age group who advanced with their schooling.113
 
 
The World Education Forum, launched in Dakar in April 2000, points out that  
 
Girls are more likely than boys to care for a sick family member and help keep the 
household running. Deprived of basic schooling, they are denied information about how 
to protect themselves against the virus. Without the benefits of an education, they risk 
being forced into early sexual relations, and thereby becoming infected. Thus, they pay 
many times over the deadly price of not getting an education. But by the same token, 
education is the tool whereby we can break the vicious cycle of AIDS and ignorance. 
The key to all the locks that are keeping girls out of school - from poverty to inequality to 
conflict - lies in basic education for all.114
                                                 
106  Gutto at 251. 
 
107  Gutto 251. 
108  Gutto 251. 
109  World Bank 3. 
110  World Bank 4. 
111  Coomb C & Kelly M J “Education as a vehicle for combating HIV/AIDS” at 1, see 
htttp://lobby.la.psu.edu/107th/127_Basic_Education/Organizational_Statements/Basic%20Education
%20Coalition/BEC_Educ_combating_AIDS.pdf (visited 31 March 2009).  
112  Coomb & Kelly 1.  
113  Coomb & Kelly 1.  
114  Document accessed at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000426.sgsm7369. doc.html 
(visited 5 April 2009). 
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The view that education is a vehicle for addressing the spread of HIV is promising. 
HIV/AIDS education provides an expectation that there is an approach, “the well-known 
as well as the tried way” of worldwide and improved quality education, for curbing the 
advanced increase of the HIVAIDS pandemic. Twenty years into the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, millions of the younger generation, including those in the most adversely 
affected countries are largely still uninformed about the disease and have mistaken 
beliefs about the disease as well.115 South Africa’s Minister of Education in 2008, Naledi 
Pandor, noted that all educational institutions are now required to include HIV/AIDS in 
their curricula.116 Presenting the national educational budget in 2006, she reported that 
the purpose of the second additional grant that had been set aside was to co-ordinate 
and support the structured integration of life skills and HIV/AIDS programmes across all 
learning areas in the school curriculum.117 She further noted that the Department of 
Education planned to develop educational programmes on the impact of HIV/AIDS.118 
The youth must have a comprehensive knowledge of the virus so that when they make 
decisions regarding sexual activity, these decisions are informed decisions that take into 
account the implications of their decisions and behaviour.119 Information on HIV/AIDS 
should be enhanced by attitudes and values which will result in proper and constructive 
decisions.120
 
  
Ultimately, education holds the potential to transform the socio-cultural environment in 
which persons live and behave,121
 
 adjusting in the process some of the features of the 
family environment and community.  
                                                 
115  World Bank at 5. 
116  Department of Education, “Pandor: Education Dept Budget Vote 2006/07 NCOP”, document 
accessed at http://us-cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/articles/attachments/02735_ pandor23-05-
06.pdf (visited on 2 March 2009) at 2. See http://us-cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/articles/ 
attachments/02735_pandor23-05-06.pdf (visited on 2 March 2009) at 2. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120  World Bank Education and HIV/AIDS at 4. 
121  Coomb & Kelly 11. 
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3.7.2 HIV/AIDS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
 
All women and girls eventually have to make decisions affecting their sexual and social 
life. Attitudes regarding harmful cultural practices that may possibly put persons at risk 
of HIV infection should gradually change over time as a result of proper and 
comprehensive HIV/AIDS education. Enhanced knowledge and information, better 
future planning of informed and educated individuals, as well as the improved economic 
position of these persons all work together to foster a social environment that will assist 
in the prevention of HIV. Despite that no vaccine presently exists for HIV infection, the 
public has a “social vaccine”: the vaccine of education.122
 
 
HIV/AIDS education is included in the curricula of all levels of educational systems. The 
sad fact remains many black adult women living in rural areas today are still illiterate, 
with no hope of accessing or entering the education system. Many of these women 
either never entered school or left school at a young age to get married.  
 
Perhaps part of the solution lies in the example of a certain community-led participatory 
group whose objective is to decrease HIV/AIDS infection amongst commercial sex 
workers in one of South Africa’s mining areas.123
 
 Similarly should the government and 
NGO’s target specifically rural areas in order to reach these vulnerable women through 
activities and programmes that aim to educate them regarding the risks of HIV/AIDS, as 
well their fundamental rights. 
The Constitutional provision which value the right to education is theoretically bold yet it 
has not been practically implemented.124
                                                 
122  Coomb & Kelly 13. 
 In our day, regardless of the survival of an 
innovative and rights based curricula and a policy agenda of the transformation of 
123  Campbel C Mzaidume Z “Grassroots participation, peer education, and HIV prevention by sex 
workers in South Africa” (2001) 91 (12) American Journal of Public Health at 1. 
124  Bauldaf RB & Kaplan RB Language planning and practice in Africa (2004: Cape Town: Multilingual 
Matters) at 255.  
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education, the legacy of the apartheid structure persists.125 The disproportionate access 
to education in the past is still a factor which impacts on the human rights of women, 
reinforcing their disadvantaged status. This situation renders them susceptible to 
repression and eventually violence.126
 
 
Bunch127
 
 submits that respect for women’s rights ought to begin with the implementation 
of the right to education. The successful implementation of the right to education will 
undoubtedly influence young girls confidently to refuse marriage at an early age and 
prioritise education.  
The educational system also presents an opportunity for challenging attitude regarding 
violent behaviour for both boys and girls.128 The World Bank perceives education as the 
most potent weapon for reducing the social and economic susceptibility that increases 
women’s risk of HIV/AIDS infection.129
 
  
Having gainful employment will obviously raise a women’s self esteem and their position 
in the community as a whole.130
 
 A lack of education therefore perpetuates the position of 
women that live under dreadful social and economic conditions which place them at a 
high risk of becoming infected with HIV/AIDS.  
Basic awareness educational programmes on HIV/AIDS are crucial in order to reach the 
rural illiterate community. Alertness programmes aimed at the illiterate would undeniably 
influence the disproportionate HIV/AIDS infection in the rural areas.131
 
 
                                                 
125  Brand & Heyns at 60. 
126  Bunch C “The intolerable status quo: Violence against women and girls” Women’s Commentary 
(1997) 40-49, at 44, compiled by UNICEF, in: The progress of the nation (1997, Popline document 
number 133031). 
127  Bunch at 44. 
128  Bunch at 44. 
129  World Bank Education and HIV/AIDS at 7. 
130  Bunch at 44. 
131  Kandasamy W V B Analysis of social aspects of migrant labourers living with HIV/AIDS using fuzzy 
theory and neutrosophic cognitive maps (2004, Phoenix: Xiquan) at 221. 
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3.8 CONCLUSION 
 
Whereas chapter two above has focused on a number of cultural practices that in 
varying degrees increase women’s vulnerability to HIV-infection, this chapter has 
illustrated a range of fundamental rights that are relevant to the present study. Women’s 
inequality and vulnerability in respect of HIV-infection and gender violence in South 
Africa is a great concern. A starting point for addressing these issues is to have a closer 
look at various fundamental rights that are at stake, starting with the right to equality, 
followed by the right to human dignity, the right to freedom and security of the person, 
the right to access to health care services, and finally, the right to education. Against 
this constitutional framework, women’s increased vulnerability towards HIV, 
exacerbated by certain cultural customs, inequality and gender violence will be much 
clearer. Where relevant, this chapter has contextualised the relevant human rights, as 
well as explained the interaction between factors such as HIV/AIDS, gender inequality 
and violence. It is impossible to isolate anyone of these factors as a primary contributing 
factor to women’s increased vulnerability in respect of HIV/AIDS, as well as their 
extreme susceptibility towards gender violence. 
 
To complete the constitutional framework, the next chapter will turn to the application of 
the limitation clause in the Constitution to examine possible and justifiable limitations of 
the rights discussed above. 
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“But around the globe today, especially in developing countries, girls and women suffer in silence, out of 
range of the cameras, and off society’s radar. In too many nations and regions, they are still devalued and 
denied, or treated as second-class citizens. They are the victims of gross inequity, or all too often, much 
worse.” (Statement of UNICEF Representative Director, Ann Vanemina, on International Women’s Day in 
Washington DC, 8th of March 2006.) 
 
CHAPTER 4 
PART 1: THE LIMITATION OF RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
HIV/AIDS, GENDER EQUALITY AND GENDER VIOLENCE 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION  
 
The discussion of specific human rights1
 
 affected by the intersection of HIV/AIDS, 
gender inequality and violence in the South African context cannot be complete without 
an investigation of possible limitations of these rights. This discussion is also necessary 
to provide the framework for the exercise in the second part of this chapter where the 
constitutionality of a specific indigenous custom will be scrutinised more closely. Such 
an exercise cannot be undertaken without a thorough and complete understanding of 
the underlying theoretical principles and its application with reference to relevant 
constitutional cases. 
Rights in the Bill of Rights can neither be used to incompetently violate the rights of 
others or to irrationally and unjustifiably obstruct the state in its lawful government 
purpose.2 If this were the case, the Bill of Rights would become a hollow instrument; a 
“charter for the abuse of rights”.3 The majority of contemporary bills of rights hence have 
a limitation clause which allows for human rights to be restricted in a legitimate manner.4
 
 
                                                 
1  E.g. those human rights discussed in chapter two above. 
2  Buhlungu S “State of the nation: South Africa, 2005-2006” (2006: Pretoria, HSRC Press) at 101. 
3  Buhlungu 101. 
4  Buhlungu 101. 
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Infringement of human rights does not always render such infringement necessarily as 
unconstitutional.5 Section 36, the limitation clause in the 1996 Constitution,6 affords a 
device for the open assessment of challenging values and interests, and for settling the 
tension involving democracy and rights.7 If an infringement passes the limitation test, 
then the violation is constitutionally valid.8 The weighing of rights discards an “absolute” 
or “rigid” set of principles.9
 
  
The grounds for restricting any fundamental rights are required to be very strong.10 The 
Constitution permits the limitation of a right only by law and also requires a justifiable 
ground for the restriction of such rights.11 In other words, the reason for the limitation 
should be compellingly vital.12
 
 
The general limitation clause is qualified by the word “general” for the reason that it 
relates to all the rights in the Bill of Rights and that it also makes provision that all the 
rights must be restricted by using the same standard.13
                                                 
5  De Waal J & Currie I The Bill of rights handbook (2005, Lansdowne: Juta) at 164. 
 In determining whether a right 
has been unreasonably limited, it firstly has to be ascertained whether a law of general 
6  Section 36 of the Constitution reads as follows: “(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited 
only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable 
in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including – (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose 
of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and 
its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit 
any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.” 
7  Woolman S et al Constitutional law of South Africa (2006, Juta: Cape Town) at 34-67 and 34-69. 
8  Woolman at 34-67. See also De Waal & Currie 164. 
9  Woolman 34-69. This was affirmed in S v Manamela 2000 (3) SA (CC) paragraph [32]. Also see 
Axam H S If the interest of justice permits: Individual liberty, the limitation clause and the qualified 
constitutional right to bail (2001) 17 South African Journal on Human Rights at 320, where the 
Constitutional court explained that it does not mechanically adhere to a sequential checklist list, but 
engages in a balancing exercise. 
10  Axam 325. See also De Waal & Currie 164. 
11  De Waal & Currie 164. See also Axam at 325. 
12  Axam 325. See also De Waal & Currie164.  
13  De Waal & Currie 165. It is also interesting to note that the United States Constitution does not 
contain a limitation clause. The German Bill of Rights does not have a “general limitation clause” but 
has a particular limitation for each right. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, on the other 
hand, has a general limitation clause. 
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application violates a right in the Bill of Rights.14 In other words, the constraint of the 
right is required to be sanctioned by the law. The phrase “law of general application” is 
the term used for a fundamental standard of “liberal political philosophy and 
constitutional law”, viewed by many as the rule of law.15
 
  
The meaning of “law” in the phrase “law of general application” has been interpreted to 
include all forms of original and subordinate legislation. This was pointed out in the case 
of Larbi-Odam v MEC for Education16 where the Constitutional court held that 
subordinate legislation applicable to all teachers in South Africa constitutes “law of 
general application”. Common law public and private rules and customary law both 
qualify as “law of general application”.17 In Hoffmann v South African Airways18 the 
Constitutional court ruled that a policy or practice does not meet the criteria of law. In 
this case the South African Airways had a policy that applicants for the position of cabin 
attendant within the airline should not be HIV positive.19
 
 
The second component to the rule, namely “general application” denotes that it must 
apply to each person affected by it in the same way.20
 
 
                                                 
14  S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR (CC) at 706 paragraph [98]. 
15  De Waal & Currie 168. It appears that there are two connotations to this rule. To begin with, this rule 
denotes that the authority and control which the government possess derives from the law. To this 
end, the government ought to have lawful power for its conduct or else it will be a dictatorship 
government. The case of August v Electoral Commission 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC) exemplifies this 
component of the rule. In this case the Constitutional court was faced with a complex issue to decide 
whether the failure of the electorate commission to register prisoners on the voter’s role was 
unfounded. The failure to register the prisoners on the voter’s role resulted in the deprivation of the 
prisoners’ rights to vote. See August v Electoral Commission and Others at 374, paragraph [22]. The 
Electorate Act 73 of 1998 does not contain a provision which deprives prisoners their right to vote. 
Hence the failure of the Electorate Commission to register eligible voters was not prescribed by any 
law. The court hence found that the application of section 36 in this regard was not feasible for the 
reason that there seemed not to be an opportunity for justifying the infringement since there was no 
law (at paragraph [23]). 
16  Larbi-Odam v MEC for Education (North West Province) 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC) paragraph [27]. 
17  Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) paragraphs [44] and [136]. 
18  See Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) paragraph [41]. 
19  See Hoffmann v South African Airways paragraph [41]. 
20  De Waal & Currie 169. In the case of Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority 
2002 (4) SA 294 (CC) the idea that the Code of Conduct was applicable to board of directors only 
and inapplicable to the public as a whole was not an issue of concern. 
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4.2 THE PROPORTIONALITY TEST 
 
Section 36(1) states that “[t]he rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of 
law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in 
an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking 
into account all relevant factors, including - (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance 
of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation 
between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose”. Reasonableness in this context means that the law that limits the right should 
only do so in a rational manner which does not exceed its purpose.21
 
 Hence there is 
need to prove the relativeness of the impairment done and the benefits intended to be 
attained.  
In addition to “all relevant factors”, section 36(1)(a) requires a consideration of the 
nature of the right affected by the alleged infringement.22 The weighting of rights is not 
strictly equal: the more significant a particular right to an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, the heavier the burden of proof 
convincing the justification for the restriction of the particular right.23
                                                 
21  De Waal & Currie 176. 
 The significance of 
the rights to human dignity, equality and freedom and security of the person is clear 
from South Africa’s history of apartheid and violence. The intersection of these rights in 
the context of HIV/AIDS, as evidenced in the previous chapters, clearly testifies to the 
need for serious consideration of the effects of conduct and customs that continue to 
perpetuate and entrench inequalities. The proper realisation of these rights is significant 
in furthering the objectives of the Constitution “to create an open and democratic society 
22  It is remarkable to note that not all academic scholars favour that the nature of the right in question 
must be examined in the section 36 enquiry. Cheadle (see Cheadle H “Limitation of Rights” in: 
Cheadle H, Davis D & Haysom N (eds) South African Constitutional Law:F The Bill of Rights (2002) 
at 693) points to the fact that a right cannot be rationally restricted. For a contrary view, see 
Woolman at 34-73. It seems illogical to evaluate whether a right has been violated without analysing 
that particular right. 
23  Woolman 34-71. 
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based on human dignity, equality and freedom”. It is the duty of the courts to figure out 
the value of the specific right in question.24
 
  
The next factor set out in section 36(1)(b) which instructs that the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation be considered, suggests that the reason for a limitation of a 
right must be indispensable.25 If the reason for the restriction of a right is not 
transparent, then such a reason cannot be described as reasonable.26 Additionally, if 
the reason for the restriction is not founded on a democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, such a restriction cannot as a result be regarded as 
reasonable.27
 
  
The importance of the purpose for the limitation requires two separate investigations:28 
Firstly, the purpose for the restriction of the right must be examined,29 followed, 
secondly, by an evaluation of the importance of the recognised purpose.30
 
  
                                                 
24  De Waal & Currie 178. The best practical example to illustrate this point is found in the case of S v 
Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at 666 where the constitutionality of the death penalty was 
considered. Didcott J found that the death sentence violated the rights to life, human dignity and to 
freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading sentence (at 670). For the death penalty to limit the right 
to life validly it was required that such a punishment should be realistic and reasonable. Hence the 
intention of the death sentence was supposed to be weighed against the infringement of three 
fundamental human rights. The court found that the right to life and dignity are the principal human 
rights and all other rights emanate from them (at 669). It is an obligation of everyone including the 
state to respect these rights in all they do including the mode in which sentences are conducted. For 
this reasons it was required of the state to provide forceful and convincing reasons for clarifying the 
restriction of such rights. 
25  De Waal & Currie 179. 
26  De Waal & Currie 178. 
27  De Waal & Currie 178. 
28  Woolman at 34-73. 
29  Woolman at 34-73. 
30  Courts are often faced with complications to determine the purpose of the restriction since the object 
is frequently not presented or made clear in the Act. The other complex issue is that the purpose can 
be written in general terms. In the case of S v Makwanyane, three important rights were violated (at 
662). The state had to prove whether the purpose for limiting the three rights was vital in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. The state argued that the 
death sentence provided three functions which could not be served by any other type of penalty (at 
669). In the first place, it was said to serve as a deterrent to violent crime; secondly, it was said to 
prevent the repetition of violent crime so that a murderer would not murder again; and thirdly, it was 
seen as serving the purpose of retributing violent crime. The third purpose, however, was disputed 
on the grounds that retribution is not aligned to the principle of ubuntu and the standards of 
reconciliation (at 717-718, paragraphs [129]-[130]). 
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Examining of the nature and extent of the limitation in section 36(1)(c) requires the court 
to evaluate the manner in which the infringement impinges on the fundamental right.31 
The question is to determine the degree of the violation of the right; in other words, 
whether the violation of the right is more than the scope of the purpose for the limitation. 
In S v Manamela32 the judge correctly observes that “[t]he level of justification required 
to warrant a limitation upon a right depends on the extent of the limitation. The more 
invasive the infringement, the more powerful the justification must be.”33
 
 
Examining the “relation between the limitation and its purpose” (section 36(1)(d)) in 
plain language means that the reason for the infringement must be good and there has 
to be a fundamental link between the law and its purpose.34 A determination of “less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose” (section 36(1)(e)) requires a consideration of 
the fact that a limitation cannot appropriately be considered as reasonable, relative or 
ultimately reasonable and justifiable when its purpose(s) could be achieved by a less 
invasive means.35
 
 
The limitation of a fundamental right is valid only when the benefits that are meant to be 
realised are relative to the costs of the restriction.36 The limitation is regarded as not 
proportional if other means exist that may perhaps be applied to realise the similar ends 
which optional means may perhaps not restrict rights at all or will not limit such rights to 
such an extent.37
                                                 
31  De Waal & Currie 181. 
  
32  S v Manamela 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC) paragraph [34]. 
33  The courts at times consider the question of whether the restriction is perpetual or provisional or 
whether it is as an absolute or partial denial of the right under enquiry. See Woolman at 34-81. In the 
case of Makwanyane the Constitutional court had to establish the proportionality of the harm inflicted 
by the death sentence on the one hand and deterrence and prevention of crime on the other hand (at 
713-717 at paragraphs [116]-[128]). If the harm is more than the purpose achieved, then there is a 
clear disproportionate case (at 723, paragraphs [145]-[146]. 
34  De Waal & Currie 182. 
35  Woolman S ‘“Out of order? Out of balance? The limitation clause of the final Constitution” (1997) 13 
South African Journal on Human Rights 102 at 111. 
36  De Waal & Currie 183. 
37  The death sentence was clearly a critical infringement of the rights to life, dignity and freedom from 
cruel punishment (see Makwanyane at 753, paragraph [234]). It is difficult to assert that the option 
used to limit the right is reasonable and justifiable in a case where alternative methods exist that 
does not result in a grave limitation. The Constitutional court remarked that imprisonment for a long 
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Against the background of the constitutional framework relating to the human rights 
discussed in chapter three above, as well as theoretical introduction on the limitation of 
human rights outlined in part I above, the discussion now turns to a critical evaluation of 
customary law practices that seriously impact on the human rights of the women 
subjected to these practices (part II below). 
 
                                                 
period or for life was an alternative method which could be used in place for a life sentence (at 753, 
paragraph [234]).  
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CHAPTER 4 
PART 2: INDIGENOUS CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES 
THROUGH THE LENS OF THE CONSTITUTION 
 
4.3 OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING 
TOWARDS WOMEN’S INEQUALITY AND INCREASED EXPOSURE TO 
HIV 
 
South Africa’s history of apartheid rule and colonialism has resulted in a marked overlap 
between the factors of race and poverty. In addition, because poverty and inequality are 
so strongly gendered, rural black women are the most marginalised in society. Many of 
them are still subjected to a cultural regime and practices that reinforce their 
subordination and inequality. It is therefore also not a surprise that they are also the 
worst affected by HIV/AIDS. The impact of HIV/AIDS on the lives of these women 
reflects the complexity of the interface between race, gender, poverty and inequality. 
 
The extent to which African customary law is compatible with the notion of the 
fundamental right of equality entrenched in the Constitution is a topic that has been 
addressed in detail by some authors.38 The patriarchal nature of customary law is 
undisputed.39 It is clear from the first two chapters that many of these highly 
controversial customary practices have remained unchallenged. Nhlapo40
                                                 
38  See Bennett TW et al (eds) African customary law (1991, Cape Town: Juta), also published in (1991) 
Acta Juridica. This volume consists of a range of contributions on the nature of customary law; 
patriarchy, etc. Albie Sachs regards the practice of polygamy as incompatible with the notion of sex 
and gender equality in a democratic South Africa - see “The constitutional position of the family in a 
democratic South Africa” in: Sachs A Protecting human rights in a new South Africa (1990, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) 64 at 72. 
 correctly asks 
what it is about custom that is inimical to women’s rights and replies that it is “everything 
that emanates from an attitude to women in marriage and in the family which sees them 
39  See, for example, Nhlapo RT “The African family and women’s rights: Friends or foes” in: Bennett 
African customary law at 137. 
40  Nhlapo “The African family and women’s rights” at 138-139. 
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solely as adjuncts to the group … rather than as valuable in themselves and deserving 
of the recognition for the human worth on the same terms as men.” Patriarchy is the 
main obstacle that needs to be challenged in order to achieve equality.41
 
 
The persistence of harmful indigenous practices has a vast impact on the human rights 
of women. For many women, the family home is the locus of horror.42 Under these 
circumstances it is not the assault of strangers that these women need to fear the most, 
but the brutality at the hands of relatives, friends and lovers.43 In addition to the 
combined impact of HIV/AIDS, poverty and gender inequality, violence by women’s 
intimate partners has become a grave public matter.44 Intimate partner violence is not a 
once in a lifetime occurrence, but a series of actions or a constant pattern of ill-
treatment.45 The practical reality of all of these factors working together is that the lives 
of women are literally worth less than men.46
 
  
Domestic violence is not only a personal or cultural matter, it is also intensely political.47 
Until recently, domestic violence was not strongly reprimanded by the public or political 
sphere.48 Only when women and girls gain their places as strong and equal members of 
society, will violence against them perhaps be viewed as a shocking aberration rather 
than an invisible norm.49
 
  
                                                 
41  See Kaganas F & Murray C “Law, women and the family: The question of polygamy in a new South 
Africa” in: Bennett African customary law 116 at 132. 
42  Bunch C “The intolerable status quo: Violence against women and girls” Women’s commentary 40-
49, compiled by UNICEF, in: The progress of the nation (1997, Popline document number 133031) 
at 42. 
43  Bunch 42. 
44  Lipshitz M & Ekstrom I Domestic violence and its reverberations (2006, New York: Nova Publishers) 
at 200. 
45  Lipshitz & Ekstrom 200. 
46  Bunch 45. 
47  Bunch C “Women’s rights as human rights: Toward a re-vision of human rights” (1990) 12 Human 
Rights Quarterly 486-498 at 491. 
48  Kramarae C & Spender D (eds) Routledge International encyclopaedia for women (2001, New York: 
Routledge) at 418. 
49  Bunch Women’s commentary 42. 
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Female subordination is embedded so deeply that unless contested, it is observed as 
unavoidable or natural, rather than viewed as a politically construed reality, preserved 
by patriarchal interests, beliefs and institutions.50 The ubuntu botho-curriculum, for 
example, used in schools in KwaZulu-Natal, still promotes the traditional Zulu family 
with the man as the head of the family.51 If sex discrimination continues to be observed 
as natural, it will persist unchanged, reaching into subsequent generations.52 The 
methodical repression of women and girls within the family consequently shapes 
societal views on the subordinate role and position of women and the so-called 
“benefits” associated with male dominance in general.53
 
  
4.4 FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY 
 
4.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The conflict involving cultural norms and the right equality is not new in South Africa.54 
There seems, however, to be support for the view that the right to equality supersedes 
the right to culture where a clash of these rights arises. The Constitution obliges the 
limitation of any right to be done in a manner that is reasonable in an “open and 
democratic society based on freedom and equality.”55 It is argued that although this way 
of limiting rights does not have a direct effect on the clash between the right to equality 
and culture, it nevertheless reasserts the honoured position that the right to equality 
finds in the constitutional dispensation.56 Section 39 of the Constitution57
                                                 
50  Bunch C “Women’s rights as human rights: Toward a re-vision of human rights” at 486.491. See also 
Kaganas F & Murray C “The contest between culture and gender equality under South Africa’s 
Interim Constitution” (1994) 21(4) Journal of Law and Society 409-433 at 411. 
 gives central 
51  Kaganas & Murray at 411. 
52  Bunch Women’s commentary 42. 
53  Bunch Women’s commentary 42. 
54  Kaganas & Murray “The contest between culture and gender equality under South Africa’s Interim 
Constitution” (1994) 21(4) Journal of Law and Society 409-433 at 411. A typical example of such a 
clash is found in the case of Bhe (discussed in detail in chapter two above). 
55  See Section 36 of the Constitution above. 
56  Kaganas & Murray 411. 
57  Section 39(1) of the Constitution reads as follows: “When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, 
tribunal or forum – (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based 
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concern to equality by giving the courts a duty to interpret the Bill of Rights in a manner 
that upholds the principles that underlie an “open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom”. Equality should hence be the guiding principle 
where there is a conflict of the right to equality and the right to culture. It is submitted 
that it is illegitimate to protect a culture that maintains and reinforces the unequal status 
of women. 
 
The Constitutional court considers dignity as the most imperative right and constitutional 
value.58 It is sometimes argued that female genital mutilation has a range of physical, 
aesthetic and psychological advantages.59 It is submitted that the harmful health 
consequences of this procedure, however, override any alleged advantages that it 
allegedly may have.60
 
 
Characteristically, the women who submit to female genital mutilation suffer from severe 
pain, shock, infection, complications in urinating and menstruating, abnormality and 
scarring of the genitalia, physical and psychological strain with sexual intercourse, 
bleeding and an increased vulnerability to HIV-infection.61 Additional complications are 
an increased threat of sterility and infant mortality. Death may result as a direct effect of 
female genital mutilation.62 These consequences clearly cannot make people to take 
pride in their culture.63
                                                 
on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider 
foreign law.” 
 As this practice is usually performed on girls barely able to grasp 
the full consequences of this invasive procedure, the question arises as to how “well-
58  Woolman at 34-116. 
59  James S A “Reconciling international human rights and cultural relativism: The case of female 
circumcision” (1994) 8 (1) Bioethics at 8. 
60  James 8. 
61  Rahman A & Toubia N (eds) Female genital mutilation: A guide to laws and policies world wide 
(2000, London: Zed Books) at 8-10. Also see James 8-9. 
62  James 9. Rahman & Toubia 23. Death is a rare result, usually caused by haemorrhage. See James 
at 9. 
63  Bunch 43. See also James 9. 
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informed, independent, mature, free and real” their assent to FGM is.64 Yet, some 
cultures persist in defending the practice.65
 
  
At the outset, female genital mutilation violates the right to freedom and security of the 
person, the right to human dignity, the right to life (where death is a direct result) and 
the right to a person’s physical and psychological integrity. The right to physical integrity 
is often associated with the right to freedom from torture and includes a number of other 
of human rights values such as the right to human dignity, the right to liberty and 
security of the person and the right to privacy.66 Violent acts whose result is death or 
serious physical harm clearly impede on a person right to life and physical integrity.67
 
 
The Constitution expressly in section 12(1(c) protects the right to be free from all forms 
of violence “from either public or private sources”. Additional protection is afforded by 
virtue of section 12(1)(d) that protects the right not to be tortured in any way and section 
12(1)(e) that provides for the right not be treated or punished “in a cruel, inhuman or 
degrading way”. 
Female genital mutilation can be said to diminish a woman’s bodily and sexual 
autonomy. Section 12(2)(b) of the Constitution provides for a safeguard of the body 
against physical attack and for an assurance of autonomy regarding one’s body.68 
Reproductive autonomy is a prerequisite for the sexual and social equality of women.69
                                                 
64  James 14. 
 
Arguments in favour of the practice based also on section 12(2)(b) of the Constitution 
cannot be accepted. Firstly, the right to make decisions regarding reproduction 
presupposes a person capable of understanding the risks and benefits associated with 
a particular decision. The very young adolescent girls subjected to the practice are 
65  Bunch Women’s commentary 43. 
66  Rahman & Toubia at 23. 
67  Howland C W & Buergenthal T Religious fundamentalisms and the human rights of women at 83 
(2001, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan) at 8. See also Rahman & Toubia at 23. 
68  Bishop & Woolman, in: Woolman at 40-85. 
69  Swanepoel M Embryonic stem cell research and cloning: A proposed legislative framework in 
context of legal status and personhood (unpublished LLM thesis, UP, 2006) at 122. 
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hardly “free” to make an objective decision in this regard.70 Young women who assent to 
the practice are greatly vulnerable to compulsion by their elders.71 These elders may 
coerce these young women by persuading them in various ways to undergo the 
operation.72 Rejecting to undertake the operation may endanger a woman’s family 
affairs, her shared life with her cultural group and her chances to find a spouse.73
 
 
Secondly, as was alluded to above, the extent of and grave nature of the procedure that 
impacts on a range of human rights far outweigh any so-called ‘positive’ benefits 
attributed to it.  
The practice of female genital mutilation is based on the perception that women’s 
bodies are innately defective and require correction.74 This is also evident in the 
customary practice of dry sex which is intended to alter the original structure of the 
vagina for the purpose of enhancing sexual pleasure for men. Female genital mutilation 
is also intended to preserve female chastity and female marriage prospects.75 This in its 
self violates women’s inherent dignity.76 Respect for the human dignity of women entails 
the recognition of their innate physical qualities, which among others include the normal 
form and functioning of their reproductive organs and women’s sexual role.77
 
 
Female genital mutilation also discriminates against women on the ground of their sex. 
Article 1 of the CEDAW defines sex discrimination as  
 
[a]ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or 
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, 
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any 
other field.78
                                                 
70  Karanja D N Female genital mutilation in Africa (2003, Longwood: Xulon Press) at 51. Rahman & 
Toubia 23. 
 
71  Karanja 36. 
72  Rahman & Toubia 23. 
73  Rahman & Toubia 23. 
74  Rahman & Toubia 23. 
75  Bunch 43. 
76  Rahman & Toubia 23. 
77  Rahman & Toubia 23. 
78  Article 1 of the CEDAW. 
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As a form of discrimination against women under human rights law, female genital 
mutilation will need to meet the terms of the above definition, eg meeting the criteria of: 
 
1) the distinction must be on ground of sex; 
2) the purpose of the distinction should be harmful to women’s equal enjoyment of 
rights. 
 
Female genital mutilation is said to pass the above test for the reason that it is a 
customary practice designed for women and girls specifically; and its result constitutes a 
grave violation of human rights. It also aims to control women’s sexuality.79 Moreover, 
the practice supports the view that women’s role is one only destined for motherhood. 
This reinforces their subordination in political, economic, social and cultural spheres.80
 
  
It is often argued that because in some cultures, both sexes are subjected to a form of 
initiation or circumcision, female genital mutilation cannot be regarded as discrimination 
on the ground of sex.81 It is submitted that despite the fact that both men and women 
undergo circumcision of some sort, female genital mutilation is far more severe than 
male circumcision and carries a critical and degrading social message.82 This does not 
mean that male circumcision is above constitutional scrutiny, however.83
 
 This is however 
a question that will not be addressed in this study. 
4.4.2 FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION? 
 
As was explained in chapter 3 above, section 9(5) of the Constitution establishes a 
rebuttable presumption that discrimination on either of the grounds listed in section 9(3) 
                                                 
79  Rahman & Toubia 21. 
80  Bunch 43. See also Rahman & Toubia 21. 
81  Vandenhole W Non-discrimination and equality in the view of UN human rights treaty bodies (2005, 
Antwerpen: Intersentia) at 134. See also Cook R J Human rights of women: National and 
international perspectives (1994, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press) at 541. See also 
Rahman & Toubia 21. 
82  Rahman & Toubia 21. See also Cook at 541. 
83  Rahman & Toubia 21. 
 133 
amount to unfair discrimination.84 It is clear from the discussion in chapter two above, 
 
as 
well as the introduction above on the nature of female genital mutilation as a procedure, 
that it constitutes discrimination on the basis of equality in respect of the following 
grounds listed in section 9(3): 
(1) sex 
(2) gender 
 
In addition, it is submitted that following from the discussion above, female genital 
mutilation also pose a threat to the following fundamental human rights: 
 
(1) The right to human dignity (section 10); and 
(2) The right to freedom and security of the person (specifically sections 12(1)(c), 
12(1)(d) and section 12(1)(e), and also sections 12(2)(a) and 12(2)(b)). 
 
The constitutionality of the practice of female genital mutilation in light of the foregoing 
analysis will next be considered, particularly in relation to the right to equality. 
 
The practice of female genital mutilation is part of customary law, more specifically 
unwritten customary law. A lot of the unwritten customary law, as is pointed out by Van 
Niekerk,85
 
 is recited and has traditionally been recited by men. If evidence of female 
genital mutilation is given by men, it is submitted that the actual impact and scope of 
this custom will not be accurately portrayed to any court in question.  
Customary law is subject to the provisions of the Constitution, including the Bill of 
Rights, by virtue of section 211(3) of the Constitution which provides that the courts may 
                                                 
84  Van Reenen T P “Equality, discrimination, and affirmative action: An analysis of section 9 of the 
Constitution of the Republic Of South Africa” (1997) 12 SA Public Law at 151-165 at 163-164. 
85  Van Niekerk G “Indigenous law and narrative: Rethinking methodology” (1999) 32 Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa 208 at 212. 
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apply customary law where it is applicable, “subject to the Constitution and any 
legislation that specifically deals with customary law”.86
 
  
The discussion above in chapter three has already indicated that the Bill of Rights also 
applies horizontally, as is clear from section 8(2) of the Constitution.  
 
Turning now to the three-stage enquiry discussed in chapter three above, the first 
question that needs to be answered in determining whether the practice of FGM unfairly 
discriminates against women on the ground of equality, is whether the alleged provision 
(in this case customary practice which forms part of unwritten customary law) makes a 
distinction between people or categories.87 Although a statutory provision is not at issue 
here, the question should be answered in the affirmative, as female genital mutilation is 
practiced disparately across the country. Not all African women are affected by the 
practice. The application of the practice hence differentiates not only between women 
themselves, but also between the sexes, as the practice, although also applicable in 
respect of young boys in some communities, is not as invasive and severe as in the 
case of young girls.88
 
  
The question next is whether the differentiation is unfair, which, as was explained in 
chapter three above,89
                                                 
86  Emphasis added. Section 8(1) of the Constitution makes it clear that the Constitution applies to “all 
law”. 
 involves determining whether the differentiation amounts to 
discrimination. This is established by determining whether the differentiation is based on 
a listed ground under section 9(3) of the Constitution. In the case of female genital 
mutilation, this is also answered in the affirmative, as the practice is said to discriminate 
87  See paragraph 2.2.1 of chapter three above. 
88  See discussion under paragraph 6 of chapter two above on female genital mutilation. The term 
“mutilation” already provides an indication of the severity of FGM. For more reading on this topic, see 
Brennan K “The influence of cultural relativism on international human rights law: Female 
circumcision as a case study” (1989) 7 Law & Inequality at 367; Funder A “De minimus non curat lex: 
The clitoris, culture and law” (1993) 3 Transnational law and contemporary problems at 417; 
Oosterveld, V L “Refugee status for female circumcision fugitives: Building a Canadian precedent” 
(1993) 51 University of Toronto Faculty Law Review at 277; Slack A T “Female circumcision: A 
critical appraisal” (1988) 10 Human Rights Quarterly at 473; Toubia N Female genital mutilation: A 
call for global action (1993, New York: Women’s Ink). 
89  See paragraph 2.2.3 of chapter three above. 
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against women on the grounds of sex and gender (both listed grounds under section 
9(3)).  
 
The next step is the unfairness test, eg determining whether the discrimination amounts 
to unfair discrimination.90 As was explained above, if the discrimination refers to a 
ground listed in section 9(3), it is presumed that unfairness exists. The consequence of 
this is that if differentiation exists on an explicit ground, a presumption of unfairness is 
created in addition to the alleged discrimination. As was seen in the discussion of the 
unfairness test in the case of Harksen91 in chapter three above, this test is designed to 
determine unfairness by looking also at the following: (1) the status of the complainants 
in society, if they have been affected by past patterns of disadvantage; (2) the nature of 
the provision (or conduct) or authority and the function required to be accomplished by 
it; and (3) the degree to which the complainants’ constitutional rights or interests have 
been infringed and whether the infringement of such rights impacted on their 
fundamental right to human dignity (or whether the impairment constitutes an 
infringement of a comparably serious nature). The above test hence considers the 
impact caused by the unfair conduct, illustrating both the historical and the contextual. 
The central value in this comprehensive test is the right to dignity. The more susceptible 
a person or group to be a victim of discrimination, the more inequitable the 
discrimination may be found to be. Such a notion of equality revolves around an 
understanding that aims to break with past patterns of disadvantage and interpret 
discrimination against the background of past and existing social, political and economic 
inequalities.92
 
 Based on this, female genital mutilation undoubtedly constitutes unfair 
discrimination in terms of section 9. 
Now that it has been established the practice constitutes unfair discrimination, the 
enquiry must turn to the next step, namely to establish whether the said discrimination 
can be justified under the limitation clause of the Constitution. The court observed in 
                                                 
90  See paragraph 2.2.4 of chapter three above. 
91  Harksen v Lane NO & Others 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC). 
92  See discussion under par 2.2.4 of chapter three above. 
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Hoffmann v South African Airways93
  
 that whether this stage arises or not, however, will 
be dependent on whether the measure complained of is contained in a “law of general 
application”. 
It is clear from the discussion above on the limitation clause that the practice of female 
genital mutilation does not fall within the category of “law of general application”, as set 
out in terms of section 36(1).94
 
 There is hence no need for justifiying the alleged 
infringement in terms of section 36, as there is no law of general application applicable. 
Despite the fact that it is not necessary to embark on the rationality enquiry, it may be 
instructive to consider the arguments relevant to this enquiry in any event. 
As far as the question regarding the nature of the violated right is concerned, the 
previous chapters in this study have presented a detailed discussion of what the right to 
equality, dignity and freedom and security of the person entail. The importance of these 
rights within the South African context flows not only from South Africa’s particular 
history, but cannot be emphasised enough. As a result of the significance of these 
rights, their infringement requires grave justification. The more significant a particular 
right to an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
the heavier the justification for the restriction of the particular right, as was explained in 
chapter three above. 
Looking at the reasons offered for the existence of the practice of female genital 
mutilation, one finds that these centre around the idea of preserving female chastity (by 
making sex physically impossible or painful); or keeping young girls “pure and clean” 
before they get married.95
                                                 
93  2001 (1) SA 1 (CC), paragraph [24] per Ncgobo J. 
 The alleged purpose served by the practice, namely female 
chastity, although a lofty-sounding purpose, cannot be said to serve an important 
purpose in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom. The invasiveness and harm caused by the practice outweigh any so-called 
94  See Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) paragraphs [23] and [41]. See also in 
general, August v Electoral Commission 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC). 
95  See Penn M L & Nardos R Overcoming violence against girls and women: The international 
campaign to eradicate a worldwide problem (2003, New York: Rowman & Littlefield) at 94. 
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benefits by far. Chapter two above has discussed the far-reaching effect of this practice 
on young women, not only psychologically, but also physically. The practice is also 
instrumental in increasing women’s exposure to HIV. In this context, women’s right to 
life may also become relevant. 
 
Although this constitutional scrutiny exercise has only focused on the right to equality, 
the chapters above have outlined the other fundamental rights also under threat by the 
practice, namely the right to human dignity and the right to freedom and security of the 
person. 
 
If chastity is the prime objective for the practice, then one may argue that there are 
many other less restrictive means to achieve this same purpose. Many different 
cognitive frameworks exist within which girls and young women can organise their 
thoughts about sexual behaviour. These options, if applied, will not in any way restrict 
the rights to equality, dignity and freedom and security of the person in the same 
manner than female genital mutilation. Some chastity or abstinence programmes advise 
young people to delay sexual activities until they are old enough or married.96 One 
specific approach, better known as the integrated critical health approach, is another 
alternative approach which may achieve the same purpose.97
 
  
Finally, no limitation can be regarded as reasonable and justifiable when its purpose(s) 
can be achieved by less invasive means.98
 
 
4.5 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION 
 
                                                 
96  Thomas R M God in the classroom: Religion and America’s public schools (2007, Wesport: 
Greenwood Publishing Group) at 221. 
97  Denniston G C Male and female circumcision: Medical, legal, and ethical considerations in paediatric 
practice (1999, New York: Springer) at 324. 
98  Woolman S ‘“Out of order? Out of balance? The limitation clause of the final Constitution” (1997) 13 
South African Journal on Human Rights 102 at 111. 
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It is apparent from the discussion above that female genital mutilation violates the 
constitutional rights to equality, human dignity and freedom and security of the person. It 
is clear that there will in future still be numerous situations were South Africa will need 
to find answers to the inconsistency between women’s desires and cultural claims.99 
The dynamic character of indigenous culture denotes that it is permeable by innovative 
norms and that it will not remain as impervious to the mores of emancipation and 
equality.100 Culture is always in the process of being reinvented,101 capable of evolving to 
become more egalitarian.102 While changing these harmful norms the law does not 
necessarily transform women’s lives, but the law has a normative force and can 
influence thinking.103
 
 
It is next necessary to briefly examine the international human rights framework relevant 
to HIV/AIDS, gender inequality and violence. 
 
 
4.6 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF HIV/AIDS, 
GENDER INEQUALITY AND VIOLENCE  
 
The Constitution instructs in section 39(1) that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a 
court, tribunal or forum must not only promote the values underlying an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom (subsection (a)), but 
must consider international law (subsection (b)), and may consider foreign law 
(subsection (c)). The international human rights framework relevant to the issues of 
gender inequality and violence will next briefly be considered. Specific reference will be 
made to those rights that promote women’s struggle for gender equality and 
reproductive freedom, which in turn may assist in lessening some women’s severe 
                                                 
99  Kaganas & Murray “The contest between culture and gender equality under South Africa’s Interim 
Constitution” (1994) 21 (4) Journal of Law and Society 409-433 at 426. 
100  Kaganas & Murray 426. 
101  Robertson D A Dictionary of human rights (1997, New York: Routledge) at 1. See also Kaganas & 
Murray 426. 
102  Kaganas & Murray 426-427. 
103  Kaganas & Murray 427. 
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susceptibility to HIV. It must be noted that a complete and thorough investigation of all 
the relevant rights under international human rights law relevant to women in the 
context of HIV/AIDS, gender inequality and violence falls unfortunately outside the 
scope of the discussion that follows. 
 
4.6.1 CHARTER-BASED SYSTEM 
 
4.6.1.1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
The notion of human rights is one of the few ethical visions recognised globally.104 The 
support for human rights is a broadly acknowledged objective and as a consequence 
affords a constructive structure for addressing gender abuse.105 The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights106
 
 (UDHR), the first comprehensive human rights 
document to be adopted by an international organisation, signifies this world vision. 
Although not much is articulated on the subject of women, Article 2 affords everyone 
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such 
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.107
 
 
Bunch108
  
 submits that the reason why Eleanor Roosevelt and the American women 
fought for the inception of sex as a ground of non-differentiation was to address 
women’s subordinate position in society. 
The UDHR gives assurance of fundamentals civil and political rights, socio-economic 
rights and the right to health care, all of which are of important to both people vulnerable 
                                                 
104  Bunch C “Women’s rights as human rights: Toward a re-vision of human rights” (1990) 12(4) Human 
Rights Quarterly 486-498 at 486. 
105  Bunch C “Women’s rights as human rights: Toward a re-vision of human rights” 487. 
106  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by GA Res 217A (III) of 10 
December 1948. 
107  Article 2 of the UDHR. 
108  Bunch 487. 
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to HIV/AIDS and people living with HIV/AIDS.109 The UDHR pays less attention to 
socio-economic rights.110
 
 
Article 25111 of the UDHR refers to the right to health care and special assistance to 
mothers and children. It is argued on the basis of article 25(2) that women and children 
(who happen to be the most susceptible groups to HIV/AIDS in Africa) merit special 
consideration with regards to health care.112 The High court decision in the case of the 
TAC, discussed under the right to access to health care above, is an example of the 
advancement of the rights of mothers and children.113
 
  
Article 1 and article 2114 of the UDHR gives assurance to the right to equality and 
dignity. It is argued that the phrase “other status” referred to in article 2 as one of the 
factors on which no distinction in relation to the guaranteed rights in the UDHR is 
permitted. This suggests by inference also a person’s HIV-status.115
 
 
The right to dignity is reflected in article 5116 which proscribes torture and cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 6117
                                                 
109  Uko E J “Legal rights of people vulnerable to HIV/AIDS in Africa” (2004) 45(1) Codicillus 32-46 at 36. 
 may as well be construed to 
110  Nienaber A G Ethics and human rights in HIV-related clinical trials in Africa with specific reference to 
informed consent in preventative HIV vaccine efficacy trials in South Africa (unpublished LLD thesis, 
UP, 2007) at 200. 
111  Article 25 of the UDHR reads as follows: “(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his 
control.(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, 
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.”  
112  Uko at 36. 
113  Uko at 36-37. 
114  Articles 1 and 2 of the UDHR read as follows: “1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a 
spirit of brotherhood. 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction 
shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or 
territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any 
other limitation of sovereignty.”  
115  Uko at 36. 
116  Article 5 of the UDHR reads as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.” 
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encompass the right to dignity, as this article points that everyone has the right to 
recognition everywhere as a person before the law. Despite this assurance, there are 
still many instances where women are not afforded the equality and dignity that they are 
entitled to. 
 
The claim to the right to privacy is echoed in article 12 of the UDHR,118 which prohibits 
arbitrary interference with a person’s privacy, family home or correspondence. There is 
a connection between the rights to privacy, liberty and autonomy.119 Griffin120
 
 remarks 
as follows: 
[W]e need certain forms of privacy to develop the confidence and capacity to overcome 
the enormous barriers to autonomous decision. 
 
Within the context of HIV/AIDS, for example, the right to privacy includes the right of 
persons not to be subjected to unwarranted “medical tests, experiments or treatment” 
without their free, voluntary and informed consent.121
 
 
4.6.1.2 The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women  
 
On 20 December 1993, the UN general Assembly adopted the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVW) as an acknowledgment that gender-
based violence manifests disparate power relations and is the critical social mechanism 
for preserving women’s subordination to men.122
 
  
                                                 
117  Article 6 of the UDHR states that “[e]veryone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person 
before the law.”  
118  As explained in chapter one above, this study did not address the right to privacy in detail, but 
acknowledges its relevance to persons living with HIV and AIDS. 
119  Griffin J On human rights (2008, Oxford: Oxford University Press) at 235. 
120  Griffin 235. 
121  Uko 38. Also see Nienaber at 191 and 250 where she discusses informed consent, the right to 
privacy and the right to human dignity within the context of clinical research and HIV patients. 
122  The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, (DEVW), proclaimed 
by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 48/104 of 20 December 1993 (hereafter referred to as 
the (DEVW).  
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This declaration describes gender-based violence as violence directed at women for the 
reason that they are women.123 Such violence is seen as a form of discrimination that 
hinders women’s realisation of rights and freedoms on a level proportional to men.124 
Although the DEVW is not an international treaty, it is instrumental in recognising 
intimate violence against women.125 It includes references to private, intimate acts of 
violence, violence within the community and harmful traditional practices to which 
women and girls are subjected.126
 
 
Article 4 of the DEVW provides inter alia that “states should condemn violence against 
women and should not invoke any custom, tradition or religious consideration to avoid 
their obligations with respect to its elimination”. 
 
Although important, this strong pronouncement is limited to the elimination of violence 
against women and does not extend to the broader guarantee of all women’s rights. The 
DEVW places a positive obligation on all states to address and eradicate any customary 
or religious conduct which has a harmful effect on women. Where cultural and religious 
practices include or are accompanied by violence  
 
4.6.1.3 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
                                                 
123  Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women. Also see, in general, McGillivray A & 
Comaskey B Black eyes all of the time: Intimate violence, aboriginal women, and the justice system 
(1999, Toronto: University of Toronto press) at 151. 
124  McGillivray & Comaskey 150. 
125  McGillivray & Comaskey 150. 
126  Article 2 of the DEVW reads as follows: “Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, 
but not be limited to, the following: (a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the 
family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, 
marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal 
violence and violence related to exploitation; (b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence 
occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and 
intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced 
prostitution; (c) Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, 
wherever it occurs.” 
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The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights is a regional instrument that 
embodies an African perspective on issues of human rights over and above the support 
and protection of the rights of African people.127
 
 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights is the responsible organ for the 
enforcement of the rights contained in the African Charter.128 Despite the fact that the 
African Charter recognises the significance of women’s rights, it is criticised for covering 
only a small part of areas in which women require protection.129 Regardless of this 
criticism, the African Charter recognises the significance of women’s rights through 
article 2, the equality clause, which states that the rights and freedoms protected in the 
Charter are to be enjoyed by everyone irrespective of their sex; as well as article 3, 
which provides that all individuals are equal before the law and are entitled to the equal 
protection of the law. Article 18(3)130
 
 refers to the protection of the rights of women and 
children specifically. Article 60 declares that the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ rights should draw its insights from various international human rights, 
including CEDAW. 
Despite these assurances, women need noticeably more than these provisions if their 
rights are to be advanced and efficiently protected.131
 
  
4.6.1.4 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa 
 
The reason for this protocol was because it was important to have a separate document 
addressing the rights of women specifically,132
                                                 
127  The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted on June 27, 1981. Also see Musa R et 
al Breathing life into the African Union Protocol on Women’s Rights in Africa (2006, Oxford: 
Pambazuka) at 10. 
 as the interpretation of existing rights in 
128  Musa 10. 
129  Musa 10. 
130  Article 18(3) provides as follows: “The State shall ensure the elimination of […] discrimination against 
women and also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in 
international declarations and conventions.”  
131  Musa 11. 
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the African Charter that protected women was not sufficient.133 A particular treaty on 
women’s rights was thought to have the advantage of emphasising the topics that 
impact upon women particularly. A more gendered approach to the interpretation of 
human rights was necessary.134
 
  
The coming into force of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa135
 
 plays an important role in the protection and 
support of women rights in Africa, generating novel rights for women in terms of 
international standards. This innovative protocol endeavours to protect the rights of all 
African women in the political, social and cultural sphere. 
Article 14(2)(c) of the Protocol inter alia sets out the reproductive right of women to a 
medical abortion when pregnancy results from rape or incest or when the furtherance of 
the pregnancy jeopardises either the health or life of pregnant women.136
 
 Additionally, 
article 14(1)(e) of the Protocol specifically refers to the right to be informed of one’s 
health status, as well as that of one’s partner, including HIV/AIDS.  
Article 2(1) of the Protocol furthermore protects women from all forms of discrimination. 
The Protocol places an obligation to all member states to combat all forms of 
                                                 
132  Evans M & Murray R (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The system in 
practice 1986-2006 (2008, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 445. 
133  Evans & Murray 445. 
134  Evans & Murray 445. 
135  Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 25 
November 2005. 
136  Article 14 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa reads as follows: “(1) States Parties shall ensure that the right to health of women, 
including sexual and reproductive health is respected and promoted. This includes: (a) the right to 
control their fertility; (b) the right to decide whether to have children, the number of children and the 
spacing of children; (c) the right to choose any method of contraception;(d) the right to self-protection 
and to be protected against sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS; (e) the right to be 
informed on one’s health status and on the health status of one’s partner, particularly if affected with 
sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS, in accordance with internationally recognised 
standards and best practices; (g) the right to have family planning education. (2) States Parties shall 
take all appropriate measures to: (a) provide adequate, affordable and accessible health services, 
including information, education and communication programmes to women especially those in rural 
areas; […] (c) protect the reproductive rights of women by authorising medical abortion in cases of 
sexual assault, rape, incest, and where the continued pregnancy endangers the mental and physical 
health of the mother or the life of the mother or the foetus.” 
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discrimination against women by creating legislation and other measures that are likely 
to contest any form of unfair and discriminatory behaviour. Article 3137 in addition 
protects the dignity of women. Finally, article 5138 calls for the lawful proscription of 
harmful practices that negatively impact on the rights of women and which are contrary 
to recognised international standards. Female genital mutilation is specifically 
mentioned in this provision.139
 
 
4.6.2 TREATY-BASED SYSTEM 
 
4.6.2.1 The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women 
 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women140 
(hereafter CEDAW) is an international legal instrument against sex discrimination that 
seeks to make active legal and political instruments work for women and to develop 
states’ accountability for the infringement of the human rights of women.141
                                                 
137  Article 3 reads as follows: “Every woman shall have the right to dignity inherent in a human being 
and to the recognition and protection of her human and legal rights.” The same provision instructs 
states parties to adopt and implement appropriate measures to ensure the protection of every 
woman’s right to respect for her dignity and protection of women from all forms of violence, 
particularly sexual and verbal violence. 
 This 
Convention can be described as an international bill of rights for women and a 
framework for women’s involvement in the advancement of rights. CEDAW recognises 
138  Article 5 states that: “States Parties shall prohibit and condemn all forms of harmful practices which 
negatively affect the human rights of women and which are contrary to recognised international 
standards” and that “States Parties shall take all necessary legislative and other measures to 
eliminate such practices […].”, including: (a) creation of public awareness in all sectors of society 
regarding harmful practices through information, formal and informal education and outreach 
programmes; (b) prohibition, through legislative measures backed by sanctions, of all forms of 
female genital mutilation, scarification, medicalisation and para-medicalisation of female genital 
mutilation and all other practices in order to eradicate them; […] (d) protection of women who are at 
risk of being subjected to harmful practices or all other forms of violence, abuse and intolerance.” 
139 See footnote above: “… prohibition […] of all forms of female genital mutilation …”. 
140  The United Nations Convention on The Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) of 18 December 1979.  
141  Bunch “Women’s rights as human rights: Toward a re-vision of human rights” 495. 
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and echoes international values and principles relative to attaining equality between 
women and men.142
 
 
The relevance of CEDAW143 for this study relates to its main objective which is to place 
an obligation on member states to prohibit discrimination against women in all forms. 
This Convention is the only human rights instrument whose aim is to confirm and mark 
culture and tradition as powerful forces shaping gender roles and family affairs.144 
Signatory states to the CEDAW are required to create strategies addressing 
discrimination against women and are obliged to account on their observance to the 
committee of CEDAW.145
 
 
Article 5146 of the Convention instructs member states to transform cultural practices and 
all other practices which are subject to the idea of “inferiority or the superiority of either 
of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women”. Article 16 further provides for 
the equal status of men and women in issues relating to the regulation of marriage and 
family affairs.147
                                                 
142  Bunch 495. 
 Article 11 inter alia requires member states to eradicate discrimination 
in all forms against women in the field of employment. 
143  Article 2 of the CEDAW. 
144  See http://un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/ (visited 10 February 2009). 
145  Bunch 495. 
146  Article 5 states that: “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: (a) “to modify the social and 
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices 
and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority 
of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.” 
147  Many aspects of this article are particularly relevant to this study. Article 16 states that “States 
Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters 
relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men 
and women. […] (a) The same right to enter into marriage; (b) The same right freely to choose a 
spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent; (c) The same rights and 
responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution; d) The same rights and responsibilities as 
parents, irrespective of their marital status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases the 
interests of the children shall be paramount; (e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on 
the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education and 
means to enable them to exercise these rights; (f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to 
guardianship, wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children, or similar institutions where these 
concepts exist in national legislation; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount; (g) 
The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a family name, a 
profession and an occupation; (h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, 
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Despite the fact that the Convention deals with many issues of sex and gender 
discrimination, one of its shortcomings is that it does not deal with the subject of 
violence against women.148 At some point during CEDAW’s eighth session in Vienna, 
CEDAW approved a decree expressing serious concern on the matter of gender 
violence and by instructing states to incorporate in their review reports information 
concerning statistics, legislation and support services regarding the subject of gender 
violence.149
 
  
The human rights agenda for women embodied in CEDAW, if acknowledged and 
enforced by member states would mark a massive movement forward. Regrettably, the 
United Nations does not regard this convention as a powerful convention as 
demonstrated by the problems that CEDAW has in getting countries to account on 
observance with its provision. In addition, some governments and a large number of 
non-governmental organisations regard CEDAW as a manuscript concerned with 
“secondary rights”.150 An understanding of the word “secondary” could refer to 
something less important or derivative. Despite these perceptions, CEDAW remains a 
constructive declaration of values and principles approved by the United Nations in 
terms of which women can constructively start addressing legal and political 
transformation in their regions.151
 
 
4.6.2.2 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
On 28 August 2002, South Africa became a signatory state to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.152
                                                 
acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of 
charge or for a valuable consideration.” 
 Human dignity as the core value for other 
148  Bunch 495. 
149  Bunch 495-496. 
150  Bunch 496. 
151  Bunch 496. 
152  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 3 March 1976. Also see 
www.worldcoalition.org/modules/wfdownloads/visit.php?cid=34&lid=162 (visited 14 April 2009). 
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rights is affirmed in the preamble of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.153
 
  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter the ICCPR) upholds 
certain human rights that are applicable to people vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. Uko154
 
 
asserts that within the ICCPR the right to life impacts on all other rights. The right to life 
protects citizens against any pandemics that may be perilous to them by placing a duty 
on the state to take necessary measures to reduce such epidemics. In this context, 
individuals vulnerable to HIV/AIDS may invoke this right, for example through 
demanding appropriate preventative and curative services from their governments to 
prevent or control HIV/AIDS.  
4.6.2.3 The International Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights 
 
Through its significant humanitarian involvement, South Africa became a signatory to 
the International Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights on 3 October 1994.155
 
  
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights156
                                                 
153  The Preamble of the International Covenant On Civil and political Rights of 3 March 1976 states that 
“[…] in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of 
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, recognizing that these rights derive from the 
inherent dignity of the human person […].” 
 
obliges member states to take appropriate measures to realise the right to physical or 
mental health. It is argued that the duty created on member states incorporates the 
“prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic and occupational and other 
154  Uko 37. 
155  International Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights of 3 January 1976. See also 
http://www.unaavictoria.org.au/media/RMIT%20MUNC/South%20Africa%20Position%20Paper%20-
%20Steph%20Bolas.pdf (visited 14 April 2009). 
156  Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights GA res 2200A 
(XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp (No 16) at 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3, 1, states as follows: 
“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”  
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diseases” as well as the establishment of circumstances that would guarantee health 
services and medical interest to everyone upon sickness.157
 
 
Article 12 may perhaps be considered as vague for the reason that it allows state 
parties undefined discretion. Nearly all, if not all, socio-economic rights are assured on 
condition of a progressive realisation, thereby allowing justifications by the state parties 
for the delay in the execution of these rights, or in the instance of non-performance. 
Uko158
 
 asserts that the High court and the Constitutional court in South Africa could 
have relied on section 12 of this Covenant in arriving at the conclusion that the state 
must provide Nevirapine to all pregnant women at all state hospitals at the state’s cost.  
The spirit of the development of the right to dignity is greatly set in international human 
rights instruments which appeal to human dignity in the logic of our universal humanity. 
In this Convention inherent dignity is also seen as a foundational value.159
 
  
4.6.2.4 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
Section 24(2)(d)160
 
 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is of 
particular importance for pregnant, HIV-positive women. This provision obliges state 
parties “to ensure appropriate prenatal and postnatal health care for mothers”. Proper 
pre-natal health care for pregnant HIV-positive women may include access to 
antiretroviral drugs which will prevent mother-to-child-transmission of HIV. Post-natal 
health care may include medical advice regarding the danger of breast-feeding in order 
to prevent mother-child transmission of HIV.  
                                                 
157  Uko 38. 
158  Uko 39-40. 
159  The Preamble of the International Covenant on Economic and Cultural rights of 3 January 1976 
provides inter alia that “[…] recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” and 
that “these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.” 
160  Section 24(2)(d) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened 
for signature, ratification and accession by GA res 44/25 of 20 November 1989.  
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4.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The discussion above has only briefly touched on selected rights that are protected in 
terms of the international human rights framework. As the previous chapters have 
illustrated, the interdependence of a range of rights that relate to women affected and 
infected by HIV/AIDS makes the protection of women not a straightforward matter. For 
example, the vulnerability of women to HIV infection derives in large part from pervasive 
violations of women’s human rights and dignity. 
 
A society based on human rights, equality and freedom, as South Africa strives to be, is 
obliged to react to the violent and methodical infringement of women’s rights locally and 
internationally.161 It would require a review of patriarchal biases that permeate its 
customs and institutions.162 Each and every state has the duty to arbitrate in the 
exploitation of women’s rights within its territory to end its collusion with the forces that 
commit such violations in other countries.163
 
  
The discussion in this chapter has, following on the previous chapter, discussed the 
limitations clause of the Constitution briefly, followed by a closer look at the practice of 
female genital mutilation through the lens of the Constitution. The conclusion that the 
practice constitutes a form of unfair discrimination against women on the grounds of 
equality, human dignity and freedom and security of the person, is echoed and 
supported by a brief overview of international human rights provisions relevant to 
women. Some of these instruments refer specifically to customary practices that are 
harmful to women, such as female genital mutilation.  
 
                                                 
161  Bunch C 492. 
162  Gordon A A Transforming capitalism and patriarchy (1996, Colorado: Lynne Rienner) at 173. See 
also Bunch 492. 
163  See in general, Berer M (ed) Women and AIDS: An international resource book (1993, London: 
Pandora Press); Mann J & Tarantola D (eds) AIDS in the world (1992, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press); Mariasy J Triple jeopardy: Women & AIDS (1990, London: Panos Publications). 
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On a more general level, the reality remains women are to a large extent still seen as 
the vector of HIV, with their sexuality as something that needs to be managed in order 
to curb the spread of HIV. The conceptualising of gender violence, reproductive 
autonomy and the impact of HIV/AIDS on women has still been left exclusively to men, 
in that men have often been left to formulate, explain and regulate violence against 
women and reproductive autonomy, resulting in the silencing of women’s experiences. 
Long-term success will be strengthened by a rights-based approach, based on the 
values of human rights and dignity and which also takes notice of the real lived 
experiences of women. 
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“Violence against women is the extreme form of inequality, and it is hard to think of an act against women 
that can be more damaging or enduring than sexual violence.” (Statement of UNICEF Representative 
Director, Ann M Vanemina, on International Women’s Day in Washington DC, 8th of March 2006). 
 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 CONCLUSION 
 
This  article explored the intersection between HIV/AIDS, gender inequality and gender 
violence, and more specifically, critically assessed some cultural practices and customs 
that contribute towards and exacerbate women’s subordination and inequality, which in 
the process increase women’s exposure to become infected with HIV. Relevant to this 
focus is inevitably an investigation of perceived threats to specific fundamental human 
rights as a result of some entrenched practices that continue to reinforce women’s 
subordinate position in society, aggravated by the high incidence of gender violence.  
 
One of the secondary objectives of this study was to deepen an understanding of the 
legal position and vulnerability of women with respect to their rights to equality, dignity, 
freedom of choice and freedom to be free from any form of violence. The nature of the 
issues selected for discussion inevitably points to matters related to the private (and 
personal) sphere. As the study has shown, the family is seen as the unit of male 
dominance, the location of male violence and hence the main site of women’s 
oppression. States have traditionally viewed women’s concerns as “private” instead of 
“public” matters, hence the historical reluctance to intervene in matters such as 
domestic violence. This study has attempted to emphasise the gendered context in 
which some women infected and affected by HIV find themselves. 
 
This study has illustrated that gender-based violence and social inequality in intimate 
relationships are key factors in the spreading of HIV/AIDS. Some of the general factors 
that influence the pattern of HIV/AIDS in South Africa are the general low status of 
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women in society and within relationships; women’s traditionally subordinate role in the 
family and limited personal resources in indigenous communities; general 
misinformation regarding and ignorance regarding HIV/AIDS; disrupted family and 
communal life due in part to apartheid, migrant labour patterns and high levels of 
poverty; and finally, a settled transport infrastructure and high mobility of persons, 
allowing for the rapid movement of the virus into new communities. 
 
There are several ways in which HIV/AIDS, violence and gender inequality may overlap 
in the context of women’s lives. Firstly, male violence may impede a woman’s ability to 
protect herself from HIV. Sexual violence increases a woman’s risk through non-
consensual sex, or by limiting her efforts or ability to convince her partner to wear a 
condom. Condom use in some instances is potentially more dangerous than even 
raising the issue of birth control, as condoms are widely associated with promiscuity, 
prostitution and disease in these cultures. A woman requesting her partner to use a 
condom may trigger a violent response. Hence, any HIV-prevention strategy that aims 
to get woman to “negotiate” condom use is doomed to fail, as it rests on the assumption 
of equity between the sexes that simply does not exist in both consensual and coercive 
relationships. 
 
In addition to the direct health harm posed by cultural practices that encourage 
concurrent sexual networks within a marriage (eg between multiple wives, the husband 
and other extra-marital sexual contacts of all the spouses permitted in terms of 
polygyny), the latter significantly amplifying the HIV transmission rate, other seemingly 
less harmful practices, for example those of “dry sex”, female genital mutilation, virginity 
testing, the levirate, also increase women’s vulnerability to HIV as the study has shown. 
Patriarchy, harmful stereotyping (which equates a woman’s worth with her reproductive 
capacity), women’s subordinate role in certain communities, and the compounding 
factor of gender violence, are all interrelating factors that increase women’s 
vulnerability. Women’s vulnerable position often compels them to continue with unsafe 
or harmful practices, simply because the social, economic and cultural costs of avoiding 
these risks may be too high. Women lacking economic resources may often resort to 
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prostitution or informal sexual relationships with several men in exchange for material 
goods or financial support. 
 
Some women, especially in rural areas, put up with the impact of most of the 
discriminatory cultural practices, especially within the context of the family or intimate 
relationships. In the present era of HIV/AIDS, the power imbalance between sexes in 
the cultural context carries a novel sense of urgency. Women have become especially 
susceptible to the disease as a result of their limited power in sexual encounters, 
despite the assurance of the right to reproductive autonomy enshrined in the 
Constitution. A critical examination of the rights to equality, dignity, education, access to 
health care services and freedom and security of the person sketched a clear picture of 
how skew the realisation of these rights in the lives of some women is. The right to 
education was specifically selected for discussion as education is one of the most 
important instruments through which not only HIV/AIDS may be addressed, but also the 
problem of gender violence. The study has referred to research that shows that young 
girls are the most affected by the lack of education: they are the ones staying at home 
to care for relatives who are suffering from AIDS; they are more likely to drop out of 
school early because of unplanned pregnancies; they are often forced into marriages at 
an early age; they are more vulnerable to contract HIV as a result of “dry sex” or female 
genital mutilation, etc. On the other hand, the study has also shown that HIV infection 
rates are significantly lower for women who completed secondary or tertiary levels of 
education, a result which is clearly the consequence of a proper education. 
 
A detailed analysis of the equality clause, as well as the limitation clause, was next 
presented as the backdrop against which one specific cultural practice, namely female 
genital mutilation, was subjected to constitutional scrutiny. The result of this exercise 
shows that the practice cannot be defended and in fact constitutes a form of unfair 
discrimination against women, apart from being a form of gender violence too. 
 
Although the right to belong to a cultural group is recognised in the Constitution, no 
such group may practice any customs which are inconsistent with the provisions of the 
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Bill of Rights. A fine balance must be struck between the recognition of cultural customs 
that contribute towards the sense of belonging of its relevant members, and those 
customs which are harmful or have a detrimental effect on the fundamental rights of 
women. Some of these customs are simply outdated, but are maintained without a 
critical consideration of its true impact. The fact that women themselves voluntarily 
submit to these customs is often cited in defence of the continuance of these customs, 
whereas it in fact testifies to their subordination in their communities. The vicious cycle 
of women’s inequality and lack of reproductive freedom often compels them to continue 
with these as they are often financially dependent on those who endorse it.  
 
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
HIV/AIDS flourishes more demonstrably in a society where women are vulnerable. 
Addressing women’s vulnerability is not a straightforward matter, however, as the 
factors contributing towards women’s vulnerability in respect of HIV/AIDS and gender 
violence, are often the result of deeply engrained social and cultural roles, stereotypes, 
superstition, ignorance, fear, poverty, to name but a few. 
 
• The first recommendation is that those customs that are harmful to women (most 
notably “dry sex” female genital mutilation) be eradicated. Traditional customary 
societies are not culturally inert but diverse, dynamic and are able to change after 
a certain period of time. Traditional cultural beliefs are as well neither monolithic 
nor static.1 In other words they may possibly be changed in reaction to varied 
social demands. People have the capacity to control their individual destiny even 
if their choices are restricted by the widespread common structure or culture. 
Cultural transformation can be an outcome from individuals being exposed to 
accept novel ideas.2
                                                 
1  Margaret L et al Sociology: Understanding a diverse society (2005, New York: Wadsworth 
Publishing) at 75. 
 In this regard, individuals who decide to accept innovative 
ideas, even if influenced by their personal concerns, can start a procedure of 
2  Ibwawoh B “Between culture and Constitution: Evaluating the cultural legitimacy of human rights in 
the African State” (2000) 22(3) Human Rights Quarterly 838-860 at 841. 
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transformation which may control overriding cultural traditions. The writer 
concedes that this may not be a simple task, as there is often fierce resistance to 
change deeply entrenched customs. Accompanied by sensitive briefing to 
relevant communities on the harm caused and how these practices are in conflict 
with constitutional values and norms may be a starting point. 
• It is convincingly clear that South Africa has enough laws that protect the rights of 
women. It is therefore out of line to stress the need of new laws to protect the 
vulnerable group of women whose human rights are being violated. However, 
there seems to be a huge lack of the implementation of the existing legal norms 
that protect women. This would require a strong enforcement of women’s rights 
by allowing physically powerful access to the courts for those women whose 
human rights have been violated. The role of education is crucial in this regard. 
Strong emphasis should be placed in the media (via NGO’s or politicians) on the 
extremely important role of a proper basic education for all, especially young 
girls. The problem of illiteracy should be seriously addressed, starting with a 
stronger governmental action and input into primary education, particularly in 
respect of remote rural areas where schools function haphazardly and frequently 
without proper teachers. Only through better education will the message of legal 
remedies to women subjected to violence and inequality become known. 
Poverty, however, remains a severe factor which compounds women’s position. 
This study has repeatedly illustrated how a range of factors interact in 
compounding the problem. Continuous poverty reinforces the vulnerability of 
women, as this often leads to a situation where everyone vies for himself or 
herself, where the strongest will prevail, again reinforcing women’s vulnerability. 
Crime flourishes, which in turn breeds increased dependence on kinship and 
patronage relations.3
• Legal action by most women against perpetrators who infringe on women’s 
human rights has its restrictions. Legal action against perpetrators who violate 
 
                                                 
3  Van Niekerk A “Moral and social complexities of AIDS in Africa” (2001) 27(2) Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy 143-162 at 156. 
 157 
women’s human rights is at the disposal of the economically privileged.4 Black 
rural women on the other hand hardly have the resources or the knowledge to 
bring their cases to the fore. Women living in traditional structures possess 
restricted capacity to involve themselves in social change litigation.5 There is 
presently a huge delay in the prosecution of cases involving violence against 
women. It is therefore suggested that more equality courts should be established 
in order to meet the demands of the pending cases. This will therefore also 
require the government to train and appoint new magistrates with relevant and 
appropriate equality expertise. A stipulated reasonable time frame for hearing 
cases should be set up which will allow all cases to be heard while they are still 
untainted and while evidence is still fresh.6
• Although outside the scope of this study, protecting the property rights and rights 
of access to land of women in customary law could also assist in addressing 
some of the imbalances and inequality. This reminds us of the customary law 
principle of primogeniture which still persists, despite its abrogation. 
 There is also presently a strong need 
to review the extent to which legislation has or has not appreciated and facilitated 
the concerns, preferences and guiding principles that apply to women, especially 
within the context of delayed justice. 
• What is ultimately required, are specific behavioural changes in respect of 
violence against women; HIV/ADS; and women’s reproductive autonomy. 
Behaviour is most effectively addressed through communication (mass media, 
peer education, and counselling) that focuses on factors that may reduce risks of 
HIV-infection (including information on customary practices that contribute 
towards women’s exposure to HIV and women’s inequality). 
• Involving and reaching out to small and remote communities in order to  
                                                 
4  Justice Mokgoro Y “Constitutional claims for gender equality: A judicial response” (2003) 67 Albany 
Law Review 565-574 at 573. 
5  Ntlama N “Equality: A tool for social change in promoting gender equality” Presentation at the Law 
Conference of the Law Society of the Northern Province entitled: The improvement of the quality of 
life, status, justice and constitutional development of women (1-2 August 2002). 
6  Mokgoro 573. 
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brief and inform women at grass-root level of their constitutional rights and how 
the Constitution is designed to protect their rights. It makes no sense to target the 
most vulnerable of these communities (women and young girls) without a proper 
understanding of the root causes of their vulnerability. This study has hence 
attempted to illustrate some of the causes of women’s vulnerability. 
• All of the above recommendations are not the task of the government alone. 
There are many non-governmental organisations, including a number of foreign 
interest groups that focus on the problem of HIV and AIDS locally. More success 
may be gained if these efforts are better coordinated and streamlined. 
• Rights that focus on harms sustained by women in particular need to be 
identified and developed by also bringing these rights discourse into the public 
sphere.7 It is fundamental that women’s voices find a public audience.8
 
 
In the final instance, the boundaries of human rights law must be redefined so that 
human rights law becomes able to incorporate an understanding of the world from the 
perspective of the socially subjugated.9 The first step forward in human rights law is to 
challenge the gendered dichotomy of both private and public worlds.10
                                                 
7  Cook R C “Human rights of women: National and international perspectives” (1994, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press) at 76. 
8  Cook at 76. 
9  Cook at 76 
10  Cook at 76. 
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